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A bstract
The unifying theme of this dissertation is the importance of inter­
mediate institutions for income distributions, inequality and intra- 
distributional mobility. First, we analyse the effects of informational 
problems in a general equilibrium model with dynamically evolv­
ing wealth distributions. Poor agents need to borrow funds but a 
non-commitment problem on the capital market leads to persistent 
inequality. The next important institution to be examined is the 
tax-benefit system. The third chapter investigates the relative per­
formance of alternative unemployment benefit regimes in a search- 
theoretic general equilibrium model of the labour market. Policy 
objectives such as the reduction in inequality or the alleviation of 
poverty are considered and the incentive problems are examined. 
Prior to the empirical analysis, the fourth chapter develops the large 
sample distribution of a number of inequality and mobility indices. 
Moreover, the relative performance of these (asymptotic) approxi­
mations and various bootstrap estimators is examined. The data 
is described in chapter five. The sixth chapter analyses the distri­
butional consequences of the German tax-benefit system using the 
German Socio-Economic Panel. Two dimensions income dynamics 
are investigated by distinguishing between shape dynamics and intra- 
distributional mobility. The complementarity between various tools 
such as non-parametric stochastic kernel density estimates and tran­
sition matrices is explored. As the transition probabilities are found 
to be time-varying, several statistical models of income mobility are
vin
estimated (and a new mover-stayer model is proposed) in the last 
chapter. In order to give an economic explanation of the observed 
mobility patterns various duration models (with duration dependent 
hazards and unobserved heterogeneity) are estimated.
IX
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation contributes to the explanation of income and wealth 
distributions, and their evolutions in time. It is obvious that no single 
universal explanation can be given for such a complex phenomenon. 
As Champernowne (1952) observes:
’’The forces determining the distribution of incomes 
in any community are so varied and complex, and inter­
act and fluctuate so continuously, that any theoretical 
model must either be unrealistically simplifled or hope­
lessly complicated. We shall choose the former alterna­
tive but then give indications that the introduction of 
some of the more obvious complications of the real world 
does not seem to disturb the general trend of our conclu­
sions.” (p.246)
X
In the same vein, Atkinson (1994), ” (s)eeking to explain the dis­
tribution of incomes” , emphasises time and again that the distribu­
tion of incomes amongst persons cannot be identified with the distri­
bution of factor incomes; distributional analysis needs to go beyond 
the latter. To illustrate this he singles out diverse and complex issues 
which need to be taken into account such as: differences (inhomo­
geneities) of incomes, human capital, diversity of income sources, in­
tervening institutions such as social insurance, income from abroad, 
and the influence of the state budget. In an attem pt to illustrate 
the many inter-relationships between them, he presents a diagram 
involving 25 arrows. Moreover, all these aspects are overlapping, 
complementary, and not mutually exclusive. They constitute eco­
nomic forces, unfolding in time, which lead, individually, to greater 
or lesser inequality. Given this complexity, particular aspects have 
to be singled out, and the chosen elements have to be examined in 
isolation.
However, the observation tha t the theory of personal income dis­
tribution extends beyond the scope of the theory of the distribution 
of factor incomes had already been made by Dalton (1920) in his 
inquiry into ’’Some aspects of the inequality of incomes in modern 
communities” . He wrote:
’’While studying economics at Cambridge in 1909-10,
1 became specially interested in those [parts] which set 
out to discuss the distribution of income. 1 gradually no­
ticed, however, that most ‘theories of distribution‘ were
x i
almost wholly concerned with distribution between ‘fac­
tors of production‘. Distribution as between persons, a 
problem of more direct and obvious interest, was either 
left out of the textbooks altogether, or treated so briefly, 
as to suggest that it raised no question, which could not 
be answered either by generalisations about the factors 
of production, or by plodding statistical investigations, 
which professors of economics were content to leave to 
lesser men.” (p. vii)^
Before summarising the thesis in detail, it is perhaps useful to 
describe the intellectual space spanned by its eight chapters. This 
dissertation focuses on the importance of intermediate or ” interven­
ing institutions” (Atkinson (1994)) for the distributional outcome. 
Such intermediate institutions are many, and the dissertation singles 
out just two of them. First, chapter 2 analyses the distributional 
consequences of informational problems in a dynamic general equi­
librium model in which the capital market is modelled explicitly. 
The behaviour of financial intermediaries confronted by such prob­
lems turns out to be a powerful mechanism for making inequality 
^The last sentence is reminiscent of William Playfair’s observation made in 
the Statistical Breviary (1801): ”.. there is no study less alluring or more dry and 
tedious than statistics, unless the mind and the imagination are set to work or 
that the person is particularly interested in the subject; which is seldom the case 
with young men in any rank in Ufe.” However, by applying our statistical tools in 
the empirical chapters of this dissertation we hope to set mind and imagination 
to work and tell interesting and important stories about income dynamics.
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persistent. A quite different type of intermediate institution is the 
tax-benefit system^. It is an institution which is particularly promi­
nent in developed economies since public transfers constitute, after 
earnings, the second most important component of income. Chap­
ter 3 examines the performance of alternative benefit systems in a 
search-theoretic general equilibrium model of the labour market. The 
relative performance of fiat-rate and earnings-related unemployment 
benefits is assessed in the light of policy objectives such as the reduc­
tion of inequality or the alleviation of poverty. Although the point 
of departure of this chapter is an empirical observation, the analysis 
is conducted entirely in the context of a theoretical model.
By contrast, chapters 5 to 8 present an essentially empirical 
analysis for ’’plodding statistical investigations” is an integral part 
of distributional analysis (and one approach pursued here is plotting 
non-par ametric estimates of the income distribution). After all, one 
of the principal concerns of distributional analysis is the question 
‘W hat does the distribution look like?’ spawning other questions 
such as ‘Has its shape changed? ‘ and ‘How many modes are there 
and where are they? ‘ In these chapters the distributional conse­
quences of the German tax-benefit system are examined. At first, 
the focus of chapter 6 is one particular year. Chapters 7 and 8, 
however, analyse the dynamics of the post-tax post-benefit income
^As Atkinson (1996) observes: ’’The gross incomes generated by production 
are typically modified by taxation, used to finance public spending, including 
transfers which constitute [another] source of personal incomes.”
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distribution. The use of a panel dataset is especially powerful in this 
context since one can go beyond the analysis of moving cross-sections 
and investigate the other dimension of income dynamics. Chapter 
7 divides the analysis of income dynamics into its two constituent 
components by distinguishing between the shape dynamics and intra- 
distributional mobility. Whilst chapters 6 and 7 are exploratory and 
discuss the merits of various analytical tools, chapter 8 attem pts to 
explain the observed income dynamics. First, the non-stationarity 
of the data is analysed and various statistical models are estimated. 
Then the focus is one important income state - poverty - instead 
of the entire transition matrix. Questions addressed are about the 
incidence and duration of poverty, and the extent to which the tax- 
benefit system succeeds or fails in alleviating poverty.
Despite its conceptual unity, this dissertation is organised as a 
collection of essays, which are grouped into three parts. In Part I, 
the above issues are analysed in a theoretical fashion as the analysis 
is conducted in the context of specific models. Part II develops sta­
tistical tools and collects results about some statistical aspects of dis­
tributional analysis, such as the asymptotic distributions of certain 
inequality and mobility indices. Various useful statistical techniques 
are described and discussed, such as kernel density estimation, boot­
strapping, and tests for multi-modality. These statistical tools are 
then applied in the empirical chapters of Part III, in which a panel 
dataset, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), is employed.
XIV
A more detailed outline of the issues tackled in the separate chap­
ters is as follows.
1.1 Part I -Chapter 2: The evolution
of wealth distributions and the eco­
nomics of information
In this chapter we examine the distributional consequences of infor­
mational problems in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium 
model in which capital markets are modelled explicitly. It turns 
out that the economics of information give rise to powerful mecha­
nisms which lead to persistent inequality. This model thus isolates a 
new economic channel because standard models, which invoke per­
fect markets, typically predict the vanishing of inequality. Far from 
converging to a mass point, the distributional outcome is a nonde­
generate distribution.
In order to concentrate on this new economic channel, agents are 
assumed to be identical except for their inherited wealth. They can 
be productive only if they undertake a project. However, any project 
is costly and requires the payment of an indivisible admission fee or 
initial factor outlay. Agents who cannot afford this try to borrow on 
the capital market. Banks offer a financial contract which specifies an 
interest rate and a collateral. An incentive problem emerges from the 
incompleteness of the financial contract: borrowers cannot commit
XV
not to undertake a risky activity (which has a lower expected return 
for banks). But banks can indirectly control the type of project 
undertaken by appropriate contract design. We analyse the static 
equilibrium of the model and trace the dynamic consequence of this 
informational problem.
1.2 Chapter 3: On the performance of 
social benefit system s
The motivation for this chapter is the observation that social in­
surance is an important institution which ‘stands between’ the dis­
tribution of factor incomes and the final empirical (post-tax post­
benefit) distribution of disposable incomes (recall Atkinson’s obser­
vation cited in footnote 2). It is a prominent institution in developed 
economies, designed to protect economic agents against income risk. 
The form of social insurance schemes found in practice varies con­
siderably: unemployment benefit in the UK is a flat rate, whereas 
it is earnings related on the Continent and the US; the replace­
ment rates and the methods of finance differ. This chapter analyses 
the performance of alternative unemployment benefit systems in a 
search-theoretic framework. The relative performance of fiat-rate 
and earnings-related unemployment benefits will be assessed in the 
light of policy objectives such as the reduction in inequality and 
the alleviation of poverty. However, these policy objectives may not
XVI
command a universal consensus because of either a diversity of opin­
ion or an intrinsic arbitrariness in the parameters characterising the 
social welfare function. So we might ask whether the ranking of the 
benefit regimes depends on the parameters of the social objective; 
although people may disagree about parameters, could they agree 
on a ranking ?
There is also a potential trade-off between the equity objective 
of poverty alleviation and the efficiency consideration of work incen­
tives. A greater benefit might increase the income of an unemployed 
beneficiary and thereby reduce the difference between his income 
and the poverty line. For a person who remains in poverty, this in­
crease reduces his poverty. But an increase in benefits reduces the 
incentives to work (particularly for those persons with a current low 
job productivity). Consequently, unemployment might rise, possi­
bly increasing the numbers of the poor, raising aggregate poverty. 
This potential trade-off is examined in a general equilibrium setting. 
Again, does the resolution of this trade-off depend on the parame­
ters of the social objective, or is it unambiguous for all admissible 
parameters ?
xv ii
1.3 Part II - Chapter 4: The statistical 
analysis of inequality and m obility 
indices
This chapter constitutes the second part of the dissertation. By fo­
cusing exclusively on the (often neglected) statistical problems in dis­
tributional analysis we establish an indispensable statistical frame­
work to which the subsequent empirical investigations have recourse 
in order to make statistically rigorous statements.
We summarise results on the asymptotic distributions of standard 
inequality measures and derive a framework for drawing inferences. 
A novel result is the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the 
Shorrock (1978) mobility index.
Instead of using the (Gaussian) approximations, an alternative 
approach is to bootstrap the test statistics. It is thus natural to in­
vestigate the relative performance of these two techniques for sample 
sizes typically encountered in empirical work. The approach pursued 
here is to compare the lengths of the various confidence intervals. 
Finally the robustness properties of the inequality indices are exam­
ined.
X V lll
1.4 Part III - Chapter 5: The panel dataset 
GSOEP described
This chapter describes the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
used in the subsequent empirical part of the dissertation.
These later chapters seek to assess the welfare properties of the 
income distribution and the distributional consequences of the Ger­
man tax-benefit system. To this end, data on disposable income 
-the best monetary measure of well-being- is needed. Unfortunately, 
GSOEP is most user-unfriendly in this respect, since no reliable raw 
data on net income is supplied. However, there is an extensive sup­
ply of information on income sources and pre-tax incomes. There is 
no alternative but to estimate post-tax post-benefit income through 
a tax-benefit simulation. This task is equally unglororius but equally 
essential as of Johnson (1755)’s compiler of dictionaries about whom 
he observed:
” It is the fate of those who dwell at the lower employ­
ments of life, to be rather driven by the fear of evil, than 
attracted by the prospects of good; to be exposed to cen­
sure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by miscar­
riage, or punished for neglect, where success would have 
been without applause, and diligence without rewards.
Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictio­
naries.”
XIX
Compilers of dictionaries and datasets appear to share a similar 
fate.
This chapter discusses various data issues, income definitions, and 
the tax-benefit simulations. Since one aim of the empirical investi­
gation is to make inferences about the (West German) population, 
the issue of representativeness of the sample (sample selection and 
weighting procedures) is discussed.
1.5 Chapter 6 : Incom e distribution and 
inequality in Germany
The focus of this empirical chapter is the German tax-benefit system 
and its distributional consequences. Defering the analysis of income 
dynamics to subsequent chapters, only the 1991 cross-section taken 
from GSOEP is examined in detail.
In the second part of this chapter we examine the anatomy of that 
income inequality which remains after the tax-benefit system has 
modified the distribution. To what extent do personal characteristics 
influence the shape of the resulting distribution ? Decomposition 
analyses show that the overall distribution of post-tax post-benefit 
income is a mixture of various underlying distributions. The low 
income groups are particularly dominated by foreign nationals, a 
sizeable group of the elderly, and those out of work.
These issues are addressed using two complementary approaches.
XX
In the first step, in order to assess the welfare properties of the 
income distribution and to make statistical inferences, conventional 
tools such as inequality indices and Lorenz curves are applied. For 
instance, we show that the net income distribution Lorenz dominates 
(statistically significantly) the gross income distribution.
In the second step, the non-par ametric technique of kernel den­
sity estimation is employed. The shape of the income distribution 
is thus captured directly, instead being infered indirectly from a set 
of estimated shape parameters of a parametric model or some other 
summary statistics. We examine ‘graphical features of particular in­
terest (not only by inspection but also using statistical procedures) 
such as the number and the location of the modes of the distribution. 
Although this technique has its own problems, it avoids some heroic 
distributional assumptions of parametric methods, and is a natural 
tool for an exploratory analysis driven by the question ‘W hat does 
the income distribution look like? ‘. By contrast, parametric mod­
els are often Procustian beds - crude approximations to real world 
distributions; by abstracting from their detailedness, they often fail 
to detect informative features such as emerging second modes which 
might announce a process of income polarisation. Interestingly, in 
chapter 7 we detect an emerging second mode about the lower income 
group.
XXI
1.6 Chapter 7 : Income dyncimics in Ger­
many
The study of income dynamics can be divided into the distinct tasks 
of examining the shape dynamics of the income distribution, and in­
vestigating intra-distributional mobility. The latter aspect is an often 
neglected dimension of welfare but of particular importance, since it 
measures the inequality of opportunities, and, according to some 
commentators, the fairness of the economic system. An unchanging 
shape of the income distribution may be consistent with polar oppo­
sites such as a perfect replication of income positions or their permu­
tation -alternatives amongst which a purely cross-sectional analysis 
cannot discriminate.
The other point of departure of this chapter is the observation 
that income mobility in Germany is often regarded to be low. Such 
a prejudice rests on the assumption that the labour market is seg­
mented, inflexible and immobile; since earnings constitute the main 
source of income for the majority of the population, incomes should 
behave similarly. Moreover, the entire structure of the German wel­
fare state is built on the premiss of stability - stable jobs and a 
consequent low income mobility. But is such conventional wisdom 
supported?
The shape dynamics are analysed in this paper by two means. 
The income distributions are estimated directly using (univariate) 
kernel density methods and inequality indices are computed in order
x x i i
to assess their welfare properties. The analysis of the moving cross- 
section reveals that income inequality has not (statistically) signif­
icantly changed although the sample statistics appeared to suggest 
an unambiguous increase in inequality as the Lorenz curves shifted 
out. The density estimates for 1990 and 1991 are unimodal, but in 
1992 a second mode emerges in the low income group.
In order to analyse the issue of intra-distributional mobility, two 
complementary methods are employed. Bivariate kernel density es­
timates map income transitions at the lowest level of aggregation. 
But although they constitute a powerful device, they do not permit 
a rigorous statistical analysis. This is achieved when information is 
aggregated in transition matrices.
We find that the bivariate density estimates are unimodal. A 
person’s income position is persistent because both contour plots of 
bivariate kernel density estimates and transition matrices concen­
trate most mass along the main diagonal. On the other hand 75% of 
the population experienced income changes in excess of 5% - a fact 
which is in stark contrast to the popular prejudice of German in­
come immobility. As regards the structure of the transition matrices, 
they are neither symmetric nor identical as transition probabilities 
vary with time. This non-stationarity is reaffirmed by computing 
three popular mobility indices, which suggests that mobility has un­
ambiguously fallen. The useful complementarity between transition 
matrices and stochastic kernel density estimates are explored, since 
the latter do not impose arbitrary groupings of information. The
x x m
contourplots of the latter show the complexity of the income process 
as different income groups are affected differently; at this level ag­
gregation, there is no universal trend such as a greater concentration 
about the 45 degree line.
1.7 Chapter 8 : On the non-stationarity  
of German income m obility (and some 
observations about poverty)
Chapters 6 and 7 are essentially exploratory in that they discuss the 
application of various analytical toos for describing income distrib­
ution. The next step is to build on these results and to estimate 
some relevant models in an attem pt to explain the observed income 
dynamics. The point of departure is the conclusion derived in the 
chapter 7, viz. that income transition probabilities vary with time.
Although the shape of the distribution is remarkably stable in 
the period 1983 to 1989, mobility has consistently fallen. GSOEP is 
used in this chapter to test several models which might explain these 
stylised facts. We proceed in two stages. In the first descriptive and 
statistical stage we seek a more thorough description of the mobil­
ity process. To this end several pure and mixed Markov chains are 
estimated, and a novel mover-stayer model is proposed which per­
mits time-varying transition probabilities. We show that the process 
governing income dynamics and intra-distributional mobility are rich
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and complicated because transition probabilities vary with time and 
the process exhibits a memory which extends beyond one period.
In the next stage, the strategy is to concentrate on one impor­
tant income state instead of the entire transition matrix and the 
chosen income state is poverty. In order to give an economic expla­
nation of the observed transition probabilities, a Markov model with 
explanatory variables and several duration models (with duration 
dependent hazards and unobservable heterogeneity) are estimated. 
The message of the poverty models, be they set in discrete or con­
tinuous time, is similar: unemployment is the principal determinant 
of poverty. Moreover, duration dependence is negative for the long­
term poor: the longer the poverty spell, the less likely is the person 
to escape it. Contrary to results for the US, the household formation 
process is only of minor importance.
XXV

Chapter 2 
The evolution of w ealth  
distributions and the  
econom ics of inform ation
Abstract:
In this chapter we examine the distributional consequences of 
informational problems. These are analysed in the context of a dy­
namic general equilibrium model in which capital markets are mod­
elled explicitly. The economics of information gives rise to powerful 
mechanisms which lead to persistent inequality. A new economic 
channel is isolated in this model because standard models, which 
invoke perfect markets, typically predict the vanishing of inequality. 
Far from converging to a mass point, the distributional outcome is 
a nondegenerate distribution.
2.1 Introduction
Economic models based on perfect markets typically predict that ini­
tial wealth or income inequalities vanish. However, the assumptions 
required for such a convergence result are very restrictive. These are 
relaxed in this chapter as we analyse the distributional consequences 
of informational problems. Can the economics of information give 
rise to mechanisms which lead to persistent inequalities ? This ques­
tion is analysed in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium 
model in which capital markets are modelled explicitly.
In order to concentrate on this new economic channel, agents are 
assumed to be identical except for their inherited wealth. They can 
be productive only if they undertake a project. However, any project 
is costly and requires the payment of an indivisible admission fee or 
initial factor outlay. Agents who cannot afford this try to borrow on 
the capital market. Banks offer a financial contract which specifies an 
interest rate and a collateral. An incentive problem emerges from the 
incompleteness of the financial contract: borrowers cannot commit 
not to undertake a risky activity (which has a lower expected return 
for banks). But banks can indirectly control the type of project 
undertaken by appropriate contract design. We analyse the static 
equilibrium of the model and trace the dynamic consequence of this 
informational problem.
The plan is as follows: the related literature is reviewed in sec­
tion 2 .1 .2  and a discrete and partial equilibrium model due to Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1987) is discussed in section 2.2 . Section 2.3 presents the 
general equilibrium model, the mechanism design problem and char­
acterises its static equilibrium. It builds on the revealed preference 
argument of section 2 .2  and demonstrates carefully the dependence 
of the market equilibrium on the attitude towards risk. Specifically, 
the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion is examined in section 
2.3.1. A continuum of separating contracts emerges in equilibrium. 
A simulation study is presented in section 2.3.2 which illustrates 
the previous analysis, and supports various comparative statics ex­
ercises. Moreover, a tentative welfare analysis is conducted. Section 
2.3.3 briefly considers the case of constant absolute risk aversion. The 
analysis is rendered dynamic in section 2.4. Section 2.4.1 examines 
the manner in which the dynamics depend on the model’s parame­
ters and initial conditions. A well behaved case emerges for which 
the dynamics lead to an ergodic distribution. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 .1  T h e p rob lem  in  co n tex t
The subject of the dynamic analysis presented here, i.e. a model of 
dynamically evolving wealth distributions, is not a new one, having 
originated in the dynamic models of Champernowne (1973). He 
builds a finite-state discrete and irreducible Markov chain, a model 
which he later extends to infinite transition matrices, and shows that.
given the chosen structure of the transition matrix P, the process 
converges to a unique stationary distribution irrespective of initial 
conditions. The latter can be derived analytically as the rescaled 
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the stochastic 
matrix P , viz. 1, and P  is chosen to be very well behaved. However, 
he does not attem pt to support his model of distribution with a 
detailed economic model underpinning the transition equations.
Stiglitz (1969) re-interprets the Solow growth model, similar coun­
tries become similar individuals, and shows that in perfect and com­
plete markets the wealth distribution degenerates to a single mass 
point. However, this exceedingly strong result is qualified by con­
sidering disequalising forces, generated by different bequests behav­
iours, such as primogeniture, or a heterogeneous labour force.
Loury (1981) considers a human capital model and deduces the 
inequality of incomes from the inequality of abilities. Technically, he 
abandons a discrete modelling and formulates a model with a con­
tinuous state space in which the general theory of Markov operators 
is used.
The next generation of models is based on the economics of in­
formation. Galor and Zeira (1993) obtain a two point limiting dis­
tribution by introducing monitoring costs which lead to a difference 
between borrowing and lending interest rates. Individuals, endowed 
with insufficient wealth, have to borrow in order to acquire the costly 
human capital necessary for entering the high earnings sector in a 
dualistic labour market. Poor agents, however, refrain from borrow-
ing, because the borrowing rates are too high to make this worth 
their while.
Banerjee and Newman (1991), followed by Aghion and Bolton 
(1995) and Piketty (1992) also introduce the economics of informa­
tion into the analysis. Using this framework they motivate capital 
market imperfections, after noting the extreme assumptions in the 
previous models of either perfect (capital and insurance) markets or 
absent markets. This, in conjunction with a non-convexity, is shown 
to establish a non-degenerate wealth distribution. Inequality of out­
come is motivated by either the inequality of opportunities when the 
non-convexity represents an initial factor outlay, or in the presence 
of an incentive compatibility constraint. The former paper exploits 
the classic moral hazard problem of unobservable effort supply, and 
yields the associated incentive problem for the borrowing entrepre­
neur: he undersupplies effort because he has to share the marginal 
returns from effort with lenders. Piketty (1992) uses the same idea 
but now entrepreneurs sell their projects to insurance firms. In these 
models perfect insurance is not incentive compatible for it would then 
be a dominant strategy for the agent to supply no effort -insurance 
is only partial.
The present chapter is closely related to this new literature on 
credit market imperfections and on wealth distributions. It extends 
and generalises the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1987), summarised 
below in section 2 .1 , but employs it for an analysis of evolving wealth 
distributions. Compared to the papers surveyed above, this chapter
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enlarges the strategy space of banks and thereby introduces collateral 
considerations into the analysis. It is believed tha t collateral plays an 
important role in financial contracting. Yet, most models assume this 
issue away. The modelled capital market imperfection is therefore 
different from the above. The current model is structurally akin to 
the continuous time model of Banerjee and Newman (1993), because 
collateral plays an im portant role on an imperfect capital market 
with risk neutral agents. Depending on one’s initial wealth and the 
endogenously determined wage rate, agents are subsisting, working, 
self-employed or employing. Another similarity is that because of 
this endogeneity, the transitions of the underlying Markov process 
are not stationary. They show that the long-run equilibrium depends 
on initial conditions.
A non-convexity must be present in order to establish different 
investment opportunities, be it a technological one such as an initial 
factor outlay, or be it one introduced by an incentive compatibility 
constraint as in Piketty (1992). In this chapter, the former is chosen 
Also, the agents’ attitudes towards risk receive explicit attention.
^As in (Ferreira 1995), we will establish a three-class equihbrium in which 
agents either are poor, belong to the middle class, or are rich. However, he 
proposes a partial equihbrium model based on a different mechanism. Two tech­
nological non-convexities are present which give rise to two threshold effects, the 
capital market imperfection arises from a default risk by successful entrepreneurs, 
borrowers have to put up a collateral but interest rates are fixed exogenously. 
Both private and public capital enter the production function, and, in the ab­
sence of a budget constraint, he shows that an increase in the provision of public
t t+1
______________________________________________ ..time
born undertake state of natureconsume 
receive project revealed produce off-sprinç 
bequests of type bequeatti
(safe) or (risky) die
Figure 2.1: The chronology of events 
Finally, numerical simulations supplement the analytical results.
2.2 The static partial equilibrium model
Agents, and Projects
The economy is composed of a continuum of risk-averse agents, 
who are identical except for their inherited wealth. Time is discrete, 
they live for one period only, and one agent gives rise to one child, 
so that the population is stationary. The major events in the history 
of an agent are summarised by Figure 2.1.
Preferences take the form of a standard expected utility func­
tion. The cardinal utility function, defined over consumption 9 and
capital has an equalising effect on the wealth distribution.
bequests b, takes the form of a concavely transformed Cobb-Douglas 
function:
u(0 , fc) =  yj (2 .1 )
where 7  =  ce~°‘l3~  ^{a +  (3)°'*' is a normalising factor, a,(3 € [0; 1), 
and (/? is a concave transformation function. At present, the transfor­
mation if remains unspecified in order to capture different assump­
tions about risk aversion.
The indirect utility function is:
U {Y)=u(e '{Y) ,b '{Y))  = <p[Y“+i^ ]
as maximising the objective function u{6] b) subject to the bud­
get constraint 6 b < Y  entails the first order condition 6* = 
( a /  {a + P)) Y  and b* = {p/ {a + P)) Y.  Of course, U is strictly 
concave with U' > 0 and U” < 0. For analytical simplicity let 
a + P = 1 . The Cobb-Douglas specification gives rise to a mech­
anistic link between income and bequests as the optimal bequests 
are linear in realised income Y . Other specifications are conceivable, 
since, of course, people can live without bequests. However, it is 
then reasonable to assume that bequests decline in income, worsen­
ing the distribution. The Cobb-Douglas form is chosen to facilitate 
the analysis.
In order to gain access to an investment opportunity, the agent 
has to pay an indivisible admission fee, or initial factor outlay of c. 
The agent may then choose whether or not to participate and then
9
project type safe risky property
success probability 
return
p{safe)
Risafe)
p{risky)
J^ irisky)
pisafe) ^  pirisky)
J^ {safe) ^  j {^risky)
p{safe) j^{safe) ^  p{risky) j {^risky)
Table 2.1: projects characteristics
between two projects, which differ in terms of their risk and associ­
ated pay-off. A failed project pays no return. The safe project safe  
succeeds with probability , realising a return . The risky
project is described by but the expected return on
the safe project is higher > pirtsky) j {^rtsky) (although
(^r-îsfcy) ^  Au agout, who iuvests his own funds will there­
fore always choose the safe project. A borrower, on the other hand, 
will discount the cost of fimds to reflect the probability of bank­
ruptcy. Note that the inequality governing the expected pay-offs is 
reversed in most models. Table 2.1 collects this information.
Banks, financial contracts, and pay-offs
Banks are competitive, or there is a competitive mutual fund 
coordinating lending and borrowing. If the funds of an agent -his 
wealth is denoted by IT- are insufficient to gain admission to the 
investment opportunity he turns to the credit market for finance. 
Banks have complete knowledge about the type of the loan applicant, 
so that adverse selection problems are absent.
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The financial contract consists of an interest rate r  and a collat­
eral requirement C : (r, C). But, as shown below, banks condition 
r on C, yielding a schedule r{C). For the sake of computational 
simplicity, attention is confined to standardised contracts, in which 
borrowers receive a loan of size c, instead of (c — In the latter 
case, the rate of return would also depend on the size of the loan 
made.
Possibly different contracts are offered. An agent, who cannot 
meet these terms is denied credit. If the project fails, the agent 
forfeits his collateral. Consequently the expected return to the bank 
from a project of type i G {risky ^ safe}  is tt =
In addition, the agents lends excess funds at the deterministic but 
endogenously determined lending rate p on the credit market because 
the opportunity costs of lending excess funds is zero.
Let I  G {0,1} be an indicator of the state of nature: T ’ if the 
project is successful, ’0’ if it failed. The agent then receives the 
following incomes from a project of type i.
If he borrows, invests in project of type i, and succeeds, he obtains
= W  + -  c(l +  r{W))
but if he fails, he forfeits his collateral, and the remaining income 
is independent of the chosen project
similar contract is discussed in Banerjee and Newman (1993) in which 
"someone with wealth level w <  I  who wants to become self-employed therefore 
uses w as collateral and needs to borrow 7” (p.281)
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yg(*) = w-c.
If the collateral requirement C does not equal the agent’s wealth 
VK, the borrower cannot be made fully liable for a failed project - 
there is some wealth which is inalienable and cannot be collateralised. 
W  > C  represents thus a limited liability constraint.
If the agent is only a lender
y  =  iy ( i  +  p)
Finally, if he is sufficiently rich,IF > c, and would like to undertake 
the project, he invests in it but lends the excess funds:
y /') =  + { w -  c ) ( l  +  p) yo<‘> = { W ~  c ) ( l  +  p)
Otherwise his participation constraint is violated and he solely lends. 
Table 2.2 collects the information about pay-offs.
If the agent undertakes a project of type i, his expected util­
ity is EU = +  (1 — defining quasi-concave
indifference curves for borrowers in (r, C)-space, because
i i - p W [ / ' ( y W )
is negative and the sign of (Pr/dC‘^ depends on the attitude towards 
risk. The latter can be seen by taking logarithms of the last term 
and differentiating, as the sign of the resulting expression depends 
on the difference of the ratios G {0 , 1 }.
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type state of nature
success failure
poor and lend only Y^ = W {l  + p) Yo = W ( l  + p)
borrow and 
undertake project i
yW = w  + iJ(')
—c(l -f r{W))
Yo = W - C
undertake safe project and 
lend excess funds - ( W - c ) ( l - H p )
Y^ = { W - c ) ( \  + p)
Table 2.2: the pay-off structure
A convenient diagrammatic tool for the subsequent analysis of 
the incentive problem is the switch line introduced in Stiglitz and 
Weiss(1987), which is an incentive compatibility constraint. It is the 
locus of contracts which renders the agent with wealth W  indiffer­
ent between undertaking the safe or the risky project. Above it, he 
undertakes the risky activity, below it the safe one is undertaken. 
Consequently, a change in the choice of project takes place. As re­
gards the indifference curve defined by (2 .2 ), this translates into a 
discrete and reinforcing change of the probability ratio (1  — 
and of the ratio U' /U' {Yi^). The indifference curve above the 
switch line is steeper than below it, reflecting the higher failure prob­
ability. The utility contours are, therefore, of a winged shape, and 
not concave. In (r, C)-space, the switch line is upward sloping :
dr _  ^pisafe) _p{risky)^jjfÇ^^^
dC p ( a o / e ) [ / / ( y ^ W G ) )  _  p(risky) j j /çy i '^ is ’^ y)^
since and > U ' . A utility contour
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SL
risky
safe
Figure 2 .2 : The agent’s utility contour and the switch line (SL). 
Above SL, the agent chooses the risky project, below it the agent is 
better off choosing the safe project.
and the switch line is depicted in Figure 2.2.
2.2.1 T he incentive problem  in a partial equilib­
rium  m odel
The model developed so far is rich enough to bring out the main 
incentive problem, and is discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss (1987). 
There are just two discrete groups of agents, a middle class and the 
poor who may offer a collateral of at most Cpoor and Crich- Stiglitz 
and Weiss stipulate preferences, which exhibit decreasing absolute
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risk aversion (DARA), so that for a given contract, richer borrowers 
would choose riskier projects. The switch line SL of the richer SL(R), 
then, lies below the switch line of the poor SL(P) (Figure 2.3) whilst 
the indifference curves of the rich are shallower than those of the 
poor. (A mean-utility preserving change for the rich, representing a 
point on the switch line, makes a more risk averse person, i.e. the 
poorer borrower, worse off. He will then choose the safer project.) 
Figure 2.3 depicts these properties (an iso-profit line -a locus of equal 
profits- for banks has been added).
The incentive problem in this model arises from the inability of 
loan applicants to commit to undertaking a project of a particular 
type. If faced with a contract above his switch line, banks know that 
the borrower maximises expected utility by choosing a risky project. 
But this risky project yields a lower expected return to the bank. 
As a consequence, banks will offer contracts along the switch line 
- borrowing rates are sticky. (In equilibrium, a contract cannot lie 
below the agents’ switch line because banks can raise their expected 
returns by raising the interest rate whilst being certain that the agent 
still undertakes the safe project.)
Observe also that since Cpoor < Crich the two groups can easily 
be separated by demanding a sufficiently large collateral C, which 
cannot be offered by the poor, Cpoor < C < Crich-
Given the conjunction of this incentive problem and the fact that 
the poor have relatively limited collateral, credit rationing may oc­
cur in various forms, depending upon the configuration of preferences
15
Poor
Rich
SL(P)
iso -profit
line
SL(R)
Figure 2.3; With DARA, the indifference curves of the rich are shal­
lower than those of the poor, and the switch line of the rich SL(R) 
lies below the switch line of the poor.
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and the supply of credit. At the maximum feasible collateral (of the 
poor) there may be a persistent excess demand for credit. The inter­
est rate will not move to eliminate excess demand, for such a Wal­
rasian elimination cannot characterise an equilibrium as the returns 
to banks would fall. This market shares its generic characteristics 
with all markets, in which ’quality depends upon price’. As Stiglitz 
(1987) observes:
”In each of these cases, the story is the same: Because quality 
(... bankruptcy probability) changes as the price (... interest rate) 
changes, excess supply or demand may persist without any tendency 
for price .. to move to correct the market imbalance” [p.7].
Figure 2.4, depicts a situation in which the poor are credit con­
strained. Although they are the most keen on undertaking a project, 
they are the most likely to be denied credit. Implicit in this revealed 
preference argument is the assumptions that it is more profitable to 
lend to the rich^ but such a situation is associated with excess supply 
of credit. The forces of competition drive down the returns along the 
switch line until all available loanable funds have been allocated. In 
equilibrium, the two contracts F  and E  must pay the same expected 
return to banks, for otherwise funds would be re-allocated, and the 
two groups consistently undertake the safe activity.
^This is an assumption since, in general, collateral C  is higher for the rich but 
the borrowing rate r may be lower. If lending to the rich is not more profitable 
than lending to the poor, other rationing configurations become possible; cf. 
Stightz and Weiss (1987).
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utility
SL(P)
rich(& risky)
SL(R)
Cpoor Crich
Figure 2.4: Depiction of a separating contract. The poor are offered 
contract F and the rich obtain E. Both contracts yield the same 
expected returns to banks. The interest rate will not change to 
eliminate excess demand.
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2.3 The general equilibrium model
Let US build on the insights of the two-class partial equilibrium model 
to see the implications for a model with a general distribution of 
wealth. Let Ft{w) denote the proportion of the population at time t 
with wealth less than w. In the next section we examine the evolu­
tion of this distribution, but for the current static analysis the time 
index has been dropped. For now assume tha t the initial distribu­
tion is, for analytical convenience, well behaved, viz. integrable and 
piecewise continuous everywhere on its support. Let the support 
be bounded on [0 ,w)]. Attitudes towards risk have an important ef­
fect on decisions taken by agents, and we analyse two cases. Since 
this section generalises the Stiglitz and Weiss model, we first give 
an extensive analysis of the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
considered by them. The case of constant absolute risk aversion is 
examined next in order to investigate to what extent other forms of 
risk aversion change the analysis.
2.3 .1  D ecrea sin g  ab so lu te  risk  aversion  (D A R A )
Logarithmic preferences such as f/(c, 6 ) =  ln{7 ^"6 ^~“ -t- 1}, exhibit 
DARA because d{—U''/U'}/dY < 0. Richer borrowers are willing 
to undertake riskier projects.
The model of the previous section is now generalised by letting 
the size of the collateral Ci of person i vary with his wealth Wi sub­
ject to a limited liability constraint C* < 6Wi, where 0  < 6  < 1 is
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an exogenous parameter which determines the limitation of the de­
faulting borrower’s liability. In fact, let banks demand the maximum 
collateral Q  =  whilst the second instrument -the interest rate- 
is set to make the contract incentive compatible: undertaking the 
safe project must give the borrower a greater expected utility than 
can be gained from undertaking the risky activity EU safe >  EU risky 
When met with equality, this constraint yields a solution function 
f{W^ 7/), being the highest interest rate for a given collateral 6W  and 
model parameters 77 that a bank can charge, which ensures that the 
borrower still undertakes the safe project:
_  p{risky)-<j in{(i - S ) W  + 1} (2.3)
=  +  +  +
_ p ^ n ! ,k y )  ^  f i l r i s k y )  _  +  +  1 }
As a closed form solution cannot be obtained^, the constraint 
will be computed numerically in the simulation study^. Despite this,
“^ This problem persists for the entire class of utility functions U{Y)  — 
(1/ (1 — a)) . The logarithmic specification is just its limit when a  a tends
to 1
^Despite this, some analytical discussion is possible. Take the general case 
of a concave utility function U. To derive the slope of the incentive con­
straint (2.3), differentiation yields the equation — ^2 )dW =  Picdr where
=  p { s a f e ) j j / Ç y { s a f e ) ^ _ ^ ( ^ r i s k y ) j j f ^ Y { r i s k y ) ^  >  0 and ^2 =  (pW=)-p(^"^%/))(l_
6)U'{Yq) > 0 . As the liability of the borrower becomes greater, banks extract 
a larger collateral for a given wealth level, and in the hmit  ^ |  1 and p2 i  0.
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the effects of various parametric changes can be examined. Increas­
ing the return on the safe project, for instance, it can be shown 
by differentiating (2.3) totally with respect to f  and that
>  1 .
W hat is the set of contracts offered in equilibrium ? Let u  denote 
the cut-off point on the wealth line below which agents are either 
credit constrained or optimally choose not to borrow (see discussion 
below on the determination of w). If the incentive constraint defined 
by (2.3) yields an upward sloping schedule in (r; W)-space, then it 
is always more profitable to lend to the richer loan applicants rather 
than to the poorer since not only is his automatically fixed collateral 
level higher, but also the incentive compatible interest rate the bank 
can extract from him.
In equilibrium, every offered contract must fulfil two require­
ments: all contracts must yield the same expected return, say 11^, 
the lowest return on a contract associated with wealth level , the 
cut-off point LÜ. The equal profit condition is:
p(so/e)^(l ^  +  ( ! _ +  r) +  (1  -
(2.4)
for all W  such that u  < W  < \. This equation defines a solution func­
tion r(W, 77) where the vector 77 collects all the parameters. The con-
In this case d f / d W  >  0. However, as the liability of the borrower becomes in­
creasingly more limited, as 6 decreases the slope of the incentive constraint can 
switch signs.
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IC
E ’
CO c Wealth
Figure 2.5: The set of incentive compatible contracts lies on the seg­
ment EE’. The line IC depicts the solution to the incentive constraint 
defined by equation (2.3).
tract offered to person i whose wealth is Wi is thus (ri(W\7])\8Wi). 
As the second equilibrium recpiirernent, the offered contract must 
also satisfy the person’s specific incentive compatibility constraint. 
But the set of contracts defined by equation (2.4) is indeed incentive 
compatible since the interest rate has been reduced, thus increasing 
the attractiveness of the safe project and relaxing the incentive con­
straint. In consequence, the set of contracts offered in equilibrium 
yield expected profits 11^, and lie on a downward sloping schedule 
defined by equation (2.4), illustrated in Figure 2.5 as line EE’.
Having thus characterised the set of actual contracts offered, it
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is possible to examine the behaviour of the participation constraint 
for a potential loan applicant. The borrower optimally undertakes 
the project when its associated expected utility exceeds the expected 
utility derived from lending at p. From this we obtain the participa­
tion constraint:
\n{W + -  c(l +  r{W, v)) + l } +  (2.5)
( l _ p ( » “/ ^ ) ) l n { ( l - 5 ) H " + l }
> ln{W"(l +  p) +  l}
This inequality yields an indicator jV  G {0,1} depending on the 
wealth level, which states whether or not the agent would like to un­
dertake the project given the financial contract and thus apply for a 
loan. How does equation (2.5) behave ? Given the cut-off level w, as 
wealth increases, so does the associated collateral and the required 
interest rate falls. Thus the left member of (2.5) increases. But, 
given w, p remains unchanged and so the right member increases 
as well. The relative effect depends on the parameters and the ini­
tial distribution and is examined in the simulation study of section 
3.2. Note, however, that economic growth leads to a reduction of 
the lending rate p as loanable funds become less scarce, reducing the 
participation constraint for any given wealth level. If the partici­
pation constraint for the loan applicant is satisfied, then so is the 
participation constraint for the rich W  > c because they do not have 
to spend resources on repaying a loan. In general, meeting such a
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type of participation constraint requires that agents are not too risk 
averse, since they face a (low) chance of bankruptcy. The pay-off 
from the successful project must exceed their risk premium.
Given these properties of the model discussed so far, it is possible 
to complete the description of the financial market and to classify 
agents according to their wealth. The demand for loans comes from 
the mass of agents, who inherit a wealth level less than the admission 
fee for investment. However, since the supply of loanable funds may 
prove insufficient, and agents with a higher collateral are in front of 
poorer agents in the credit queue, the poorer agents may be denied 
credit. All they can do is lend at the prevailing depositors’ rate p. 
Let ÇI denote the point at which all loanable funds are exhausted. 
The supply of funds comes from the poor and from the rich.
This behaviour implies the following quantity constraint on the 
financial market since funds are firstly allocated to the richer loan 
applicants
n c  r Q  P O O
/  cdF{w) < /  wdF(w) -(- /  {w — c)dF{w) (2.6) 
JQ Jo Jc
with 0  < n  < c. n  is a measure of the credit capacity of the economy, 
for the richer the economy, the lower is H. If the economy is initially 
too poor, > c, the financial market does not exist, and only the 
rich undertake the safe project (In this case the economy will have to 
grow before a sufficient surplus of funds is accumulated). Whether 
depends on the participation constraint. If p is not too high, 
then the person with wealth level O would like to undertake the
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The poor; 
lend
The middle class: 
borrow
The rich: 
lend
cut-off point CO wealth
Figure 2.6: The type of agents ordered on the wealth line
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project and thus lu = Q . However, if the participation constraint is 
violated, then lj > Cl .
Finally, the lending rate is determined endogenously from the 
zero-profit condition for banks. Equating expected costs and ex­
pected returns, making use of the law of large numbers (which re­
quires that the economy is sufficiently large), and given the cut-off 
point w, yields p as the rate of return on lending one unit:
■ nu pooj  wdF{w) H- y  {w — c)dF{w) (2.7)
[p(®“-^ )^c(l 4 - r{w)) +  (1 — dF{w)
with p >  0. Note that when loan supply increases, ceteris paribus, 
p falls, so that the equation is well-behaved.
Summary of the model
The model has a difficult structure because of the many simul­
taneities, and non-linearities. The incentive compatibility and par­
ticipation constraints introduce important inequalities into the analy­
sis.
The nature of the financial contract arising from the incentive 
problem sorts agents into classes: the poor lenders, middle class bor­
rowers and entrepreneurs, and the rich. (2 .6 ) determines the credit 
capacity Cl of the economy. The global incentive compatibility con­
straint (2.3) constrains the set of equilibrium contracts. If it is up­
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ward sloping, then it is always more profitable to lend to richer loan 
applicants and a credit queue emerges. The least profitable con­
tract is associated with the wealth level u  and must lie on (2.3), viz. 
{r{u);6u}. All other contracts are determined by the equal profit 
condition (2.7). This contract curve is downward sloping. Given this 
set of contracts, (2 .6 ), and the cut-off level w, the lending rate p is 
determined by (2.7). Finally the participation constraint gives a crit­
ical level Ü above which agents would like to undertake the project 
and thus borrow, u  is determined by max{^l, w}.
2 .3 .2  T h e  sim u la tion  and som e com p arative  sta ­
tic s
Despite the complex structure of the model, its simulation is not 
too difficult since the underlying implicit functions determining Q, in 
equation (2.6) and f{w^r]) in equation (2.3) are monotonie, and their 
values can be calculated using binary search algorithms. Of principal 
importance is the verification of the participation constraint of loan 
applicants, the behaviour of which at times may appear surprising as 
the discussion below demonstrates. The computer simulation offers 
a convenient method by means of which to examine how the prop­
erties of the model depend upon: the initial parameters, the initial 
distribution, the degree of risk aversion, and the cost of the project. 
Finally, a tentative welfare analysis is conducted.
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The role of the initial distribution
The properties of the participation constraint (2.5), it turns out, 
are of fundamental importance, affording characteristics according 
to which economies may be classified. First, I examine the extent to 
which the static equilibrium depends on the initial wealth distribu­
tion and the resulting lending rates. This analysis gives rise to two 
types of economies.
Type I: The economy may be endowed with insufficient wealth. 
In this case prices are too high and no trading takes place. Inaction 
is the only equilibrium: the financial market is non-existent, only 
the rich undertake the safe project, and everyone else is condemned 
to inaction.
Type II: A more moderate effect may emerge in richer economies, 
but it is a manifestation of the same driving force. If the lending rate 
is sufficiently high (but not as high as in the previous case), then the 
attractiveness of undertaking the project over mere lending decreases 
as the wealth of a loan applicant increases. The participation con­
straint (2.5) becomes less relaxed, even though the required interest 
rate r{w) falls as wealth increases. This situation implies a form of 
rationing: although the poorest agents could benefit most from un­
dertaking the project and are therefore the most keen on obtaining 
credit, they are also the most likely to be denied credit.
An example of an economy of this type is given by the parame- 
ters c =  1,<5 =  0.8, =  (0.9; 1.9), =
28
(0.5; 2.8), and an initial distribution which is discrete and uniform 
ranging from 0 . 0 1  to 3 on a wealth grid with Aw  =  0.01. In this case, 
all persons whose wealth lies below the admission fee c =  1 could be 
allocated credit, O =0.01. All participation constraints are satisfied, 
LÜ = ÇI , but in the above manner, so that (2.5) becomes less relaxed 
in wealth. Figure 2.7.A depicts this situation. The lending rate is 
p=0.527, whilst the highest borrowing rate is r {u)= 0.207. Figure 
2.7.A depicts the set of equilibrium contracts for this economy.
A change in risk aversion
A change in risk aversion can be modelled by changing the indi­
rect utility function to 1/  =  ln{T -f e}, where e > 0  is a constant, so 
that risk aversion decreases as e increases because d{—V "IV ') fde < 
0. How does this affect the incentive compatibility constraint (2.3) ? 
The intuition suggesting that the schedule moves down is the same 
which underlies Figure 2.3 This is borne out by the simulations. 
As a consequence, the lending rate falls for a given wealth distrib­
ution. For instance, using the above configuration for the type II 
economy (with no binding credit constraints), changes in the risk 
aversion parameter e yield the results collected in Table 2.3.
®Analytically d{d r ldw}lde  is ambiguous, since differentiating the expres­
sion dr/dw  derived in the previous footnote yields a messy expression, the first 
term of which is negative, the second of which is positive. However, as 6 |  1, 
d{dr/dw}/d€  becomes unambiguously negative.
29
parameters:  ps: 0.9; He: 1.9; pr: O.b; Hr. 2.B; a e i t a :  O.B
1
IC
5
0
0 .25 .5 .75 1
ps: 0 .9 ; Rs: 1.9; p r: 0.5; Rr: 2.8; tau : 0 ana 0.1
1.5
1
.5
0
0 .5
w
1
Figure 2.7: Some simulations.
The upper diagram depicts Figure 2.5 for the chosen parameters. On 
the IC line the incentive constraint (2.3) is met with equality. The 
equilibrium contracts lie on the line EE. For the chosen parameters 
and the initial distribution, there is no credit rationing.
Lower diagram: government intervention leads to higher interest 
rates. The IC schedule for the âflbsidised economy lies above the 
one for the unsubsidised economy.
e 0.9 1 1 . 1
P 0.536 0.527 0.5126
Table 2.3: changes in the risk aversion parameter
Changing the cost of the project
As the cost of the project c increases, the credit capacity of the 
economy Q cannot increase since funds become scarcer. W hat hap­
pens to the incentive constraint (2.3)? As before, the behaviour of 
d{dr/dw}/dc  is somewhat ambiguous, being composed of two oppos­
ing effects. However, as 6  f 1 , it becomes unambiguously negative, 
so the schedule swivels down. This should follow, since an increase in 
the project cost, be it a direct increase in the cost or an indirect one 
through the rise in the interest rate, makes the risky project more 
attractive. (Pick a contract that satisfies the incentive constraint 
with equality. Holding the interest rate constant, an increase in c 
induces undertaking the risky project. Thus the interest rate has to 
be reduced in order to induce undertaking the safe project.)
The simulation reflects these consequences. For the economy of 
the previous example c has increased from 0 . 8  to 1 .2 , and the results 
are collected in the Table 2.4. Note, however, that the economy 
is sufficiently rich, so that it can absorb this increased project cost 
without reducing its credit capacity, r (u) falls but p increases. Thus 
the direct effect of an increase in c outweighs the decline in the in-
31
c 0 . 8 0.9 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 2
f(cj)
p
0.508
0.424
0.34
0.475
0.207
0.527
0.097
0.528
0.006
0.532
Table 2.4: changes of the project cost c
terest rate charged, so that there is an overall increase in the lending 
rate.
Welfare analysis
Can a government subsidy, which reduces the cost of investment, 
increase social welfare? Any policy objective has to be evaluated 
in the light of the constraints on the system: the subsidy has to 
be financed through taxation, and a balanced budget needs to be 
maintained. The analysis of such a situation depends on a host of 
assumptions, in particular on the assumed tax schedule, the social 
welfare function employed for the evaluation of the redistributive 
consequences, and on the initial conditions of the economic system. 
The subsequent discussion reflects this level of generality, and only 
aims at illustrating some points.
Let all potential borrowers, i.e. all persons with wealth level 
w < c =  1 be subsidised by an amount A, whilst a lump-sum tax r  is 
levied on all successful projects. The balanced budget constraint re­
quires A =  clFjr and thus depends on the wealth
distribution. Such a policy is redistributive from the rich to the poor.
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Pareto improvements are not possible in this static model since not 
everyone can feasibly experience a net gain in utility. How does 
this policy affect the incentive problem (2.3) ? Differentiating this 
schedule with respect to A results, as before, in ambiguous results, 
which disappear as ^ |  1. In the latter case d{dr/ dw}/ >  0, 
being a similar effect as caused by a reduction in the project cost 
because this redistributive policy reduces the net cost of the project 
for borrowers.
The simulation exercise confirms these observations. Continu­
ing the above example with c= l, levying a lump sum tax of r = 0 . 1  
leads to a reduction of the project cost by A=0.27. However, this 
only aggravates the incentive problem, a situation which is depicted 
in Figure 2.7.B. The IC schedule for the subsidised case lies above 
the schedule for the unsubsidised economy, and thus do all equilib­
rium contracts. Assuming that no person is credit constrained, this 
rise in the borrowing rate reduces welfare. Only in the presence of 
credit constraints can there be net welfare improvements. If pre­
viously credit constrained persons may now undertake the project, 
then there utility gain may outweigh the utility loss from an increase 
in the borrowing rates and the tax levy. But this scope for aggre­
gate utility gains depends crucially on the concavity of the social 
welfare function. The less concave it is, the less scope for welfare 
improvements there is.
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2 .3 .3  C onstan t a b so lu te  risk aversion  (C A R A )
If the concave transformation function in (2.1) is chosen to be ex­
ponential, then preferences are u{6, b) = — exp{— and exhibit 
CARA for, when a  +  /? =1, —U"/U'=l.  Let the cost of the project 
be c=\ for notational simplicity. The principal change to the above 
analysis is that the incentive constraint can now be calculated ex­
plicitly. When this constraint is met with equality EU {risky) =  EU{s), 
which implies
(p(sa/e) _  exp{— ( 1  — (5) ic}
^ ~  ^^pisafe) exp{- (w + -  1 )} -  exp{- {w + -  1 )
which can be simplified to
pisafe) _  p{risky)
f  = \nâ-\-bw—l where à = pisafe) exp{-R(^^/^)} — exp{-R("’“ ^ )^}
This schedule is upward sloping in (r; u;)-space. Hence the conclu­
sions derived in the previous analysis remain fully intact.
2.4 Dynamically evolving wealth distri­
butions
Let Ft be the distribution of wealth at time t. It will be assumed, at 
first, that Ft is bounded on [0 , w] for all t, but an argument presented 
below demonstrates that this boundedness is a property of the model, 
arising from a convergent difference equation in wealth.
Let (R, IH, p) be a probability space, where Dt is the cr-field of 
Borel subsets of the real line. Agents bequeath a fraction ( 1  — a) of
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their realised income to their offspring. Consequently, the evolution 
of the wealth distribution Ft+i = T*{Ft) is determined recursively 
by the transition equations for dynasties, viz. their bequests. These 
define a Markov process since only the preceding wealth position is 
relevant for the determination of the current one. The stochastic 
process is perhaps best visualised as a generalisation of a finite state 
discrete irreducible Markov chain with transition matrix P. In such 
a case the stationary distribution tt is derived as the fixed point of 
the equation tt =  ttP, or the rescaled eigenvector corresponding to 
the largest eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix P , viz. 1 . For a 
model with a continuous state space, the technicalities become more 
complex and abstract theory of operators needs to be employed 
The Markov operator is defined as a convolution
{Tf)(z) = j  f{z')Q{z,dz') all z e R
where Q{a,A) = Pr{zf+i G A\zt = a} is the transition function. 
{Tf){z)  is the expected value of the function /  next period condi­
tional on the current state z. The adjoint of the Markov operator, 
denoted by T*, is defined by means of the inner product relationship 
< T / ,  A > = <  / ,  T*A >. Expanding the inner product yields
^See Chung (1960) for an extensive but concise treatment of Markov chains. 
For a good general introduction to operator theory in a Hilbert space setting see 
Young (1988). Futia (1982) surveys opeator-theoretic techniques and hmiting 
theorems. Lucas and Stokey (1989) collect convergence results and other useful 
theorems. The classic but voluminous treatise is Dunford and Schwartz (1957).
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( r X ) { A )  =  j  Q(z,A)\{dz) all Aç<A
It is the probability measure over the state next period given that 
A is the probability measure over the current state. Yet, since the 
model is a general equilibrium model, the lending rate p is deter­
mined endogenously, and enters the pay-off and thus the (linear) 
transition equations. As a consequence, the Markov process is ini­
tially not stationary, and the operator T* is time dependent. Thus 
the evolution of the wealth distribution is recursively determined as
However, if the economy is well-behaved and grows (as discussed 
below), the lending rate p falls over time, rendering the transitions 
stationary. This convergence can be established by an argument by 
contradiction. If p does not converge to p, then the wealth of the rich 
grows without bound. But if this happens, then, on the other hand 
from (2.7), p |p  , contradicting the previous assumption. Moreover, 
as the economy grows, the loan capacity increases, reducing any pre­
vious (if any) credit constraint. Finally, if the economy is stationary, 
then the transitions remain stationary in the succeeding periods
®For a rigorous proof of this proposition in a similar context see Aghion and 
Bolton (1995).
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2.4 .1  P a ra m eter  values and th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  d y­
n am ics
The next paragraphs examine the manner in which the model’s pa­
rameters and initial conditions determine the nature of wealth dy­
namics. Note that because of the special specification of the utility 
function, wealth transitions are linear in pay-offs as parents bequeath 
a fraction (1 — a) to their offspring. For simplicity let the cost of the 
project be c =  1 .
The rich and wealth growth
Since the rich lend excess funds at the endogenously determined 
lending rate p, their transition functions are not stationary. For what 
parameter values will there be (initial) wealth growth? Their wealth 
grows if
E{wt+i\wt > l } - w t  =  (1 -  a )  )-!(;*  >  0.
In the worst case, if ( 1  -|- p) > (1  — a)~^ then we r e q u i r e > 
(1 H- p) > (1 — for there to be growth. In consequence, the re­
turns to the project must be high, whilst the initial distribution must 
not be too rich, so that initially the lending rate p is high as well. For 
instance, if parents bequeath a fraction 0.6 of their wealth, a=OA, 
and the following is required: p > 2/3 and > 5 /3 .  If
pisafe) _  Q g then > 1.852 must hold.
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Figure 2.8: Upper diagram: Recursion diagram for the rich 
Right diagram: Recursion diagram for the middle class 
Lower diagram: Recursion diagram for the well-behaved case
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W hat type of recursion diagram emerges for the rich ? Assume 
p has fallen to zero, and concentrate on the lineage which is always 
successful (the probability of which event falls to zero |  0 ).
If (1 — a) +  {wt — 1)] — Wt > 0, then the transition func­
tion for this group lies initially above the 45 degree line. This 
condition requires >  a ( l  — a)~^Wt +  1. In particular at
w = + 1. li a = 0.4 then > 5/3
must hold. Note, however, that the above condition cannot hold for 
all wealth levels w, since it defines a convergent difference equation. 
Thus wealth above a certain point, say w, cannot be sustained. This 
argument justifies restricting the support of the wealth distribution
F. The recursion diagram is depicted in Figure 2.8 .A.
The middle class
Since the incentive constraint (2.3) is time invariant, if the econ­
omy is sufficiently rich, a; =  0 , the transition function for mem­
bers of the middle class is stationary. How does the recursion di­
agram look ? Focusing again on the successful lineage, its transi­
tion function lies above the 45 degree line if (1 — a)[wt H- _
( 1  -f — Wt > 0. Since the incentive constraint (2.3)
defines an upward sloping schedule in (r, VF)-space, this constraint 
is at its severest at w =  1. Whence we required that >
a ( l  — û ;)~ ^-|-(l-|-r(l; ^W ^))). Continuing the above example, the
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requirement is > 5/3 +  r ( l;  The recursion diagram
for this case is depicted in Figure 2.8.B.
However, if the above parameter restriction is not met, the dy­
namics are not ’’well-behaved” , the ergodic theorem is inapplicable, 
and the limiting distribution depends on initial conditions. In terms 
of the recursion diagram, the transition function for the successful 
lineage then crosses the 45 degree line.
The poor
The wealth transitions of the poor, as of the rich, are not station­
ary because p is endogenously determined. However, if the latter has 
fallen sufficiently, they decumulate their assets until, eventually, they 
occupy a mass point at ic =  0. Since the modelling for this case is 
unrealistic, a more realistic model incorporates a subsistence activ­
ity. Introducing such a subsistence activity changes the participation 
constraint of the middle class borrowers, if undertaking the project 
or the subsistence activity are mutually exclusive actions. In this 
case the expected utility derived from undertaking the project must 
exceed the utility derived from the subsistence activity and lending. 
If the return on the subsistence activity s is sufficiently high (in the 
worst case) {I — a)[wt s] — Wt > 0 , the recursion diagram is well 
behaved: the transition function then lies above the 45 degree line.
®Note, however, a subtlety in this condition since as increases so does
the contracted borrowing rate.
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The well-behaved case and the ergodic distribution
If the above parameter restrictions are met, the resulting recur­
sion diagram is depicted in Figure 2.8.C. An agent attains any wealth 
level within the support of the distribution with positive probabihty 
and in finite time. Moreover, the transition functions and thus the 
Markov operator become stationary. Thus, in this well behaved case 
the ergodic theorem (see appendix) applies and a unique invariant 
distribution emerges.
2.5 Conclusions
The chapter has analysed the dynamic consequences of a non-commitment 
problem in the credit market and has shown that the behaviour of fi­
nancial intermediaries brings about a new economic channel through 
which inequalities are made persistent. The inequality of opportu­
nities leads to persistent wealth inequality, the dynamics of which - 
a Markov process - depend upon parameters and initial conditions, 
(although one well behaved case emerges for which the ergodic the­
orem is applicable).
Models with perfect markets typically predict that initial inequal­
ities vanish. For instance, Stiglitz (1969) considers ”a simple model 
of accumulation, with a linear savings function, a constant reproduc­
tion rate, homogeneous labour, and equal division among one’s heirs.
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In such an economy, if the balanced growth path is stable, all wealth 
and income is asymptotically evenly distributed.” (p.382). But far 
from converging to a point mass, the outcome here is a nondegenerate 
distribution. Thus the economics of information has an important 
contribution to make to distributional analysis; working through the 
channel of financial intermediaries, this emphasises again the impor­
tance of analysing the role of intermediate institutions for the final 
distributional outcome -the general theme of this dissertation.
A quite different institution is examined in the next chapter. The 
theory of Markov processes has been employed here in the context 
of an abstract model. Chapters 7 and 8  examine the applicability of 
the former in an empirical and statistical context.
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2.6 Appendix: the ergodic theoreni and 
the well-behaved case
The ergodic theorem applies in the well-behaved case, since agent 
attains any wealth level within the support of the distribution with 
positive probability and in finite time. See Aghion and Bolton (1995) 
for a detailed and explicit construction of the Markov operator. Con­
sequently, the conditions for the following theorem are readily ver­
ified, establishing the existence of a unique invariant distribution. 
One form of the convergence theorem is given in Lucas and Stokey 
(1989) (theorem 11.12 , p.350), which builds on a particular structure 
of the transition equations:
Condition M ( p.348): There exists s > 0 and integer A  > 1, 
such that, for any A € 91 , either P ^ (s , A) > e , oi P^{s, A^) > e , 
Vs G R .
Theorem (p.350): Let (P, 91) be a measurable space; let A(P, 91) 
be the space of probability measures on (P, 91) , with the total varia­
tion norm let P  be a transition function on (P, 91) ; let T* be the 
adjoint of the operator associated with P . If P  satisfies condition M 
for A  > 1 and s > 0 , then there exist a unique probability measure 
A* G (P, 91) such that:
Recall the total variation norm defined as ||A|| — s u p ^  ||A(Aj)|| where the 
sup is taken over all finite partitions of the state space into disjoint subsets. It 
is the norm of the Banach dual, since T* maps the Banach space of bounded 
finitely additive functions defined on the space into itself.
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(*) ||T*'^^Ao — A* 11 ^  (1 — s) ||Ao — A* 11 all Aq G {R, 91) , A:=l,2,.. 
Conversely, if (*) holds, then Condition M is satisfied for some 
N  > 1 and e > 0.
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Chapter 3 
On the performance of 
social benefit system s
A bstract: The chapter analyses the performance of unemployment 
benefit systems in a search theoretic framework. The criteria of 
evaluation comprise the alleviation of poverty and the reduction in 
income inequality. Diversity of opinions about these criteria is ex­
plicitly allowed for. Also, the trade-off between the attainment of 
social objectives and work incentives is examined.
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3.1 Introduction
Social insurance is a prominent institution in developed economies, 
designed to protect economic agents against income risk. The form 
of social insurance schemes found in practice varies considerably: un­
employment benefit in the UK is a flat rate, whereas it is earnings 
related on the Continent and the US; the replacement rates and the 
methods of finance differ. This chapter analyses the performance 
of alternative unemployment benefit systems in a search-theoretic 
framework. The relative performance of flat-rate and earnings-related 
unemployment benefits will be assessed in the light of policy ob­
jectives such as the reduction in inequality and the alleviation of 
poverty. However, these policy objectives may not command a uni­
versal consensus because of either a diversity of opinion or an intrinsic 
arbitrariness in the parameters characterising the social welfare func­
tion So we might ask whether the ranking of the benefit regimes 
depends on the parameters of the social objective; although people 
may disagree about parameters, could they agree on a ranking ?
There is also a potential trade-off between the equity objective 
of poverty alleviation and the efficiency consideration of work incen­
tives. A greater benefit might increase the income of an unemployed
^As Atkinson (1993a) observes in the context of poverty alleviation: ’’Such 
a ’sharp’ representation of the social objective may not, however, be universally 
accepted. There may well be disagreement about the location of the poverty hne 
... Alternatively, there may be agreement about the location of ..[the poverty 
hne], but concern for the non-poor, or the group close to the poverty hne”(p.l7).
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beneficiary and thereby reduce the difference between his income 
and the poverty line. For a person who remains in poverty, this in­
crease reduces his poverty. But an increase in benefits reduces the 
incentives to work (particularly for those persons with a current low 
job productivity). Consequently, unemployment might rise, possi­
bly increasing the numbers of the poor, raising aggregate poverty. 
This potential trade-off is examined in a general equilibrium setting. 
Again, does the resolution of this trade-off depend on the parame­
ters of the social objective, or is it unambiguous for all admissible 
parameters ?
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1.2 briefly reviews 
the related literature. The model is presented in section 3.2. It 
juxtaposes a flat-rate and an earnings-related unemployment beneflt 
regime in a general equilibrium framework. Incentive problems of 
the beneflt regimes are also examined. Section 3.3 assesses the rela­
tive performance of the beneflt regimes, and analyses the conditions 
under which an initial ranking of the beneflt regimes is reversed. In 
section 3.3.1 the evaluation criterion is poverty, and in section 3.3.2 
it is inequality. W ithin the (limited) context of the current search- 
theoretic framework, it is shown that no beneflt regime dominates 
its competitor in all circumstances. Section 3.3.3 examines whether 
there is an equity-efficiency trade-off. As this section makes clear, 
preserving incentive compatibility for its own sake is a value judge­
ment, and its normative character ought to be made explicit. Section 
3.4 concludes.
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3.1 .1  T h e co n tex t  o f  th e  prob lem
The nature of the risk analysed in this chapter is that of a tempo­
rary job loss, engendering the institutional response of unemploy­
ment insurance. Pension schemes attempting to counter the risk of 
a permanent job loss through age or disability have been examined 
elsewhere (e.g. Diamond and Mirrless (1986)). Foynter and Martin 
(1995), Habib (1995) , and Schluter (1995) provide extensive exam­
inations of the complexities governing the British, the French, and 
the German social insurance system.
These institutional features have been relatively neglected in the 
recent literature on social insurance schemes. Some chapters com­
pletely ignore the institutional rules, whilst taking them explicitly 
into account dramatically reverses the implications of some popular 
models (Atkinson (1990)). An example is the treatm ent of eligibility 
conditions in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model. 
Since, in practice, shirking automatically disqualifies the claimant 
from benefit entitlement for a non-trivial period, their shirking con­
dition is simply not applicable. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) 
develop this criticism of neglecting institutional considerations in 
economic modelling. The incentive problems engendered by the ben­
efit system are further analysed in Besley (1990), who compares the 
relative performance of a means-tested benefit, which tops up in­
comes in order to reach a pre-defined poverty line, with a universal 
benefit, paid to all persons in the economy, even to the richest per­
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son. Some authors, like Besley and Coate (1992), model benefit 
institutions in a historical fashion. They design a revelation mecha­
nism by subjecting the benefit claimant to a sufficiently large work 
requirement, the result of which bears a strong resemblance to the 
Poor Laws in Britain and practices in colonial India (Dreze (1990)).
Easley, Kiefer, and Possen (1985) use a two-state, two-period 
general equilibrium model with two heterogeneous risk averse agents 
in order to analyse the (relative and joint) performance of unem­
ployment insurance and negative income tax systems. Their numeri­
cal simulations suggests that under certain parameter configurations 
and functional forms, both programmes bring about Pareto improve­
ments. Other researchers have incorporated efficiency wages into 
general equilibrium models of unemployment: when workers’ effort 
depends on the relative remuneration of capital and labour, Agell 
and Lundberg (1992) show that any tax policy which increases the 
wage-rental rate leads to a reduction in unemployment.
The model developed in this chapter is based on a standard 
search-theoretic framework as described in Pissarides (1990). Its 
principal attraction stems from the fact that it endogenises the risk 
of losing one’s income. This is achieved by modelling trade in the 
labour market as uncoordinated, time consuming and costly for both 
workers and firms. A congestion or thin market externality will be 
present in most equilibrium conditions, their levels depending on the 
number of workers and firms engaged in search. W ith the unem­
ployment rate thus endogenised, its level will reflect the incentive
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structure of the benefit system. It is then possible to examine to 
which extent unemployment is caused by the incentive structure un­
der operation, rather than by the stochastic nature of the exogenous 
shocks. Involuntary unemployment can be distinguished from ’vol­
untary’ unemployment. It has been observed that ” (t)he optimum 
taxation models developed to date are not satisfactory in this regard, 
since the treatment of the labour market is insufficiently develope- 
d” (Atkinson (1989), p.42). The model employed in this chapter is 
an attem pt at this in the context of social insurance. In using this 
framework, the present analysis is akin to Atkinson (1990)’s, in that 
a search-theoretic framework is also employed. However, he analyses 
these issues within a model of a segmented labour market: a primary 
sector job offers high wages and unemployment insurance, whereas 
the low paid jobs in the secondary sector are uninsured.
3.2 The model
This section spells out a standard search-theoretic framework with 
stochastic job matching derived from Pissarides (1990), chapter 5, 
which is itself an extension of the basic search model of Diamond 
(1982). The novelty is that we explicitly consider an unemployment 
benefit 6, and the budget constraint faced by the government which 
levies a pay-roll tax r  on workers and employers. Moreover, the 
benefit might be further constrained by incentive considerations.
The aim of this section is to establish a simultaneous equation
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system, which permits the determination of the endogenous unem­
ployment rate it, the set of incentive compatible benefit levels, and 
the level of the pay-roll tax necessary to finance the latter. Stochastic 
job matching permits the derivation of a non-trivial wage distribu­
tion, which then may give rise to a non-trivial benefit distribution.
Assume that workers are identical ex ante, and if they search, 
they do so with the same intensity, but the productivity a  of a par­
ticular job match varies. Its precise value is only revealed upon 
contact although the distribution of productivities G {a)  is common 
knowledge. Workers are heterogeneous ex post. Since all workers 
are identical ex ante, they have the same reservation productivity 
ar.  If productivity has the distribution G with support [ai, then 
workers accept all jobs characterised by a  > o;^ .:
dG =  l - G { a r )  (3.1)
^Let u denote the unemployment rate and v the vacancy rate (be­
ing the number of job vacancies over the total labour force). Trade 
in the labour market is uncoordinated, time consuming and costly. 
This notion is captured by a matching function,z (it, f), giving the 
fraction of job matches x as a function of the unemployment and 
vacancy rates. This function is commonly assumed to be homoge­
neous of degree one. Define 9 := v/u a.s a. measure of labour market
^Firms have a reservation productivity, but, as demonstrated below, the Nash 
bargaining rule governing wage determination implies that both workers and 
firms agree on a common reservation productivity.
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tightness. Thus x jv  = x{Q~^  ^1) =: x{9~^). The stochastic processes 
governing the economy are Poisson processes. A vacant job becomes 
occupied at a rate q{6^  ar) := [1 — G (a^)] x{6~^) since only jobs are 
formed which exceed the reservation productivity. Workers transit 
from unemployment to employment at rate 9q (^), but they become 
unemployed at the exogenously given separation rate s.
In equilibrium, the inflow into unemployment equals its outflow, 
9q{9,ar)u = 5 ( 1  — u), whence the Beveridge Curve (BC) in (v^u)- 
space is arrived at:
+  (3.2)
The beneflt system
A person may apply for a beneflt b when unemployed, but the 
institutional conditions of eligibility may be more extensive. For 
instance, unemployment beneflt may be paid for a limited dura­
tion only or it may be contingent on the contributions record of 
the claimant. Below two beneflt schedules will be discussed, viz. a 
flat-rate {FR) and an earnings-related {ER) schedule. The attain­
ment of any policy objective is, however, constrained by the scarcity 
of resources, and the social budget needs to be balanced. It is a 
common institutional practice that contributions are shared equally 
between employer and employee. Here it is implemented as a pay­
roll tax T on gross earnings w, levied in equal proportions on the two 
parties.
Firms
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The firm has a standard neo-classical production function, ex­
hibiting constant returns to scale, but because of the reservation 
productivity rule it has to be written as F  = F  (AT, with con­
ditional expectations = S[a\a > o;/], since firms have to forecast 
productivities, ay is the reservation productivity of the firm be­
low which workers are rejected. The production function can be 
re-written as /(/c), where k := K/Na^j. The value of an occupied 
job J  or a vacancy V  are captured by asset value (or "no arbitrage”) 
equations. The value of a job J  is
r( J  -f- ah) =  a  [ / {k) — 6k] — w {1 + r) s {V — J) (3.3)
since it produces a [f {k) — 6k] but the firm has to pay a wage w and 
a tax WT, and loses a worker at the exogenously given separation 
rate 5. r  is the interest rate and 6 the depreciation rate. The value 
of a vacancy V  is
rV  = - T F  q ( r  -  V) (3.4)
where F is the search cost of the vacancy, and the vacancy becomes 
occupied at rate q(9,af). In equilibrium the value of the vacancy 
must be zero, V = 0, which implies = F/g, since otherwise the 
firm would change its behaviour. The condition J  =  0 yields the 
reservation productivity, since firms employ workers as long as the 
job is profitable, whilst reaping the surplus from the intra-marginal 
worker. In consequence,
_ (1 +T)W
 ^ f { k ) ~  {6 F r ) k
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Firms choose k optimally, which implies f '{k) = 6 r. After taking 
conditional expectations of the valuation of an occupied job J  and 
imposing V  = 0, the equilibrium condition on vacancy supply by 
firms becomes:
a® [/ {k) — {6 -\-r)k] — (1 +  r)  — ^  _  q  (3.6)
Workers
Being unemployed implies a value U to the unemployed because 
of the receipt of a benefit h and a chance of 9q{6) to become employed. 
The value of employment E  is derived from a net wage w (1 — r), 
but the worker may lose her job with an exogenous probability s. 
Consequently the asset value equations are :
rE  = w{1-t) - s{E-U) (3.7)
rU = b-\-6q{9^ Oiy^ i^E — C7)
Wages
The occupied job creates a surplus which must cover the search 
costs of both parties. It is commonly assumed in the search literature 
that the surplus bargained over by the worker and the firm is divided 
according to the Nash bargaining rule (Binmore, Rubinstein, and 
Wolinsky (1986)). This Nash rule implies that workers and firms 
have a common reservation productivity, ar = a/.  Suppose that 
this surplus is divided equally the chosen wage then maximises
^Note that the resulting returns will, in general, not be efficient, since neither 
party obtains its respective marginal product.
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{E — UŸ'^ {J — which implies the wage equation 
2(1 -  t ) w  =  6 +  [(1 -  t )  /  (1 +  r)] [^r +  a [ f { k )  — {6 r)/c]] (3.8)
A higher productivity is remunerated by a higher wage.
Flat-rate (FR)  benefits and eligibility
If the benefit is a flat rate, it is most conveniently formalised as 
a constant fraction of expected wages b = Xw^ where A G (0;1). 
Following Pissarides (1990, p.99), it is also convenient to formalise 
the firms’ search costs in a similar manner, F =  'yw^. If the social 
budget is balanced, expected expenditures have to equal expected 
incomes
(1 — u) 2rwdG - 2(1 — u)rw^ = bu (3.9)
J a .
where G is the conditional productivity distribution. This formula­
tion implies that all unemployed receive a benefit b,  even those whose 
productivity falls below the generally accepted reservation produc­
tivity ar. Solving (3.9) yields
I — u
u
Some algebraic manipulations yield the equation
2r (3.10)
/I \ 1 -t- T 1 — U(1 -t- r)  —  --------------2r —
1 — T U
1 r + s 1
=  0 (3.11)u s \ — u
This is the so-called Vacancy Supply curve (VS'), which, like the Bev­
eridge curve, is usually analysed diagrammatically in ( f , u)-space. 
Also an expression for the reservation productivity can be derived
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r  -  TT7  ^-  j
where a^ denotes the expected productivity.
In summary, the system consists of four equations, viz. (3.2), 
(3.6), (3.11), and (3.12). Given a pay-roll tax rate r , the unknowns 
are u ,v ,k  and Differentiating the V S  curve (3.11)shows that, 
as usual, V S  is upward sloping in (u,u)-space. As regards the Bev­
eridge curve (3.2), the problem is more complicated because of the 
presence of ar. But, following Pissarides(1990), making the assump­
tion (da^/dar) arja^ < 1 - at the optimum a rise in the reservation 
productivity increases the conditional mean proportionately less- the 
Beveridge curve can be shown to be downward sloping. This follows 
since the assumption implies that a change in the labour market 
tightness 9 has a stronger direct effect on the probability of leaving 
unemployment, which exceeds the indirect effect through the reser­
vation productivity. Finally, the unemployment rate is determined 
by the intersection of the two curves V S  and BC  depicted in Figure 
1 , and k is derived recursively from f'{k) = 6-\-r.^
The effect of a change in the pay-roll tax
An increase in the pay-roll tax may be examined diagrammati­
cally, analysing the behaviour of (3.2) and (3.11) separately. Holding
^Observe that Pissarides'(1990) partial equilibrium model is nested within 
this general equihbrium framework, as can be seen by setting T — 0.
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u constant and differentiating (3.11) totally gives an equation in dr 
and dv
Adr = 7 u s 1 — u dv where A { t ) := 1 - 2 - —u  A - t  { l - r f
(3.13)
At r  =  0 , A (0 ) < 0  and A  falls monotonically with linir A (r) =
— DO. Thus dv/dr < 0 and V S  shifts down. Concerning the Bev­
eridge curve (3.2), the same reasoning which showed that BC  is 
downward sloping leads to the conclusion that it shifts to the right. 
As r  increases both returns to the employed workers and to firms fall 
and the reservation productivity thus increases. In consequence, an 
increase in r  unambiguously leads to a higher unemployment rate. 
The size of the increase depends on the distribution of productivities
G. This situation is depicted in Figure 1.
Flat-rate benefits and incentive compatibility 
We have considered a (non-negative) value of the pay-roll tax 
below 1 0 0 %, but the domain may be further constrained by con­
siderations of incentive compatibility. Is the benefit sufficiently low 
that all unemployed beneficiaries have an incentive to search and to 
accept any given job offer ? The incentive constraint is
h =  \ w ^  <  — t ) w  ( a r )  (3.14)
since w (o^) is the lowest wage in the economy, associated with the 
lowest admissible job productivity, viz. the reservation productivity 
ar. Using the wage equation (3.8) and the equation for the reserva-
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tion productivity yields
1 — T
0 < (3.15)
1 +  r
which holds for all r  G [0; 1). The flat-rate beneflt does not create 
an incentive problem because wages are always sufficiently high.
Earnings-related benefits (ER) and eligibility conditions 
When the benefit is earnings-related, b = pw with replacement 
ratio p, the inter-temporal structure of the economy becomes impor­
tant since benefits are determined by past earnings. Assume then 
that agents are infinitely lived ( an implicit assumption so far), but 
that benefits last for one period only so tha t persons continuously 
unemployed for more than one period are ineligible for the benefit. 
The balanced budget becomes
rocu rocu
/ {l — u)2rwdG=  / upwdG (3.16)
J Or J ar
since all those whose productivity falls below the reservation pro­
ductivity, G{ar), are not entitled to an unemployment benefit. In 
order to receive a benefit one must have been separated from the 
job at most in the last period. This is a realistic assumption be­
cause most unemployment benefit programmes ( as distinct from 
unemployment assistance) make eligibility conditional on a work or 
contributions record Simplifying (3.16) yields an expression for
^Restricting benefit eligibility in this way is analytically convenient since ’’pro­
ductivity in the last period” is the state variable in terms of which the subsequent
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the replacement ratio p
\ — u
p = ----------------------------------------- (3.17)
up
(3.10) and (3.17) look similar but tax rates (and thus unemployment 
rates) may differ because of incentive problems. The subscripts have 
been added to emphasise the potential difference.
Earnings-related benefits and incentive problems
An incentive problem occurs in this regime if the person is entitled 
to a high benefit which exceeds a current low net wage offer. The 
benefit may be high because of a high previous productivity level a 
and a high pay-roll tax r . Thus, to prevent this from happening, r  
must be sufficiently low. How low ? Examining the wage equation 
(3.8), the lowest wage is achieved when a = ar and the person is
welfare analysis can easily be carried out diagramatically. Moreover, if r < r*, 
the E R  benefit is a mean-preserving spread of the F R  benefit. However, the E R  
benefit differs from the F R  benefit also in terms of its temporal nature. Suppose 
the eligibility restriction is removed so that the benefit depends on the wage 
of the last job. In this case the analytical details become more awkward. For 
instance, the balanced budget equation becomes contingent on the entire earn­
ings history of the population. In order to satisfy the incentive compatibihty 
constraint, r has to be selected such that the highest possible benefit does not 
exceed the lowest possible wage offer. The former is attained when a  =  and 
the latter when o  =  in two consecutive periods. But although the eligibil­
ity restriction is removed, the logic of the subsequent welfare analysis remains 
unchanged (cf footnote 7). Therefore the restriction remains for expositional 
clarity.
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not entitled to the benefit. The highest wage, and thus the highest 
benefit entitlement, is attained when productivity is at its highest, 
a = au, and the entitlement is in turn  the highest Putting these 
together yields the incentive constraint
1 +  I 1 — T  -----  I <  2 (1  — r)  where F  := f{k) — {r + 6)k
(3.18)
Unfortunately one cannot derive a closed form solution since (3.18) 
depends on the unemployment rate m, which can be conveniently 
examined only diagrammatically as the intersection of the V S  and 
the B C  curves. However, examining the boundaries of (3.18) for 
T = 0 and T — 1 shows that at low levels of r  the constraint is 
satisfied, but at high levels the constraint is violated. By continuity 
there exists a critical level T*(when (3.18) holds with equality), below 
which tax rates are incentive compatible but above which they are 
not.
W hat happens if the eligibility rules are relaxed for the earnings- 
related benefit, so that receipt of the benefit is only contingent on 
being unemployed ? For instance, a previously ineligible unemployed 
person could receive a flat rate below the lowest earnings-related ben­
efit. The following argument demonstrates that the critical level of 
r ,  below which all tax rates are incentive compatible, exceeds r*
^These are given by w^ nin — 6T/  (1 +  r)  and
Wmax =  [2 (1 — r) — p]  ^ [(1 — r) /  (1 -h r)] [auF +  ^F]
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in this new regime. Set r  = r*. First observe that, if the unem­
ployment rate is held constant, awarding previously ineligible unem­
ployed persons a benefit increases the number of beneficiaries, which 
reduces the replacement rate. Now let u vary. The outside option 
for the previously ineligible person increases, raising labour costs. 
The reservation productivity and thus unemployment rise whilst the 
replacement rate falls further. As only more productive jobs are 
formed, the lowest offered wage has risen. The discrepancy between 
the highest benefit entitlement and the lowest offered net wage in­
creases, the incentive constraint becomes a bit more relaxed, and the 
tax rate can be increased whilst remaining incentive compatible.
Summary
Figure 2 summarises the preceding discussion of the model in 
(n, t»)-space. As long as r  < r*, the earnings-related benefit is in­
centive compatible, and the respective unemployment rates in the 
two benefit regimes are the same. But if the incentive compatibility 
constraint for the earnings-related benefit is violated, the unemploy­
ment rate increases and exceeds the one for the fiat-rate regime. An 
increase in the pay-roll tax rate r  increases the unemployment rate u, 
but the precise increase depends on the distribution of productivities 
G.
W hat do the benefit schedules look like ? In Figure 3, they are 
depicted as a function of a , the last productivity of the unemployed 
claimant. It is assumed that r  < r* , so the unemployment rates
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associated with the two regimes are equal, which implies that the 
two benefit parameters satisfy X = p. The diagram also shows the 
different eligibility conditions for the different regimes (but this ar­
gument will be generalised below). The position of the E R  schedule 
depends on the location of and two possibilities are arise: either 
ar is sufficiently low, so tha t the E R  schedule intersects the FR  
schedule, or it is so high that the ER  benefit always exceeds the FR  
benefit.
3.3 Evaluating the performance of the  
benefit regimes
The criteria according to which the benefit regimes will be assessed 
are poverty, inequality, and a more general social welfare function. 
Do we obtain a universal ranking of benefit regimes or does the 
preference for one regime change when a different criterion is chosen?
These criteria incorporate value judgments and a certain degree 
of arbitrariness. For instance, not everyone may agree on the loca­
tion of the poverty line. Or there may be disagreement about the 
sensitivity parameters of these criteria. Can this diversity of opinion 
be accommodated, so that the ranking of the benefit regimes does 
not change as these parameters change? Finally, to what extent does 
the ranking depend on the eligibility conditions?
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3 .3 .1  P overty
The properties of the conventional poverty indices are well known, 
but the choice of a particular poverty index may be quite arbitrary. 
The particular choice may be defended in the light of the special ques­
tion posed, and for the present analysis the decomposable poverty 
index proposed in Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) is conve­
nient. Let z denote an exogenous poverty line, F  is the distribution 
of incomes y, and (3 a sensitivity parameter. The poverty index 
only takes into account the income of the poor (all y < z), and 
weighs their (percentage) income shortfall from z , i.e. the gravity 
of poverty, by the sensitivity parameter j3 :
n z  /  \  ^  ^
^13= ( - — ~ I dF{y) = V  VkPffk, where /3 >  0 (3.19)
Jo \  y /
The poverty index can be decomposed as follows. Partition the pop­
ulation into K  groups with respective population share Vk, and let 
Pf3k denote the computed poverty index Pp for group k. Then the 
index is expressible as the weighted sum of poverty over the K  sub­
groups of the population.
The natural partition in the model is to group the employed and 
the unemployed. If r  <  r*, the population and the wages of the em­
ployed are the same for the two benefit regimes. In consequence, in 
an assessment of the relative performance of the two benefit regimes, 
one can concentrate on the poverty of the unemployed.
Does a change in the poverty line z change the ranking of the 
benefit regimes whilst keeping the sensitivity parameter fixed ? If
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/? =  0, then (3.19) becomes the head count index. If z = Zi in 
Figure 3 then FR  dominates E R  but if z = Z2 then E R  dominates 
ER.  In fact z = Zi is the trivial case since F R  dominates E R  for all 
sensitivity parameters /?.
Does the ranking change when the sensitivity parameter (3 changes 
whilst the poverty line remains unchanged at z =  Z2 ? Is there a 
trade-off between the incidence and the gravity of poverty ? For in­
stance, two situations may emerge. In situation (a) a certain number 
of people live below the poverty line, but the income shortfall is not 
large. In situation (b) fewer are poor, but they suffer from a more 
severe income shortfall. Which situation is deemed worse is captured 
by the sensitivity parameter (3. This trade-off can be examined when 
the poverty line exceeds the flat-rate benefit. A reversal of the initial 
ranking can be made by means of a continuity argument. If /? =  0  
then E R  dominates F iî , but if (3 = oo then F R  dominates ER.  
Given the monotonicity of the poverty index, a critical level of (3 
exists, /)*, such that for (3 > (3* all FR  dominate ER.
W hat happens to the ranking when eligibility conditions change^? 
Assume the earnings-related benefit is extended to cover all unem­
ployed by awarding the previously ineligible a flat rate. In this case
^If the temporal eligibility condition is removed as suggested in the previous 
footnote, the logic of the above arguments remains unchanged. Mapping the 
incomes of the unemployed in (benefit,income)-space, the F R  is a horizontal line 
which is cut by the E R  benefit schedule. This crossing is sufficient to guarantee 
the existence of a critical (3 at which a reversal of the poverty ranking of the two 
regimes occurs (when the poverty fine exceeds the flat-rate benefit).
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the income shortfall of the poorest is less severe which translates into 
a higher critical level above which the ranking is reversed. On the 
other hand, F R  may be restricted to the same beneficiary popula­
tion as ER.  Yet, the same continuity argument applies, leading to a 
reversal of the initial ranking.
3 .3 .2  In eq u a lity
Another assessment criterion is income inequality. Similar decompo­
sition considerations lead to the choice of the Generalised Entropy 
measure, defined by
K
GEn = ^
k=\
(3.20)
where is a sensitivity parameter, yi income of person i G {1 ,.., n}, 
and y. average income. The index decomposes, so that GEj^k mea­
sures inequality within group A;, where Vk is its population share, and 
Sk its income share. GE^b measures the inequality between groups 
when each person within group k is assigned the average income of 
the group.
Which benefit system is associated with higher income inequal­
ity? The population partitions into the set of the employed, un­
employed beneficiaries and unemployed non-beneficiaries. Let the 
eligibility rules for F R  be (3.9) and for E R  (3.16). If the pay-roll 
tax satisfies t  <  t *,  then the group size and the inequality of the 
employed are the same for the two benefit regimes. For FR,  there
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is perfect equality amongst the unemployed beneficiaries. But with 
the eligibility rule (3.16) there is always a group of unemployed non­
beneficiaries, whose income share is zero. This implies that F R  
always dominates ER^ irrespective of /?.
W hat happens if the eligibility rule (3.9) is changed so that the 
F R  benefit covers exactly the same population as E R ?  Choosing r  
again in an incentive compatible manner, the various income groups 
have the same size. The between-group component, GEisb , will 
also be the same, since E R  then is a mean-preserving spread of F R. 
However, there is perfect equality amongst the group of beneficiaries 
when the benefit is FR.  Thus, even under these new eligibility rules, 
F R  always dominates ER.
3 .3 .3  S ocia l w elfare and w ork incentives: a tra d e­
off ?
There might be an equity efficiency trade-off between social welfare 
and work incentives. Let the welfare criterion be the poverty index
(3.19). A socially desirable pay-roll tax, then, is the solution to the 
programme min -^ The problem is not a trivial one, for although 
an increase in the benefit reduces the gravity of poverty, it might 
increase its incidence as the unemployment rate rises. Moreover, 
the initial benefit increase might be eroded away by a rise in the 
number of beneficiaries. Finally, is the socially desirable r  incentive 
compatible ?
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If the benefit is a flat rate, differentiating A with respect to r  
yields dX/dr = [2/u][{l — u) — (du/dr)r/w ]. The sign of this ex­
pression is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of unemploy­
ment, and thus on the distribution of productivities G and the reser­
vation productivity • Two polar cases are imaginable: In case (a) 
the labour force is highly skilled (skill has to be loosely interpreted 
here since it is ex ante unobservable), where most frequency mass 
is concentrated on high productivity levels. A sufficiently small in­
crease in (Xr leads to a small increase in u and A increases. In case (b) 
the labour force is badly skilled, and most frequency mass concen­
trates on low productivity levels. The same increase in ar leads to a 
large increase in u and A falls. If the poverty line z is sufficiently low, 
so that no employed workers are deemed to be in poverty, and after 
defining z relatively as z =  the social welfare criterion (3.19) 
reduces to — u [(tt — A) / tt]^ . A s r  increases, so does u. Fewer 
persons are taxed at a higher rate, and the revenue is distributed 
amongst more persons. But in case (a) the increase in A can out­
weigh the increase in n, an effect which becomes stronger the higher 
is p.
A further question is raised by the issue of incentive compatibility: 
is the socially desirable pay-roll tax incentive compatible ? For the 
fiat-rate benefit regime this is trivially true, since all pay-roll taxes 
are incentive compatible. But for the earnings-related benefit regime, 
to which a similar analysis applies, there is a non-trivial incentive 
constraint. W hether the socially desirable r  satisfies this constraint
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Figure 3.1:
depends again on the distribution of productivities G. The principal 
insight is, however, that the attainment of incentive compatibility is a 
value judgment which needs to be justified. An incentive compatible 
pay-roll tax might not be the socially desirable one. In particular 
it may be socially desirable that some low skilled persons face the 
wrong set of incentives, since the aggregate welfare effect exceeds the 
welfare loss caused by the latter.
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3.4 Conclusion
Flat-rate {FR) benefits always produce lower inequality than earnings- 
related (ER)  benefits®, but poverty outcomes depend on the para­
meters of the poverty index. By changing these parameters, most 
initial rankings of the two benefit regimes can be reversed. More­
over, a trade-off between equity and efficiency might occur, which 
makes clear that the attainment of incentive compatibility for its 
own sake is a value judgment which needs to be justified.
However, one important assumption of the model is that agents 
are risk neutral, so that insurance has no role to play since agents 
only care about mean returns. This risk neutrality is a major cause 
for the negative results characterising the earnings-related benefit. 
Yet, insurance considerations are important in the design of actual 
tax-benefit systems. Finally, the normative question about the op­
timal insurance contract merits attention. If workers are assumed 
to be risk averse, this change destroys the linearity of the no arbi­
trage conditions for the worker and renders the model analytically in­
tractable. All the same, some qualitative observations may be made, 
which point to ingredients a useful model of (social) insurance should 
incorporate. An earnings-related benefit seems to perform well with 
a proportional pay-roll tax since it achieves a desirable stabilisation 
of incomes in every state of the world. In the absence of incentive
®I.e. by removing deleterious incentive effects in benefits one can produce 
lower inequality.
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considerations, the results of Yaari (1976) may be important who 
shows that the optimal consumption policy converges to mean con­
sumption for an agent exposed to an iid income risk, when the rate of 
interest is zero and no borrowing constraints are imposed. However, 
Yaari does not justify this stochastic process by means of a labour 
market model.
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3.5 Appendix: Risk aversion, tax-financed  
benefits, and Pareto improvements
This appendix attempts to indicate how the tax-benefit system can 
bring about Pareto improvements when agents are risk averse. The 
argument is only a partial equilibrium one, but the qualitative fea­
tures are taken from the preceding (general equilibrium) model 
Assume that workers are homogeneous. The representative agent 
maximises the expected discounted stream of utility, where utility 
is solely defined over consumption (ct)], where U{.) is
increasing and concave, U{0) = 0  and U'{0) < oo. W ith absent 
capital markets, the agent consumes all income in each period. As 
before, let s denote the exogenous job separation rate, r  the tax, b 
the benefit, and w the wage, w is drawn from the distribution F, 
with density / ,  over support [0; w]. For notational convenience, ig­
nore T and consider only b which may be zero. Below, we compare 
the welfare situation with no benefits (6  =  0 ) to a situation with a 
small benefit (6  > 0 ).
This problem will be analysed recursively. The agent’s expected 
utility is, when accepting a wage offer w,
U{w)+j3 [(1 — s) v{w) -f sv{b)], and if he chooses to search U{b)-\- 
(3 v{x)f{x)dx, where v denotes the value function. The latter
®This appendix is based on McCall (1970) and Lucas and Stokey (1989), 
section 10.7
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becomes
n w
=  max U{ w) P [ { 1  — s ) v { w) s v { b ) ] ' , U{ b ) P  /  v{x)f{x)dx
(&21)
which is well defined for the above problem. It is convenient to define 
A := U(b) P v(x)f(x)dx^ and it follows immediately tha t there 
is a unique w, w*, such that ( 1  — P)A = U{w*). This already is the 
optimal stopping rule: w* is the reservation wage below which all 
job offers will be rejected. The value function then becomes
I AÎOI w < w*d " 2  »■
which is a continuous function at w* and depicted in Figure 3.2 for 
the case 6 =  0 .
In order to derive the defining equation of the reservation wage, 
eliminate A, and break up the integral from b t o w  into one from b to 
w* and one from w* to w. It then follows, using U(w*) = {1 — P) A, 
that
£/(«)•) [1 + (3 s -  (3F{w') + +  (3)F{b)] (3.23)
P W
= {1 -  P Ps) U{b)-\~P U{x)f{x)dx
J W *
(Uniqueness of the reservation wage w* due to a single crossing of the 
schedules can be verified by differentiating both sides with respect 
to w*).
Analysing the effect of a ‘small’ benefit system reduces to examing 
dv{w)/dw\b=Q. W hat happens to the reservation wage defined by
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equation (3.23)? The value of the outside option rises whilst the 
value of the job falls if taxes are levied on the employed. The overall 
effect is an increase in the reservation wage. This is the incentive 
effect analysed in this paper. Since U{w*) = (1 — p) A, A rises as 
well. W hether the upper branch of equation (3.22) increases as well 
depends on the sign of the expression
If, for instance, no taxes are levied, then dv{w)/dw\b=o > 0 unam­
biguously, otherwise the concavity of the utility function will play an 
important role.
For such a case. Figure 3.2 depicts the effects of introducing a 
‘small’ unemployment benefit. Since v{w) is the expected utility 
given the current state, the figure shows the areas for which the area 
is better off. It is not surprising that a small unemployment insurance 
benefit should make a risk averse agent better off; however, the figure 
shows that the incentive effect -an increase in the reservation wage- 
may, in fact, reduce the welfare of some agents.
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Figure 3.2: The value functions
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Chapter 4 
The statistical analysis o f  
inequality and m obility  
indices
A bstract:We summarise results on the asymptotic distributions of 
standard inequality measures and derive a framework for making 
rigorous statistical inferences. A novel result is the derivation of 
the asymptotic distribution of the Shorrocks (1978) mobility index. 
Instead of using the (Gaussian) approximations, an alternative ap­
proach is to bootstrap the test statistics. The relative performance 
of these two approaches is assessed by comparing the lengths of the 
respective confidence intervals. Finally the robustness properties of 
the inequality indices are examined
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4.1 Introduction
Inequality indices are statistical tools employed to measure ’inequal­
ity’ within a distribution, but this measurement has normative im­
plications, and these spheres may often conflict. As their normative 
properties are analysed extensively in Atkinson (1970), this papers 
focuses exclusively on their statistical properties. Moreover, a frame­
work for making statistical inferences is established
An inequality or mobility index is a statistic T  defined on a ran­
dom variable income Y  with unobservable distribution function F. 
The measure can often be written as a linear functional or the ratio 
of linear functionals over the distribution F, so the population mea­
sure can be denoted by T{F). But since the researcher rarely has 
complete access to the population data, he is usually confined to a 
sample, and needs to estimate the true but unobservable distribu­
tion function F. The typical practice is to estimate the inequality 
measure non-parametrically by using the observable empirical distri­
bution function F^ '^^  as an estimate for F, and its derivative statistics 
(such as the sample mean or its order statistics). The value of the 
inequality measure is thus T{F^'^^).
However, the measure T{F^'^^) is itself a random variable. It has 
a sampling distribution which needs to be taken into account when 
interpreting a particular realisation t of the measure T(F^” )^. This 
issue is often ignored in the applied literature, when a particular 
value t is taken at face value. In such a case the measure is used as a
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descriptive device and not as a tool for rigorous statistical inference. 
In another situation, the researcher may have computed two different 
values of the inequality measure for different samples, this difference 
may not be statistical significant. Although the finite samples are not 
identical, they may come from the same distribution. Relying solely 
on the point estimate may induce him to draw a wrong conclusion.
is not the only conceivable estimator of the population 
parameter. Other non-parametric estimators of F  can be used, such 
as the smooth bootstrap estimator F , inducing the estimator T[F). 
Several resampling plans will be examined.
The second problem analysed in this chapter is that of data con­
tamination. The sample may be contaminated by data which is 
mistyped by the data provider, the typical example being a comma 
error. Or the surveyed person may have given a wrong answer. The 
researcher then does not calculate the inequality measure on the 
empirical distribution function of the true distribution F , but on a 
mixture distribution {1 — e) F  eH where H  is the contamination 
and £ the proportion of the data affected. We address the question 
to what extent the inequality measures are robust to data contami­
nation.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, the asymp­
totic distributions of standard inequality and mobility measures are 
derived. A framework for making statistical inference is established, 
and procedures for dominance tests are discussed. Since these results 
are only asymptotic, section 4.3 examines the relative performance of
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the asymptotics to various bootstrap techniques when sample sizes 
are relatively small, by investigating which methods result in shorter 
confidence intervals. Section 4.4 examines the robustness of the stan­
dard inequality measures against outliers or departures from the hy­
pothesised model.
4.2 A sym ptotic m ethods when the em­
pirical distribution function is used 
only once.
4 .2 .1  A sy m p to tic  d istr ib u tio n s o f in eq u a lity  and  
m o b ility  m easu res
This section collects results on the asymptotic distributions of popu­
lar measures. The typical practice is that the researcher computes an 
inequality measure on the basis of the unmodified sample from the 
population. Let Y  denote the random variable income with (unob­
servable) distribution function F  and let = (1/n) 1(y.<x)
denote the empirical distribution function putting equal weight on 
each observation where I  denotes the indicator function and n is the 
sample size. The the measure is denoted by T{F^'^^).
The surprising result is tha t all the measures analysed here are 
asymptotically normally distributed. This result is astonishing since, 
in most cases, normality does not follow from a straightforward appli-
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cation of the central limit theorem. Indeed, the arguments involved 
to justify the claim are at times intricate and differ markedly from 
measure to measure. The result about the normality of the Shorrocks 
mobility index is new and supported by a complementary bootstrap 
analysis.
T he Generalised Entropy index
Let GEa denote the Generalised Entropy index with parameter a  ^  
0,1. For these special cases de I’Hopitals rule needs to be applied 
before conducting the subsequent analysis. Then GEa{F) is defined 
by
1
— o;
(in a slight abuse of notation) where fii = J  ydF{y) and //« =  
f  y^dF{y). a  is a sensitivity parameter. The lower it is, the greater 
is the weight given to the bottom of the distribution. Using F^ '^^  the 
sample estimator GFa{F^^^) is readily computed to equal
— a
where jli = J  ydF^'^\y) and jia =  J  y^dF^'^\y). F^'^\y) — F{y) 
uniformly in y by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, and ( i=  (/ii, /ia) is 
a consistent estimator of the population parameters fi = (//i, /i^). Of 
course, {(i — y) is asymptotically normally distributed with mean 
zero and covariance matrix Q. T(.) is a differentiable function and the 
delta-method can be applied (see Rao (1973, p.387)). It follows that
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'nP'^{T{fj,) — T{fi)) is asymptotically normally distributed with zero 
mean and covariance matrix := denoting the vector of
derivatives. <7^  can be consistently estimated as by substituting 
in the sample vector fi for /i. Thus we obtain convergence to the 
standard normal distribution:
-  GEc,{F)
------------i _ J V ( 0 ; l )
a
The Gini coefficient
The theory needed to justify the normality of the Gini coefficient is 
much more intricate than in the preceding example because its usual 
estimator involves order statistics. But Hoeffding (1948) has devel­
oped a general theory of U-statistics, which he applied to the Gini 
coefficient in order to derive its asymptotic distribution. Let Gini 
denote the coefficient for the income population with distribution F 
and mean fi given by
G^niiF) =  A
where 6 /  / f y  — y\dF{x)dF{y). Gini[F^^^) is bias-corrected so
that
=  2 Â
where 6 := [n{n — 1)]~  ^J2 a^i3 — Ljaj is a consistent estimator of 
6, and jl is the sample mean. Since the income random variable 
is non-negative and assuming its second moment exists, Hoeffding’s 
theorem applies and
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^/n[Gini — Gini{F)] — > AT(0; H).
For the messy variance expression and its consistent estimator see 
Hoeffding (1948).
Lorenz curves
Beach and Davidson (1983), amongst others, derive the asymptotic 
normality of the Lorenz curve ordinates. Let Çp. and pi denote a 
quantile of the income variable and its population share, pi = F{^p.), 
and if F  is strictly monotone, ^p. = F~^[pi). A coordinate of the 
Lorenz curve is a pair (p%; ^(6pJ) and the Lorenz curve consists of 
these ordered pairs where i =  1,..,&. The coordinate for the unob­
servable population distribution F  is defined by
=  1  F \ d F ( u ) .
Vo
Substituting in the empirical distribution function yields the 
sample estimate
i=\
where r(q =  [npi] denotes the greatest integer less or equal to npi 
and Y{i) is the z-th order statistic of the sample.
The key theorem to prove normality of the ordinate estimate is 
the fundamental theorem that the order statistics are normally dis­
tributed around their population analogues, and so are linear func­
tions of the sample order statistics (see Rao (1973)). The principal
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requirement is that F  is strictly increasing and twice differentiable. 
In consequence, letting Ô
-  0] — > ATfc(0;i7)
For the messy covariance expression see Beach and Davidson (1983). 
Their principal merit is to propose a consistent estimator Ù oî Q 
which does not require knowledge of F.
This result suggests an alternative non-par ametric estimator of 
the Gini coefficient. Since the latter can be written as a linear func­
tion of 0 , say 1 — c'^ where c is a vector of coefficients, and as 
linear functions of normal variâtes are normally distributed, it fol­
lows that the Gini coefficient is asymptotically normally distributed 
with covariance matrix c'Q,c.
The Shorrocks m obility index
The setting for a discussion of the Shorrocks mobility index is dif­
ferent from the preceding discussion, since it is defined on transition 
matrices of incomes.
Let P = \pij], i = l , . . ,n ,  j  = l , . . . ,n  denote the unobservable 
nxn stochastic transition matrix, satisfying YljPij — 1,  ^ =  1,.., n 
and Pi the row vector pi = {pn, Pin)'■ Pij denotes the conditional 
probability of moving into state j  next period, given that state i 
is occupied in the current period. The matrix of all cell counts is 
denoted by X  =  [xij] and the row vector by Xi = {xn, ..,Xin)', where 
Xij is the number of observations falling into state j  given state i.
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Finally, let Xij denote the total number of observations in
each row i oi X.  The maximum likelihood estimator of the (first 
order Markov) transition probabilities is then defined by F  =  \pij\ 
with Pij = Xij/ui.
The large sample distribution of the Shorrocks index is based 
on well-known properties of the multinomial distribution ( Kendall 
and Stuart (1977), p.381): it follows from the central limit the­
orem that Xi will tend, with increasing to have a n —variate 
normal distribution, with means riiPij, variances r i iPi j{ l  — Pij)  and 
cov{xij,Xik) =  -riiPijPik ^  More specifically, y / n ^ p u  -  pu)  will tend 
towards the normal distribution A/'(0;pii(l — pu))- Assuming the 
rows of P, i.e. the conditional distributions, to be independent, 
trace{P) = tends to N { ^ .p n ; ' ^ .p i i ( l  -p u ) /n i )  and thus
(4.1)
Thus Shorrocks’ index is asymptotically normally distributed. This 
result is verified by bootstrapping the mobility index 1000 times (us­
ing income data from the panel dataset described and extensively
I^n fact, given this asymptotic normality, one can apply the delta method 
(Rao (1973)) to all standard mobihty indices to demonstrate their asymptotic 
normahty. The first order Taylor expansion of yu(P) about ;u(P) is ^{P) — 
f i {P)  +  DM{P){yec{P'  -  P')) where D M {P )  '.= dDM{P)/dvec{P ') ' .  Since 
y/nvec{P' — P') —> A (^0, V)  it follows that y/n{ij{P) — fi (P)) —»■ Æ(0, E) where 
E =  DM{ P) VDM{ Py .  See Trede (1995) for exphcit derivations.
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analysed in the next chapters). The result of this simulation is sum­
marised by Figure 4.1 which depicts a histogram for the realisations 
of the Shorrock index generated in all 1000 bootstrap runs and shows 
the asserted normality.
4 .2 .2  A  fram ew ork for h y p o th esis  te s t in g
S ta tis tic a l inference: a  d ifference o f m eans te s t
Having derived the asymptotic distribution of the standard inequal­
ity and mobility measures to be normal, one can assess the statistical 
significance of a particular estimate by computing its standard error. 
Moreover, given two independent samples, one can address the ques­
tion whether the computed measures are statistically significantly 
different. Since the asymptotic distribution of a standard measure 
is normal, the appropriate test is a difference-of-means test. Let 
denote the sample measure, its estimated variance and the 
size of the sample drawn from populations F( )^, i =  1,2. The test 
statistic is
ÿ(i) _  ÿ(2)
s =
Under the null hypothesis that the two population measures are the 
same, s is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal distribu­
tion.
Given a chosen critical level, the significance level of the test, i.e. 
the probability of a type I error of wrongly rejecting the null hypoth-
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asm
Figure 4.1; Histogram of the bootstrapped Shorrocks mobility index 
and the fitted normal distribution.
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esis, is easily found by integrating the standard normal distribution. 
However, the power of the test, the probability of a type II error 
of wrongly accepting the null, depends on the difference of the two 
unobservable population measures If this difference is
large, then the power of the test is large, but if it is small, so is the 
power of the test.
It is important to realise that this test requires independent sam­
ples. Whilst this may be safely assumed for geographically separated 
data, used, for instance, in international comparisons, this indepen­
dence does certainly not hold for variables such as pre-tax pre-benefit 
income and post-tax post-benefit income for a given year. Two ap­
proaches may be pursued. First, if the type of correlation can be 
established, the inference rule might be adjusted. If the correlation 
is positive, the above test statistic s computed on the assumption of 
independence is lower than the true value Stme, Stme ^  s. The null 
hypothesis of same means is rejected if s is largel. Since Stme is even 
larger one can reject the null even for positively correlated samples. 
On the other hand, one cannot make an inference if s is sufficiently 
small as to suggest the acceptance of the null. In the case of negative 
correlation, the converse of above arguments applies.
The second approach is to attem pt to estimate the covariance 
matrix for dependent samples. Davidson and Duclos (1995) achieve 
this aim for quantile-based test statistics, such as Lorenz curves. Let 
(y, Z) be two jointly distributed random variables, F  with inverse G 
denote the marginal distribution of %, p a probability, and define the
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expectation 7 p := E{Y\Z < G{p)). Define a second set of random 
variables V  and W  analogously {F*, G*,p', = E{V\W < G*{p'))).
Then they derive a lengthy expression for the asymptotic covariance 
of the sample estimates {pj,p 6) as:
E { Y V I [ o , a ( p } ] { Z ) I [ o , a - ( p ' } ] { W ) )  -  
E ( Y \ Z  =  G { p ) ) E { V f y , a ( j , ) m o . a - ( M W ) } -  
E { V \ W  =  G - { p ' ) ) E { Y I i o , a i p ) m o . a - < y ) ] { W ) )  +
E (Y \Z  = G{p))E{V\W = G‘ ip'))E{Iio,a(j,)](Z)Iio.a-w\(W)) 
p p ' { ( ^ , - E { Y \Z  = G {p) ) ) (S^ -E {V \W  = G'{p'))))
Whilst the unconditional expectations can be readily estimated 
by their sample equivalents, Davidson and Duclos propose to esti­
mate the conditional expectations by applying kernel density estima­
tors. Moreover, distance estimators such as T =  [Fp] =  [p(7 p /7 i ~  
^p/^i)]are shown to be asymptotically normally distributed with co- 
variance matrix of the form where J  is the Jacobian of the
transform F and D consists of the above covariances.
D om inance tests
The difference of means test can be employed to test whether two 
Lorenz curves derived from two independent samples are statistically 
significantly different. Since the sum of squares of independent stan­
dard normal random variables has a chi-squared distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of terms in the sum, it fol­
lows that the test statistic
c = (^ (1) -  (^2)) + (^2)/yi(2)^  (^ (1) -  (^2))
has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of population shares { Pi < I, i = 1, ..,k) at which the 
ordinates are estimated.
Moreover, these results can be used when designing a test as to 
whether Lorenz curves intersect, i.e. a test for Lorenz dominance. 
The test for Lorenz dominance is an example of multiple hypothe­
sis testing (see Savin (1984)), since dominance is a joint statement 
about all individual Lorenz ordinates , i =  1,.., /c. This set
of individual hypotheses induces two types of ’’simple” tests. An 
intersection-union (lU) test is based on the union of all acceptance 
regions of each individual null hypothesis. If the multiple compar­
ison null is Ho : ^  ^ ( 2)(<CpJ] for some i, and the
alternative Ha : H^a [^(i)(4^pj > ^ (2)(^pJ] for all i, then every in­
dividual null has to be rejected for the multiple comparison null to 
be rejected, and thus Lorenz dominance inferred. This induces the 
decision rule to infer that the first distribution Lorenz dominates the 
second if m in (s i,.., s^) exceeds the critical level Ca (i.e. when Ha is 
accepted).
An alternative test is an union-intersection test (UI) which is 
based on the intersection of all acceptance regions of individual hy­
pothesis. If the multiple comparison hypothesis is i/o : Hq  ^ —
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^ (2) (fpi)] for all i, and the alternative Ha : [0 (i)((p,) > 0 (2)KpJ]
for some i, then every individual null has to be accepted for the mul­
tiple comparison null to be accepted. The induced decision rule is 
to reject Hq and infer that distribution one Lorenz dominates dis­
tribution two if max ( s i , Sf c)  exceeds the critical level Cg . (This 
test could also be turned on its head by interchanging distribution 
one and two where the multiple comparison null is to be rejected if 
mi n( s i , Sf c)  < —Cs , so that Lorenz dominance is inferred when 
the first test is rejected but the second test is accepted.)
Which test is preferable ? The choice should clearly depend on 
both the significance level and the power of the test. The signifi­
cance level of the lU rule is less than the significance level of the 
individual test, since the probability of wrongly rejecting the multi­
ple comparison null when Hq is true is bounded by the probability 
of wrongly rejecting an individual null when Hq is true. In order 
to determine the significance level and thus the critical value Cs of 
the UI test, the Bonferroni inequality is frequently used^. (Slightly 
sharper results can be obtained by the Sidak inequality or a further
^The Bonferroni inequality states that P r f T i , T p }  >  1 — Pr{TU  
where Ai is an event and its complement. Applying this gives 
Pr{m ax{si, . .,Sk} < Cs}  >  1 — M, where 6 is the significance level of the indi­
vidual test. If the multiple comparison test is to have significance level we 
require l —k6 >  1—a, which implies 6 <  a/k.  The first inequality then determines 
the critical value Cs- The Sidak inequality specialises to P r { m a x { s i , s ^ }  <  
Cs}  >  (1 — 6)  ^ and a similar reasoning requires that 6 <  1 — (1 — 0 ;)“ ^. Note 
that correlations may be arbitrary and that (1 — 6)'^  >  I — k6.
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inequality derived from the studentised maximum modulus distri­
bution.) But although the significance level may be bounded, the 
choice of the test should then be determined by its power. However, 
’’little is known about the power of the Bonferroni test” ( Savin 
(1984, p.860) ). Howes (1993), comparing the two tests, also failed 
to impose a bound on the latter, but showed in a simulation study 
tha t the probability of inferring dominance when there is crossing 
can be high using the UI inference rule. He concludes that the lU 
should be used for inferring dominance, and the UI rule for inferring 
no dominance.
This method can also be employed to test for first order sto­
chastic dominance, as carried out in Beach, Chow, Formby, and 
Slotsve (1994). Let 7  =  [7 %] denote the vector of cumulative means 
7 i =  E\Y \Y  < fpj and =  [fii] the vector of quantile means 
fii = E[y|^p._i < Y  < ^pj. Beach and Davidson (1984) have shown 
G = (pi7 i; ...;Pifc7 fc) to be asymptotically normally distributed with 
covariance matrix Ù. But since 7  and /i are linearly related for equally 
spaced probabilities 7  =  Ajj,, it follows that ft = RG is asymp­
totically normally distributed with covariance matrix RQ.R' where 
R = {PA)~^ and P  =  diag{pi). The test for first order stochastic 
dominance then involves computing t-statistics for difference in sam­
ple means and then applying the union-intersection or intersection- 
union test.
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4.3 Resampling Plans
Most inequality measures are linear functionals or the ratio of linear 
functionals of a distribution function F, T  (F) = f  t{y)dF{y). For 
instance, the function t{.) may be as simple as t{y) = y in the case 
of the mean. For the Gini, S = T{F) = J  f  \x — y\dF{x)dF{y) 
or for the Lorenz ordinate T{F) = f  >jdF(y). Let F  denote
the true but unobservable distribution function. The linearity of 
the functional implies that one estimator of the population measure 
T{F) can be computed by substituting in the empirical distribution 
function, T(F^” )^. This is the standard practice. However, several 
observations can be made at this point.
First, as regards standard practice, most researchers are content 
with a particular value and ignore the analysis of statistical
significance. However, even if this analysis is conducted using the 
asymptotic theory of the previous section, sample sizes are often 
small after an extensive decomposition of the sample according to 
some characteristics. The question then arises whether the departure 
from the asymptotics is severe in small samples.
Second, is only one non-par ametric estimator of F , and other
estimates may be more suitable. In particular, if F  is smooth and the 
sample size is small, it may be beneficial to use the smooth bootstrap 
estimator F . Since T(.) is linear, T (F ) is readily computed. These 
issues are analysed in the subsequent section.
The performance of the normal approximation may also be as-
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sessed by comparing its confidence intervals with those derived by 
applying bootstrap techniques. To this end a simulation study is 
carried out below.
4 .3 .1  T h e sm o o th  b o o tstra p  es tim a to rs
Let fh denote the density estimate of the univariate distribution F  
with smoothing parameter h and kernel K{.), given by
i=l
Then
^h{y) = [  fh{x)dx 
J —oo
is an estimator of the distribution function F. The functional T{Fh) 
is readily computed as
=  f  t{Yi + he)K{e)de
after the obvious change of variable with Jacobian h.
The resampling scheme here is to draw bootstrap samples from 
the estimate Fh instead from F^'^\ It is particularly attractive in 
small samples, since in this case ordinary bootstrap samples contain 
multiple occurrences of the same datapoint. However, this advantage
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vanishes the larger the sample is (see Hall, DiCiccio, and Romano 
(1989)). Sampling from Fh can be implemented in a straightforward 
manner. If the kernel K{.) is Gaussian, one can set X i  = Y i - \ - e  where 
£ has a standard normal distribution. Often it is advantageous to 
shrink F/^ , so that the modified data has the same variance as the 
original data (see Silverman and Young (1987)). Then set x* = y* + 
(1  +  h?/ {y* — y* + he), where y* are sampled with replacement 
from the original sample, ÿ* is its mean, its variance and e is 
distributed as a standard normal. (1  4- is the rescaling
factor , and e is Gaussian since the kernel is Gaussian.
A problem for all density estimation is the appropriate choice of 
the smoothing parameter as h offers a trade-off between smoothness 
and bias. In order to determine an appropriate bandwidth for the 
subsequent simulation study, two methods were applied to one ran­
dom sample. First, the method of a reference distribution computes 
the optimal bandwidth if the sample were drawn from a normal dis­
tribution. This method yields /i=.352. The second method is cross- 
validation, which is another attem pt to minimise the mean squared 
error of the density estimate where the idea is to use the remaining 
observations to fit a density at each observation. This results in the 
estimate h = .507. For the subsequent simulation, a compromise 
value h = 0.4 has been chosen. Since the results of the first sim­
ulation using GE2 were not encouraging, the bandwidth has been 
doubled, =  0 .8 , for the subsequent simulations.
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4 .3 .2  A  sim ulation: C on fid en ce in tervals
In order to evaluate the relative performance of the normal approx­
imation and the various bootstrap methods, the following simula­
tion study is carried out. The first inequality index to be exam­
ined is GE2, which is very quick to compute. Using var{x) =
E{x^) — [E{x)Ÿ, yields GE2 = ^ . b v a r { y ) . Then the Gini and the 
Lorenz curve ordinate ^(fo.s) of median income are tested. 1000 sam­
ples (500 for the smooth bootstrap simulations) of size n are drawn 
from A (^5; 1) -the normal distribution with mean five and variance 
one. W ith F  thus defined, the population indices are GE2{F) =  0.02,
Gini= 0.11284, and ^(^ 0.5 ) =  0.42. In each iteration B = 1000 boot­
strap samples are generated. Another simulation study is described 
below.
Let t denote the value of the estimator computed from the ini­
tial sample with empirical distribution function F^'^\ The bootstrap 
estimate i = 1 , B  is computed by resampling with replace­
ment from F^‘^ \  The nominal approximate coverage probability of 
the confidence interval is 100(1 — 2a) and a  is chosen as 0.025.
Confidence intervals for the normal approximation are based on 
the fact that y/nT{F^'^^) is asymptotically normally distributed N{T{F);a^). 
Standardising leads to the confidence interval [t — 1.96y/â^/n; t +  
1.96y^d^/n] where is a consistent estimator of the covariance of 
the inequality measure and n is the sample size.
Confidence intervals for bootstrap techniques are not unique.
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Subsequently, three methods are implemented (see Shao and Tu
(1995) or Davidson and Hinkley (1995) for a more thorough descrip­
tion). First, in the basic method the bootstrap distribution oit* — t 
is used to approximate the quantiles of the distribution t — T{F). 
This yields the interval
[2t — ^((i_a)(5 +i)); — ^(a(B+i))]- Second, the percentile method
assumes that there is an (unspecified) transformation of the esti­
mator, yielding a symmetric distribution. Using the above quantile 
estimator and inverting the (unspecified) transformation gives the 
interval ^((i-a)(g+i))]- However, since the assumed symme­
try ignores bias and requires that t* — t and t — T{F) have the same 
variance, the BCq method, the third method, attem pts to correct 
for bias and skewedness (see Efron (1987) for details).
4 .3 .3  D iscu ssion
Table 4.1 reports the results; box plots are omitted for the sake of 
brevity. All methods produce confidence intervals which bracket the 
population value, and their lengths are comparable. The smooth 
bootstrap methods do not produce better results, i.e. shorter confi­
dence intervals, than their competitors. The samples of size 100 ap­
pear to be sufficiently large to erode the advantage the method has in 
’’small” samples. The (ordinary) bootstrap methods produce better 
results than the normal approximation, but the improvement is not 
dramatic. Surprisingly (but confirming results of other researchers
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71=100 77,=  1000
method average
lower
average
upper
average
length
average
lower
average
upper
average
length
GE2
normal
approx. .0144 .0257 .0113 .0182 .02184 .0036
bootstrap
basic
percentile
.01426 .0255 .0 1 1 2 .01819 .02183 .0036
.01462 .0259 .01128 .01822 .02186 .0036
.01545 .0272 .01175 .0183 .02197 .0037
smooth boot.
basic
percentile
.0135 .0262 .0127
.0141 .0267 .0126
.0146 .0275 .0129
Gini
normal
approx. .08489 .139 .05411 .1042 .12139 .0172
bootstrap
basic
percentile
.09669 .1289 .03221 .1077 .1108 .0103
.09499 .1272 .03221 .1075 .1178 .0103
.098 .1307 .0.327 .1078 .1182 .0104
smooth boot.
basic
percentile
BC,,
.0916 .1324 .0408
.0909 .1317 .0408
.093 .133 .04
LC
normal
approx. .408 .433 .025 .4164 .424 .0076
bootstrap
basic
percentile
BC«
.407 .432 .025 .4163 .424 .0077
.409 .434 .025 .4164 .424 .0076
.405 .431 .026 .4161 .4239 .0078
smooth boot, 
basic 
percentile 
BC^
.406 .436 .03
.4059 .4358 .0299
.404 .434 .03
Table Simulation study: confidence intervals for sample sizes n. The 
population distribution is N(5;l). For each case 1000 simulations (500 in case 
of smooth bootstrap) were run, each comprising 1 0 0 0  boostrap computations. 
Average lower (upper) refers to the lower (upper) bound of the confidence 
intervals, averaged across all simulatirm runs. Average length is the average 
length of the confidence interval.
in different applications, such as Burr (1994)) the computationally 
more complicated methods do not lead to shorter confidence inter­
vals. In fact, the simplest method, the percentile method, performs 
best.
However, this simulation study has examined the simplest of sit­
uations in which samples are drawn from a normal distribution, i.e. 
a distribution which is smooth, unimodal and symmetric. In more 
complicated models the normal approximation may not perform as 
nicely. In order to test this possibility, two further simulations were 
conducted. First, samples are drawn from a Gamma distribution 
with shape parameter 2  in order to test the performance of the nor­
mal approximation on skewed distribution. Second, a bimodal nor­
mal mixture distribution is generated. Table 4.2 summarises the 
results. However, the relative performance of the normal approxi­
mation does not worsen, reaffirming the above conclusions.
4.4 Robustness
Very often, a hypothesised model fits the true but unobservable 
model only approximately; or the sample contains some contamina­
tion, such as outlier introduced by decimal point error in data tran­
scription. The analysis of whether test statistics are robust against 
these types of model deviations is the subject of robust statistics, 
introduced into distributional analysis in Victoria-Feser (1993).
Formally, the observed distribution is a mixture between the
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G(2) 0.5N(2;1) -f 0.5N(5;1)
method average
lower
average
upper
average
length
average
lower
average
upper
average
length
GE2
normal
approx. .174 .3268 .1528 .0963 .1720 .0757
bootstrap
basic
percentile
.174 .324 .15 .0934 .1696 .076
.177 .3275 .1505 .09866 .1748 .076
.1895 .351 .1615 .1024 .181 .0786
LC
normal
approx. .2066 .2723 .0657 .2448 .31354 .06874
bootstrap
basic
percentile
.2023 .269 .0667 .2405 .31 .0695
.2099 .2766 .0667 .248 .3179 .0699
.2016 .2687 .0.0671 .2376 .309 .0714
Gini
normal
approx. .2745 .469 .19 .2218 .378 .156
bootstrap
basic
percentile
.3302 .4215 .09136 .2517 .35 .098
.322 .4136 .09136 .249 .3477 .098
.3315 .4235 .092 .2575 .3585 .1 0 1
Table 4.2: Simulation study: confidence intervals. The first pop­
ulation distribution is Gamma with shape parameter 2 . The sec­
ond distribution is a mixture of normal distributions 0.5N(2;1) 4 - 
0.5N(5;1). For each case 500 simulations were run, each comprising 
1 0 0 0  boostrap computations . V^^rage lower (upper) refers to the 
lower (upper) bound of the confidence intervals, averaged across all 
simulation runs. Average length is the average length of the confi­
dence interval.
underlying distribution F  and an error distribution Hz, Fs{x) = 
(1 — e) F  eHz{x), where e is the proportion of the data affected. 
Using Hz{x) = I(^ x>z)i a tool to measure locally the influence of a 
datapoint on the statistic T{.) is the influence function {IF), deflned 
as
IF{x;T-,F) = lim ~ ^ e- ^ 0  £
The crux is whether the influence of a small contamination or model 
departure can be so huge as to dominate the value of the statistic. In 
particular, if the I F  is unbounded, T(.) may be biased to the extent 
of being meaningless. Although Hz is a rather special distribution, 
the I F  thus defined is sufficient to describe the maximal asymptotic 
bias of an estimator over a neighbourhood of the model, as the latter 
can be shown to be proportional to the IF.
The use of the IF  extends, in fact, beyond the issue of robustness, 
and can be employed to derive the asymptotic distributions of section 
2  for parametric cases. Supposing the distribution G is ’near’ F , one 
can compute the von Mises/Taylor expansion of the functional T(.). 
Then substituting in G = Fn and invoking the Glivenko-Cantelli 
theorem,
Tn {Fn) = T{F) +  J  IF{x; T ; F)dFn{x) +  remainder 
Evaluating the integral then yields
n
y/n{Tn — T{F)} = {n)~^'^ ^  IF{Xi,  T; F) +  remainder
i = \
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The first term of the right member is asymptotically normally dis­
tributed due to central limit theorem. One then needs to argue in 
the specific case why the remainder vanishes asymptotically. Finally 
the asymptotic variance equals
V(T; F) = J  IF{x-,T- F fd F (x )
In the following sections the influence functions of standard in­
equality measures are derived. It is shown that most of them are 
not robust against departures from the true model. Remedies to 
overcome this shortcoming are then discussed.
4 .4 .1  R ob u stn ess  p rop erties o f  quant lie based  in­
eq u a lity  m easures
In order to derive the influence functions of the class of quantile- 
based measures, it is necessary to derive the former for quantiles 
(this is done in Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996b)).
Let Fe denote the above mixture distribution with point mass 
contamination at z, Q{F^;p) its p-quantile, and Q{F;p) = Xp is the 
p-quantile of F. Using the definition of F  ^ it follows that Q{F^;p) = 
Q{F; [p — I{xp>z)^]/(1 — c)). If F  is invertible at the quantile Xp, it is 
easily established that
For I F  to be bounded requires, for p ^ {0,1}, f{Q{F;p)) > 0. At
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the boundaries, applications of de I’Hospitals’ rule establish when 
I F  is bounded.
The computation of quantile-based measures then involves the 
derivation of cumulative means, ^ (F ;p )  =  xdF. Using F^
yields
rQ{Fe]p) rQ{Fe\p)
^{Fe]p) =  (1 — s) / xdF{x) +  6  / xdHz{x)
and differentiating this yields
F )  =  - $ ( F ; p )  +  Q ( F ; p ) / ( Q ( F ; p ) ) / F ( z ;  Q; F )  +  z
= pQ{F\p) -  0(F;p) + I{x^>z){z -  Q{F;p))
Thus a large z can render this I F  unbounded, but if the income do­
main is bounded, so is, in general, this IF.  In consequence, a mea­
sure like the generalised Lorenz curve is (in general) robust. However, 
most other quantile-based measures include a normalisation at the 
mean p, = E{x). But since the mean clearly is highly non-robust, 
these measures inherit this property.
4 .4 .2  D eco m p o sa b le  in eq u a lity  m easures
Another large class of inequality measures are the decomposable 
ones, which can be written in the form / ( / )  =  '0 [J(F ,//(F )); //(F)] 
where J (F ; //) =  j  (j){x; p)dF{x). The generalised entropy indices 
constitute a subclass of indices. Since they depend on the mean and 
are linear in income, intuition suggests that they should fail to be
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robust. The subsequent analysis follows Cowell and Victoria-Feser
(1996). The ’cleanest’ result is obtained when the contamination is 
mean preserving and contains two points, resulting in
IF{z]I]F)  = /z) [-J (F ;/x ) -hO.50(xi;/z) -hO.5 0 (x2 ;/z)]
If the income domain is bounded, so is this IF.  In this specialised 
computation, the mean remained unaffected. But since in general 
the mean changes as well, and it is clearly non-robust, the robustness 
properties of the index worsens too.
In a simulation study Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996) compute 
the Theil index {GEq) on a log-normal distribution LAT(1;0.8). If 
5% of the data is affected by decimal point errors, they find tha t the 
value of the index doubles.
4 .4 .3  R em ed ies
Although an inequality measure may fail to be robust but may have 
appealing normative properties, two approaches to ’robustify’ the 
index can be pursued.
First, the sample might be trimmed, so that after removing the 
[na\ smallest and the [n{l — a)] largest observations, the statistic 
is computed on the remaining ones. This procedure leads to such 
concepts as a trimmed Lorenz curve
La{F;p) =  [ /  xdF{x)/{l-2a)]/[  /  xdF{x)/{l-2a)]
JQ{F-,a) JF-i(a)
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Second, in the parametric approach, a parametric model for the in­
come distribution is hypothesised, and its parameters are estimated 
in a robust fashion as suggested in the literature (Hampel, Ronchetti, 
Rousseeuw, and Stahel (1986)). Then, the inequality measures are 
computed using this parametric model. These computationally com­
plicated procedures invariably trade-off efficiency and robustness.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has collected results which are important for the sta­
tistical analysis of inequality and mobility indices. The standard 
indices are shown to be normally distributed. Moreover, a frame­
work for making statistical inferences has been established, and such 
tests as dominance tests were discussed. Although the derived re­
sults are valid only asymptotically, sample sizes above 1 0 0  appear 
to be sufficiently large, as bootstrap methods do not produces much 
shorter confidence intervals. Finally, the standard measures often 
fail to be robust to departures from the underlying model. Measures 
to robustify the index include restricting its domain, trimming, or 
parametric methods.
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Chapter 5 
The Panel D ataset GSOEP  
D escribed
Part III: The Empirical Analysis
Abstract: The panel dataset GSOEP is described, the tax-benefit 
simulations summarised, and data issues such as representativeness 
and sample selection are discussed.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a panel dataset, the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP), which is used in the subsequent empirical analyses 
of Part III of this dissertation. GSOEP exists in two incarnation, 
viz. GSOEP proper and the ’’Equivalent Datafile” . The latter con­
tains a very small subset of the variables contained in the former, 
but it includes some variables created by the data-provider, which 
are not contained in GSOEP proper such as an estimation of post­
tax post-benefit household income. Its principal limitation is the 
length of the time series, encompassing currently the years 1984 to 
1990 whereas GSOEP proper offers the latest survey responses; an­
other drawback is the absence of some important variables. Chapter 
8  uses and comments on the ”Equivalent Datafile” . In order to ex­
amine more recent data, GSOEP proper is used, but the tax-benefit 
system needs to be simulated. This chapter describes the raw data, 
summarises the necessary simulations and discusses data issues such 
as representativeness and sample selection. GSOEP proper is used 
in chapter 6  and 7.
5.2 The panel: description of the raw 
data
GSOEP is a clustered-sampled panel dataset which surveys panel 
members annually since 1984. Researchers outside Germany obtain
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a random draw of 95% of the gross sample housed at DIW (Deutsche 
Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschuug), a distribution method which is 
designed to preserve the anonymity of the sample members and to 
conform to the strict German data protection laws.
The data is collected by means of two types of questionnaires. 
The household questionnaire, to be filled out by the household head, 
collects information at the household level, such as housing costs and 
household asset income. The concept of the household refers to the 
dwelling, and therefore differs from the notion of the main tax unit 
or the core-family, because grandparents and other relatives may 
share the same dwelling. Each person aged at least 16 is surveyed in 
the individual questionnaire. Otherwise, parents answer the relevant 
questions about their children. Although the GSOEP is conceptu­
ally similar to the PSID, this interview procedure constitutes a major 
difference, since in the PSID only the household head is interviewed. 
The population is then partitioned into three samples. Sample A 
consists of West Germans only, sample B contains answer of foreign 
nationals. Since 1990 the panel has been extended to cover East Ger­
many, collected in sample C. This conceptual organisation translates 
into wave92 containing six separate relevant data files. The provision 
of biographical information leads to a further supply of files, leading 
to a total of 17 files for wave92. The subsequent chapters concentrate 
on samples A and B only, because East Germany is still undergoing 
significant economic and institutional transformation.
The evolution of the panel is determined by the panel rules gov­
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erning the treatment of a person. The principal concept is that of 
an original GSOEP member (as distinct from a household), being a 
person who has been surveyed in 1984 or who has been born to one. 
They remain members of the panel, even if they leave the original 
household. On the other hand, a person who joins the household 
of an original GSOEP member is interviewed as long as the person 
remains associated with the latter. Since 1988 this follow-up concept 
has changed in that all new persons, having gained an association 
with an original GSOEP member, are kept in the panel, even if this 
association later dissolves. At its inception in 1984, 16205 persons 
were registered. In 1992 65% of original panel members remained. 
This attrition is counterbalanced by the entry of new persons, who 
become associated with an original member. The consequence is 
twofold. The total number of interviews carried out has stabilised, 
but the dataset has ceased to be rectangular.
GSOEP, of course, contains a wealth of income variables which, 
unfortunately, cannot be used as immediate input into the empir­
ical investigations. The subsequent chapters, for instance, seek to 
analyse the welfare properties of the income distribution or the dis­
tributional consequences of the German tax-benefit system. To these 
ends, the concept of post-tax post-benefit income is the most appro­
priate, but in this respect the dataset is most user-friendly. On the 
one hand, the household questionnaire includes a question about 
the household head’s estimate of the household’s disposable income. 
Unfortunately such an approach is notoriously flawed, and Rend-
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tel, Langeheime, and Bernsten (1992) show that 50% of the sample 
dramatically underestimate this quantity. On the other hand, pre­
tax variables proliferate and the only solution is to accept the fate 
lamented by Johnson in chapter one, and to pursue the unthankful 
task of simulating the tax-benefit system.
5.3 The derived data, sim ulations, and 
income definitions
Since most data about incomes are provided as gross amounts, an 
extensive tax-benefit simulation has to be applied in order to arrive 
at (post-tax, post-benefit) disposable income. The salient features 
of the (non-integrated) German tax-benefit system are described in 
Schhiter (1995), which summarises the algorithms implemented in 
this simulation and we just summarise the most prominent institu­
tional features. All benefits are tax-free, except for pensions. Bene­
fits derived from social insurance claims are mostly earnings-related, 
whilst most assistance programmes requiring a means-test pay fiat 
rates. The financial burden of child-rearing is redistributed both by 
means of direct and indirect benefits, viz. a universal child bene­
fit, special means-tested programmes, and universal tax allowances. 
Married couples use the method of split taxation, in which joint tax­
able incomes are notionally divided equally before determining the 
applicable marginal tax rate. This method translates into a smaller
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marginal tax relative to individual assessment, if an earnings differ­
ence between the partners exists. The marginal rates of income tax 
are linearised, ranging from 19% to 53%.
The concept of the surveyed household refers to the dwelling, 
and therefore differs from the notion of the main tax unit or the core 
family, because grandparents and other relatives may share the same 
dwelling. An automatic procedure has been applied to identify the 
members of the core-family, i.e. the principal tax unit. Whenever 
possible, the method of split taxation is applied to a married couple. 
Otherwise the person’s tax  liability is assessed individually.
The simulation of social security contributions has been based 
on some simplifying assumptions. Privately insured persons have 
been treated as if they were insured by the relevant statutory in­
surances. This approximation is quite reasonable, given that, for 
instance, 90% of the population are insured by the statutory health 
insurance. Moreover, only the very rich can opt out of some statutory 
programmes, and then this choice reflects preferences and consump­
tion aspects. Second, German civil servants (Beamte) enjoy special 
privileges and a number of fringe benefits. In the simulation all 310 
cases (wave92) have been treated like ordinary workers, paying, as a 
first approximation, the same social security contributions as every­
one else.
Finally, since the data for wave 92 provides only an indicator 
for the receipt of social assistance, it has been stipulated that the 
entire household received this means-tested benefit for the whole
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item s incom e label
gross earnings (including bonuses and perks) -1- 
gross pensions +  maintenance payments
annual gross income
armual gross income - social security contributions 
- taxes -t- benefits
armual disposable (post­
tax post-benefit) income
Table 5.1: Income Definitions
year, amounting to the standard rates. Actual one-off payments 
could therefore not be included.
Table 5.1 summarises the income definitions used in the subse­
quent analysis.
The following income concepts are employed: annual pre-tax pre­
benefit income includes gross earnings, gross pensions and mainte­
nance payments received. In particular, bonuses and perks are taken 
into account. All other social security payments are classified as ben­
efits. Deducting social security contributions, tax and tax-surcharges 
yields post tax income. Adding the non-taxable benefits post-tax, 
post-benefit annual income is arrived at.
The household questionnaire also provides a question about finan­
cial wealth and investment income, viz. about interest, dividends, 
and rent received. However, these items have not been included in 
the income definition employed here for several reasons. Given that 
the household is not necessarily identical with the core family, it is 
not clear why the household head should possess all the relevant in­
formation about the financial wealth of all the household members.
I l l
Second, the item suffers from a low response rate. The problems 
associated with this variable may be gathered from the fact that a 
separate one-off investment survey suffered not only from a low re­
sponse rate, but also led to a permanent 5% attrition for the entire 
panel
In order to take into account the economies of scale within the 
families, its size and composition, the McClements’ equivalence scales 
are applied. Although the choice of any equivalence scale is arbitrary, 
the McClements’ scale is widely used amongst researchers and the 
UK Department of Social Security ^.This choice has been made for 
several reason. First, Burkhauser et al. (1994) argue that the German 
social assistance scale implies too low scale economies. Second, using 
the McClements’ scale permits a first comparison with comparative 
results for the UK, such as found in Jenkins (1994) ^
The net sample of wave 92 used in this next chapter has been 
arrived at after dropping selected observations. East Germans were
^Ignoring asset income, however, also introduces a bias, as, for instance, a 
sizesable fraction of the elderly rely more heavily on this income source. The un­
observed income distribution for the elderly may thus have longer tails, resulting
in greater inequality amongst them than the analysis in chapter 6 suggests.
^Cf. DSS(1993) ’’Households below average income”, for instance. Banks et
al. (1993) provide a recent appraisal of the McClements scale.
^The results of Buhmaim et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (1992) demonstrate
that the evaluation of income inequahty can significantly change when differ­
ent equivalence scales are applied. In fact the latter discover a U-type relation 
between the value of the inequality index and the elasticity of the equivalence 
scale.
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identified and filtered out, because East Germany is still undergo­
ing significant economic and institutional transformation. Then all 
households living in a community home have been dropped follow­
ing the precedent established by the PSID, because the inspected 
data looked too peculiar. Finally, after performing all the compu­
tations, all persons were dropped whose disposable income fell be­
low the (arbitrary) cut-off point of DM1000. To get an idea of the 
various sample sizes, the resulting net sample for wave92 contains 
iV92=10107 observations in i / 92=3822. All other waves received a 
similar treatment, resulting in sample sizes above 9000. For the 
analyses of income dynamics incomes are evaluated at 1992 prices.
5.4 Representativeness
This issue of representativeness  ^ is clearly important, since the sub­
sequent chapters seek to draw inferences about the (West German) 
population and not be confined to making statements about one 
unique sample. Table 5.2 juxtaposes some characteristics of the net 
sample with census data pertaining to West Germany. Two obser­
vations can be made. The sample is ‘close‘ to the population but 
the data needs to be weighted wherever possible. This is not unex­
pected since various groups have different sampling probabilities and
^On the issue of panel attrition see Rendtel(1995). The problem of weighting 
is extensively discussed in Pischner et al. (1995), and Riebschlager(1995) juxta­
poses the weighting procedures of GSOEP, PSID and the BHPS.
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wave 92 population unweighted sample weighted sample
unemployment rate [%] 6.3 5.87 4.9
active workforce [%] 46.5 46.6 45.4
foreign households [%] 9.5 28.4 6.3
source: own calculations; Datemeport (1994) and Jahrbuch (1994)
Table 5.2: Representativeness of the sample
foreigners are deliberately over-sampled.
Moreover, the sampling probability of any wave is determined by 
three components: first, the probability of being sampled in the first 
wave. Second, the follow-up procedure needs to be taken into ac­
count, since new panel members already had a chance of being sam­
pled in the first wave. Moreover, the different drop-out probabilities 
of different socio-economic groups can be controlled for. Table 5.1 
illustrates this problem of panel attrition and quantifies its causes. 
However, the recent large influx of immigrants is not controlled for, 
resulting in a severe under-representation of this group.
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Chapter 6 
Income D istribution and  
Inequality in Germany
Abstract: Kernel density estimates are employed for an exploratory 
analysis of the distributional consequences of the German tax-benefit 
system using GSOEP. The equalising forces of the system are ex­
amined for the year 1991. Moreover, the anatomy of the remaining 
income inequality -i.e. of post-tax post-benefit income- is thoroughly 
examined.
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6.1 Introduction
The two preceding chapters examined some of the essential prereq­
uisites for a rigorous empirical analysis. In this chapter we return 
to the main theme of this dissertation -the importance of intermedi­
ate institutions for the distributional outcome. Taking its cue from 
chapter 3, we focus again on the tax-benefit system which trans­
forms the original distribution of factor incomes and results in the 
final distribution of (disposable) income amongst persons. Or, as 
Atkinson (1996) observes: ’’The gross incomes generated by produc­
tion are typically modified by taxation, used to finance public spend­
ing, including transfers which constitute [another] source of personal 
incomes.” Using the German panel dataset GSOEP we examine 
in detail the distributional consequences of the German tax-benefit 
system for the 1991 cross-section and thereby describe the empirical 
transformation of the distribution.
Although the tax-benefit system may, in the aggregate, constitute 
an equalising force, different subgroups of the population may fare 
differently. The final distribution may be a mixture distribution. The 
next natural step then is to investigate the anatomy of the resulting 
(disposable) income distribution. We examine to what extent the 
distributional implications of the German tax-benefit system vary 
systematically with personal characteristics, such as occupational 
status, work status, age and nationality.
These questions are addressed using two complementary approaches.
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First, since one of the guiding questions of distributional analysis is 
” W hat does the income distribution look like ?” , the non-parametric 
technique of kernel density estimation is employed in order to esti­
mate and depict the relevant distributions directly. Whilst not being 
without its own problems, this method avoids some heroic distribu­
tional assumptions of parametric methods, and appears natural for 
an exploratory analysis of income distribution. To the end of inter­
preting their welfare properties conventional tools such as inequality 
indices and Lorenz curves are applied.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. D ata issues and in­
come definitions are discussed in the preceding chapter. Section 6 .2  
briefly summarises the method of kernel density estimation and out­
lines a bootstrap test for multimodality. The distributional conse­
quences of the German tax-benefit system are analysed in section 
6.3 by directly estimating the income distributions. Their welfare 
properties are assessed by testing for Lorenz dominance, stochas­
tic dominance, and the computation of standard inequality indices. 
Each approach highlights different aspects of the equalising forces 
of the German tax-benefit system. In Section 6.4 we analyse the 
underlying structure of the remaining inequality by partitioning the 
population according to certain characteristics. The distribution of 
disposable income is shown to be a mixture of different underlying 
distributions. The diagrammatic interpretation is confirmed by de­
composing the generalised entropy index. Section 6.5 concludes.
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6.2 Estim ating densities and assessing their 
properties
This section summarises the principal statistical methods used in this 
chapter. Section 6 .2 .1  is concerned with kernel density estimation 
and section 6 .2 .2  discusses a test for multimodality. Since chapter 
4 collects results on the sampling distribution of inequality indices 
and establishes a framework for statistical inferences, these results 
will not be repeated here.
6 .2 .1  K ern el d en sity  e stim a tio n
Let X be the income random variable with distribution F  and corre­
sponding density / .  Xi denotes a datapoint of the sample of size n.
The kernel density estimator  ^ fn (x) estimates the density /  at the 
point X and has the general form
X — X .
h
where h represents the bandwidth around the point x, which may 
depend upon the number of observations n. The estimator can be 
visualised as imposing a window of length h about the point x  and
^Silverman (1986) gives a concise introduction to density estimation and a 
broad overview of the pertinent issues. Prakasa Rao (1983) is more technical. A 
more recent review is carried out in Hardie and Linton (1994). See Deaton(1989) 
for a discussion extolhng the merits of these non-parametric methods in analyses 
of large household survey datasets.
119
aggregating all datapoints Xi according to rule K  {.). The kernel 
used in this chapter is chosen with reference to the global accuracy 
of the induced estimator fn{x), measured by the mean integrated 
square error. The smoothing parameter h can be chosen to minimise 
this objective function, but, inevitably, the optimal h also depends on 
the unknown / .  A well known kernel is the (‘optimak) Epanechnikov 
kernel given by:
=  I 1*1 ^  ^
I 0  otherwise
The smoothing parameter is the second choice to be made. The 
problem of choosing the smoothing parameter is illustrated in Figure 
6.1 and Figure 6.3 , in which the density of one variable has been es­
timated using two different widths. The larger width irons out some 
of the bumps created by the smaller width, and by over-smoothing it 
may obscure some of the finer details of the underlying true density.
There is a large theoretical literature on choosing h under various 
conditions ranging from the quite arbitrary and informal method of 
fitting by inspection to highly sophisticated automatic algorithms. 
The applied literature reflects an absence of inexpensive automatic 
selection programmes. Deaton (1989), for instance, uses the infor­
mal method of inspection, whereas Quah (1994) uses the method 
of a reference distribution: the smoothing parameter is derived as 
the optimal width minimising M IS E  if both data and kernel were 
Gaussian. It has been noted (Silverman(1986), p.46), however, that 
this method over-smooths multimodal or highly skewed densities be-
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cause the width is too wide. Cowell et al. (1994) use an adaptive 
width, which follows similar ideas resulting in h = 0.9A'n}^^ where 
A:= min(sample standard deviation, interquartile range/1.34) for 
the pilot bandwidth as given in Silverman (1986, p.48).
In this chapter the width is fitted by inspection and the following 
algorithm is applied: the starting point is a small width producing an 
erratic density estimate. Then, the width is gradually increased until 
a smooth estimate is arrived at (see Figure 6.1 ). Cross-checking, us­
ing the same technique, is done by applying the above algorithm both 
to the log-transformed data and to the re-transform ( see Figure 6.3). 
The latter step yields a density estimate with an exponentially in­
creasing bandwidth which accommodates the sparseness of the data 
in the right tail of the (skewed) income distribution.
6 .2 .2  A  b o o tstra p  te s t  for m u ltim o d a lity
The test, proposed in Silverman (1981), is based on the fact that the 
number of modes of a Gaussian density estimate is non-decreasing 
as the bandwidth h increases. For a test of /c-modality, the null 
hypothesis is that the number of modes equals A:, against the alter­
native hypothesis of more than k mode. The test invokes the theory 
of bootstrapping. It is convenient to rescale the density, so tha t the 
modified estimate (the ’smooth bootstrap’) has the same variance 
as the original sample. The key idea is to draw bootstrap samples 
X* from the smooth bootstrap and to examine the number of modes
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Epanechnikov kernel
. 00 00 4  -
. 0 0 00 2  -
0 5 0 00 0 1000 00 150000 2 0 0 0 0 0
ypreh
n = 2 0 0  w l = 1 0 0  w 2 = 1 0 0 0
Figure 6.1; The importance of the smoothing parameter h: two 
density estimates at n equidistant points with width w.
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of its distribution. This sampling can be directly implemented by 
setting
X* =  ÿ* + (1  +  - ÿ *  + he)
where y* are sampled with replacement from the original sample, ÿ* 
is its mean, its variance and e is distributed as a standard normal.
(1  +  is the rescaling factor , and e is Gaussian since the
kernel is Gaussian. Let hk denote the smallest value of h producing 
a fc-modal density, and its equivalent for the bootstrap sample. 
The p-level is approximated as a quantile of the hi distribution by 
> hk}/B, B  being the number of bootstrap samples.
The test has the following interpretation. A large value of hk, 
indicating that a lot of smoothing is needed to generate k modes, is 
taken as evidence against the null hypothesis of modality. As a 
consequence, a large value of p is taken to support the null hypoth­
esis, whilst a low p-value constitutes considerable evidence against 
it^.
^In the computer implementation a mode is defined as a point at which the 
slope of the density changes sign. In order to avoid contamination from noise 
in the tails of the distribution only point estimates above a critical level were 
considered. The robustness of the results with respect to these critical levels was 
also examined, and the computer implementation was tested on various model 
densities.
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6.3 The estimates: The distributional con­
sequences o f the German tax-benefit 
system
The distributional consequences of the German tax-benefit system 
are best investigated directly by examining the kernel density esti­
mates of the relevant income distributions, depicted in Figure 6.2. 
The net distribution has a large mode around the median, whilst the 
gross distribution is more spread out over its support. In fact, the 
Silverman (1981) test supports the hypothesis of a unimodal net dis­
tribution. The approximate p-value is calculated to be 0.78 and the 
critical bandwidth was found to be 1273.07; the former declines to 
0.418 and the bandwidth to 1207.52 in a test for bimodality. Hence 
there is statistically significant evidence that the distribution is uni­
modal ( but observe that both critical bandwidths lie close together).
In contrast to this unimodality, net income distributions in the US 
and the UK have undergone a process of polarisation, resulting in 
bimodal shapes (see Burkhauser, Crews, Daly, and Jenkins (1995), 
and Jenkins (1995))
The distribution of disposable income is again depicted in Figure 
6.3. Its upper panel provides an estimate of the log-transformed 
data with two different smoothing parameters. This transformation 
permits a nice representation of the tail of the distribution without 
obscuring detail at the lower tail. Retransforming the abscissa values
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again in the lower panel of this figure yields an increasing width. 
However, the principal features of the initial density estimate remain 
intact.
The effects of the tax-benefit system are intuitive: the lower tail 
of the gross income distribution is squeezed to the right as benefits 
become available to persons on low incomes, whilst higher marginal 
taxes pushes the upper tail of the income distribution to the left. 
These equalising forces confirm the common wisdom of Germany 
being a relatively equal society.
The welfare properties of these income distributions can be as­
sessed by computing several inequality indices and other summary 
statistics, reported in Table 6.1. Mean and median of the net dis­
tribution do not lie too far apart, the median being about 91% of 
the mean. This already suggests that the post-tax, post-benefit dis­
tribution is relatively equal. The inequalities of both gross and net 
income distributions are measured by means of the Gini coefficient 
and the generalised entropy measure GEa with sensitivity parameter 
OL G {-1,0,1}.
All point estimates register the equalising forces of the tax-benefit 
system, which a standard difference-of-means test (see chapter 4) 
confirms as being statistically significantly.
Given these unambiguous rankings, the next natural step is to 
test for Lorenz dominance. Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4 confirm that the 
net distribution Lorenz indeed dominates the gross distribution -the 
above inequality indices inevitably produced an unambiguous rank-
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Epanechnikov kernel ,  n=200,  w=1000
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Figure 6.2: Density estimates. Note: circles refer to gross income
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Figure 6.3: Upper panel: Density estimate of log-transformed net 
income with widths w.
Lower panel: Density estimate of net income with increasing band­
width.
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year 1991 s
statistic variable
Gini net equivalised income .296 12.93*
gross equivalised income .334
GE_i net equivalised income .326 4.98*
gross equivalised income .533
GEo net equivalised income .168 4.05*
gross equivalised income .188
GEi net equivalised income .146 20.31*
gross equivalised income .2 0 2
standard deviation net equivalised income 19,007
gross equivalised income 33,928
mean net equivalised income 31,950
gross equivalised income 50,267
median net equivalised income 29,042
gross equivalised income 44,800
Table 6 .1 : Summary statistics, s refers to the difference-of-means 
test (see chapter 4), * denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.
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ing. This dominance is supported statistically using the lU inference 
rule. Recall from chapter 4 that Si refers to the difference-of-means 
test of the Lorenz ordinates for population shares i ,i  = 1, ..,k. All 
statistics Si are positive and min{5 i , s j t }  dramatically exceeds the 
critical level of the one-sided test with a=0.05 of 1.65.
Another welfare property can be investigated by inspecting the 
two empirical distribution functions (smoothed by joining the ordi­
nates) depicted in Figure 6.4. The gross distribution nearly first- 
order stochastic dominates the net distribution. The only crossing 
happens at the very lowest income points, which is an unavoidable 
consequence of the fact that some households are entirely dependent 
on transfers. Again this difference is confirmed to be statistically sig­
nificant by using a non-parametric two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
t e s t . ^
^The test statistic is
D  ;= (0.5n)°‘^  max{| m ax{F(x) — G(x)}|, | m in{F(x) — G (x)|}
for distributions F  and G  and a sample of size n. Under the null hypothesis 
F  =  G,  lim„_ooPr{-D <  Aa}. But the value D = 2 A  exceeds even A^=2.2 at 
a —0.0001.
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popu­
lation
share
net income 
Lorenz 
ordinate 
(SE)
income
share
(SE)
gross income 
Lorenz 
ordinate 
(SE)
income
share
(SE)
s
1 .029
(.0006)
.029
(.0006)
.0157
(.0007)
.0157
(.0007)
1377.7*
2 .083
(.0009)
.053
(.0005)
.0625
(.0 0 1 1 )
.0468
(.0005)
1307.3*
3 .149
(.0015)
.0663
(.0004)
.124
(.0013)
.061
(.0004)
1347.9*
4 .225
(.0015)
.0765
(.0004)
.197
(.0016)
.073
(.0004)
1329.2*
5 .312
(.0018)
.0867
(.0004)
.281
(.0018)
.084
(.0064)
1254.8*
6 .408
(.0 0 2 )
.0965
(.0005)
.377
(.0 0 2 )
.096
(.0004)
1133.6*
7 .517
(.0023)
.108
(.005)
.487
(.0 0 2 2 )
1 1 1
(.0006)
937.1*
8 .641
(.0025)
.125
(.0006)
.616
(.0024)
.129
(.0006)
730.38*
9 .787
(.0027)
.46
(.0007)
.77
(.0024)
.154
(.0007)
469.2*
Table 6.2: Lorenz curve estimates 1991. Notes: Standard Errors in 
parenthesis, s refers to the difference-of-means test for each Lorenz 
ordinate (see chapter 4). * denotes statistical significance at the 5 
percent level. The combined tes^^a lu a tes  to c=271.05*.
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Figure 6.4: Upper diagram: The cumulative gross income distribu­
tion lies (almost completely) to the right of the net income distrib­
ution.
Lower diagram: The net distribution Lorenz dominates the gross 
distribution. 131
6.4 Explaining income inequality: The 
anatomy of inequality in 1991
The net distribution is likely to be a mixture of different underlying 
distributions as economic theory predicts that several characteristics 
have important distributional consequences. Since different individ­
uals are at different points in their life-cycle, we expect age to play an 
important role. Human capital and discrimination theories highlight 
the importance of occupational status and nationality. Receipt of so­
cial security and welfare benefits is governed by eligibility conditions 
which only certain groups of non-earners can meet. Benefit levels 
differ also in terms of their generosity - most social security benefits 
are earnings related whilst means-tested social assistance benefits 
are flat rates. In order to investigate to what extent this population 
heterogeneity is important, the sample is partitioned accordingly.
In Figure 6.5 the sample has been partitioned according to whether 
the household includes at least one earner. Not surprisingly, the 
density for earners is more dispersed than that for non-earners. The 
latter has a large mode about its median. This subsample falls into 
two categories, viz. households on means-tested social assistance 
in receipt of flat rate benefits and households receiving earnings- 
related social security benefits (i.e. unemployment benefit and pen­
sions characterised by high replacement rates).
The sample depicted in Figure 6.5 is partitioned according to oc­
cupational status (which also proxies professional qualification or
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schooling because of the traditional strong link between the two 
and the highly segmented German labour market^). The density 
for blue collar workers has one dominant mode, whilst the density 
for white collar workers is multimodal with the modes being rela­
tively far apart. This is not surprising given tha t this occupational 
category is spanned by six ascending levels of seniority.
In Figure 6 .6 , the sample has been partitioned according to whether 
or not the household contains at least one foreign national. As this 
figure makes clear, these households, the majority of which are classi­
fied as guestworker (having been recruited in the booms of the 1970s 
as manual workers), dominate the lower income groups
The population is partitioned in Figure 6.7 according to age. The 
cut-off point is 65 years, being the age of regular retirement. The in­
come distribution of the elderly has a dominant mode about median 
income, which reflects the fact that the social security pension pay-
“^As regards further education and other training programmes, Pischke (1994) 
examines both its incidence and duration using the special GSOEP module on 
training conducted in 1989. He finds that 61% of university graduates participate 
in training programmes, compared to only 22% of those with apprenticeships. 
Also, the duration of the programmes is highly skewed. On the cost side, 80% 
of all training is sponsored by employers and most training takes place during 
work hours. This training’s profile potentially re-inforces wage and thus income 
inequahty. However, this consequence apparently fails to materiahse. ’’At least 
at this coarse level... there is no relationship between training and productivity” 
(p.9) and Pischke concludes that ’’there is httle evidence for wage gains among 
trainees” (p. 3).
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Figure 6.5: Density estimation of net income. Notes: circles in upper 
panel refer to households without earners; in the lower panel cirlcles 
refer to white collar workers.
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Figure 6 .6 : Density estimation of net income for Germans (circles) 
and foreign nationals.
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ment, being earnings-related but with a ceiling on insured income, 
cannot exceed a certain amount. In the year 1991, this amount was 
about 4000 DM per month. Some people receive private pension 
payments which results in the upper tail. The distribution for the 
elderly is less dispersed than the income distribution of the younger.
Since age is a continuous variable, it seems natural to compute 
conditional inequality indices in order to capture other life-cycle char­
acteristics Figure 6 .8  depicts the generalised entropy index with 
several sensitivity parameters. All indices exhibit a similar pattern. 
Inequality increases in the forties but falls slightly in the mid fifties, 
as expected because seniority and human capital levels of earners
^The conditional statistics can be estimated using density techniques since 
/(y |a ) =  f { y , a ) / f { a ) .  Let hy and ha denote the bandwidths for the estimates 
of the respective marginal distributions. An estimator of the joint density is
f ( y , a )  =
One can then solve for the conditional moments involved in the formula of the 
inequality index. For instance, 6 2^ (0 ) =  0 .5 (/X2 (a)/M(a)^ — 1). Using a Gaussian 
kernel, the conditional mean fi{a) is estimated by the Nadar ay a-Watson estima­
tor obtained by solving J yf{y\a)dy  (which requires a change of variable)
and the second conditional moment /i2 (<i) by its obvious generalisation. More 
complicated cases can be solve by numeric integration. See Pudney (1992) for 
an extensive formal analysis of the life-cycle of inequality in China. Surprisingly, 
the shapes of his estimates are similar to the results depicted in Figure 6 .8 .
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Figure 6.7: Density estimates for the elderly and the non-elderly 
(circles).
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Figure 6 .8 : The generalised entropy index with several sensitivity 
parameter, conditional on age.
become more dispersed. A mitigating factor for this increased earn­
ings inequality may be events within the household: children arrive 
in the family and jump into higher age brackets (which are taken 
into account by the McClements’ scales). Around the age of retire­
ment, inequality falls significantly as the elderly start to claim their 
pensions ( although public pensions are earnings-related, previous 
earnings are insured only up to a ceiling).
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A complementary analysis is to decompose the summary statis­
tics of inequality according to the above partitions. Using the gener­
alised entropy GEa , overall inequality disaggregates into inequality 
within groups i, and inequality between groups (when each
group member has assigned mean group income) GE^  thus:
GEa = = J2pl~°yi~°‘GEi + GE^
i
where pi represent the population share of group z, and pi its income 
share. Table 6.3 reports the findings.
The separate point estimates GE]^ register, independent of the 
sensitivity parameter a , a lesser degree of inequality within the 
groups of the elderly, households without work, and foreign nation­
als. However, comparing the within and between components of 
the inequality index reveals that overall inequality is driven by the 
within-component, as the young, employed, and German nationals 
have a more dispersed and unequal income distribution.
6.4 .1  T h e G erm an  in com e d istr ib u tio n  in con­
te x t
The overall distribution of net income is a mixture of various underly­
ing distributions. The low income groups are particularly dominated 
by foreign nationals, a sizeable group of the elderly, and those out 
of work. However, these forces tending towards greater inequality 
appear to be mitigated by the tax-benefit system, resulting in in-
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partition pop.
share
income
share
GEi^ G Ei GE{ G E f
1. age < 65 
age > 65
.832
.168
.856
.1144
.372
.118
.0 0 2 .18
.094
.0 0 2 .153
.09
.0 0 2
2 . 1 ^ worker 
no worker
.772
.229
.823
.177
.343
.234
.009 .168
.131
.007 .144
.109
.008
3. Germans 
foreigners
.935
.06
.948
.05
.335
.187
.0 0 2 .17
.117
.0 0 2 .147
.099
.0 0 2
Table 6.3: Decomposition of the generalised entropy index
equality indices for the entire distribution which appear to be low 
internationally. To back up this claim it is reasonable to compare 
the situation in Germany with the Uk and the USA.
In contrast to the unimodal German income distribution, the US 
and the UK income distributions have become bimodal in the 1980s. 
Burkhauser, Crews, Daly, and Jenkins (1995), Jenkins (1995), and 
Cowell, Jenkins, and Litchfield (1996) all find evidence of a shrinking 
middle class which is explained by an increase in the number of 
social assistance recipients and a concomitant increase in earnings 
inequality. So far, Germany has avoided this experience. Similarly, 
in a comparative study of relative trends of inequality using the 
Gini coefficient, Atkinson (1996) finds that German inequality has 
remained very stable in the 1980s. Inequality in the US has risen 
gradually. But the UK stands out for the sharpness of the recorded 
(monotonie) rise in inequality.
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At a lower level of aggregation, we can compare the shape of the 
several income distributions depicted in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 with evi­
dence for the UK reported in Cowell, Jenkins, and Litchfield (1996). 
In contrast to our with-without earner partition, they focus more 
narrowly on means-tested income support. As a consequence, the 
income distribution for this group is unimodal and very concentrated 
relative to the distribution for non-recipients. Our with-earner group 
is composed of individuals who are entitled to a variety of benefits. 
As all German social security insurance are earnings related, the rela­
tively larger spread is not surprising. The conclusion from the kernel 
density estimates and the decomposition exercise supports the com­
mon view about inequality within the group of households without 
earners. Atkinson (1993a), however, shows that this common view 
is wrong in the case of the UK when all households out of work are 
considered (instead of focusing only on social assistance recipients). 
Although the UK awards mostly flat rate benefits, he demonstrates 
that the income distribution of those out of work has a long upper 
tail, so that it is deemed more unequal than the income distribution 
of those in work.
The comparison between the UK and Germany for the groups 
of the elderly and the non-elderly produces similar results. In the 
UK, the income distribution of the elderly is unimodal whereas the 
distribution for the non-elderly is bimodal and has a heavy tail. The 
mode for the elderly income distribution is more than twice as high 
as the one for the non-elderly. The shapes for the German case do
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not show such dramatic differences. The principal explanation for 
these different shapes is, again, the fact that the UK benefit system 
pays flat rate pensions (and the differences amongst the elderly arises 
from the receipt of private pensions), whereas German pensions are 
earnings related.
Consequently, this feature of the German tax-benefit system - 
the payment of earnings-related benefits- combined with the fact 
that earnings inequality has not increased substantially, explains why 
Germany has succeeded in producing relatively low and stable levels 
of inequality. By contrast, incomes in the US and the UK have 
become polarised. The main driving force behind this increasing 
inequality seems to be the increased number of recipients of flat rate 
social assistance benefits and an ever increasing earnings inequality.
6.5 Conclusions
The chapter sought to accomplish two tasks. First, the distributional 
consequences of the German tax-benefit system have been examined 
for the year 1991. The relevant distributions were estimated directly 
using a kernel density estimator and the net distribution was suc­
cessfully tested for unimodality.
In an attempt to examine the welfare properties of the income 
distribution, we found that the net income distribution (statistically) 
Lorenz dominates the gross income distribution, so that all conven­
tional inequality indices register a lower inequality of the net income
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distribution. The tax-benefit system thus constitutes an equalising 
force The gross distribution nearly first-order stochastically domi­
nated the net distribution.
In the second step, the anatomy of the distribution of disposable 
incomes has been analysed. Several decomposition analyses show 
that the overall distribution of net income is a mixture of differ­
ent underlying distributions. The low income groups are particu­
larly dominated by foreign nationals, a sizeable group of the elderly, 
and those out of work. However, these coarse partitions reveal the 
considerable degree of inequality within the groups of the young, 
households with work, and German nationals, which dominates the 
assessment of overall inequality.
Against this background, chapter 7 analyses the issues of income 
dynamics by distinguishing between its two dimensions, viz. shape 
dynamics and intra-distributional mobility. Proceeding from this 
basis chapter 8 examines in detail income mobility and estimates 
models which accommodate time-varying transition probabilities and 
which might explain the observed mobility patterns.
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Table 6.4:
in eq u ality  resu lts in con text
study country year data source income definition equivalence scales results
Frick et al.(1995) West Germany 91
92
93
Gsoep equivalised monthly 
net income + 1/12 of 
bonuses and perks
social assistance Gini=0.263
Gini=0.264 
G in i-0.261
Buhmann at al.(1989) West Germany 81 LIS/ Germany transfer survey post-tax, post-benefit 
income
no Gini=0.280
Jenkins (1994) UK 90/91 HBAI equivalised 
household net income
McClements Gini-0.338 
GEo=0.227 
GE,=0.206
Buhmann et ai.(1989) UK 79 LIS/ FES post-tax, post-benefit 
income
no Gini=0.303
Atkinson (1993) UK 88 FES disposable income Gini=0.350
Finland 85 Household budget survey disposable income yes Gini=0.200
For the comparison of the results, be it internationally or nationally, one important proviso needs to be taken into account, viz. sample selection and 
the treatment of the tails of the distribution. This is important, since most inequality indices fail to be robust against outliers (see Cowell and Victoria- 
Feser(1995)).
Chapter 7 
Income D ynam ics in 
Germany
Abstract: Using the GSOEP we analyse the two dimensions of Ger­
man income dynamics in the 1990s by distinguishing between the 
shape dynamics and intra-distributional mobility. The complemen­
tarity between various analytical tools is explored. Although there 
appears to be an unambiguous increase in inequality, it is not statis­
tically significant. By contrast, mobility has fallen significantly.
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7.1 Introduction
A useful taxonomy for the analysis of distributional dynamics is the 
explicit distinction between shape dynamics - referring to the chang­
ing external shape of the distribution - and intra-distributional mo­
bility. These two dimensions are orthogonal, require different types 
of data, and correspond to different sets of economic questions. An 
examination of the shape dynamics is a purely cross-sectional ex­
ercise, which implies that the set of addressable economic issues is 
quite limited (such as income polarisation, cross-sectional inequality 
or the incidence of poverty).
However, the increasing availability of longitudinal datasets has 
given a strong impetus to policy-related research based on the analy­
sis of income histories. For instance, the extent of intra-distributional 
mobility is important for the design of welfare programmes. As most 
canonical models of the income or earnings process such as perma­
nent income and life-cycle models are indeed dynamic, so should 
welfare assessments be. Lifetime equity depends on the extent of 
movement up or down the distribution. The above taxonomy can 
be fruitfully applied here because the analysis of the shape dynam­
ics is inadequate for the problem of (lifetime) welfare assessments. 
This purely cross-sectional analysis cannot distinguish between such 
diametrically opposed worlds in which income positions are retained 
or permuted. It would rank the static economy exhibiting perfect 
persistence to possess the same level of welfare as the very mobile
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economy. But such a ranking would not conform to the value judg­
ment of most people. Friedman (1962), for instance, considers ’’two 
societies tha t have the same distribution of annual income. In one 
there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular 
families in the income hierarchy varies widely from year to year. In 
the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same 
position year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second 
would be the more unequal society” (p. 171). A society may be better 
equipped to deal with short term fluctuations and a high degree of 
mobility - for instance consumption may be smoothed if credit and 
insurance markets are perfect- than with long term poverty.
Income mobility in Germany is low according to conventional wis­
dom. Such a prejudice often rests on the assumption that the laboin 
market is segmented, inflexible and immobile; since earnings consti­
tute the main source of income for the majority of the population, 
incomes should behave similarly. Moreover, the entire structure of 
the German welfare state is built on the premiss of stability - stable 
jobs and a consequent low income mobility. But does such a view fit 
the facts ?
In this chapter bivariate kernel density estimators are used to 
investigate directly the changes in the economic fortunes of individ­
uals. But although such a tool constitutes a powerful device, it does 
not permit a rigorous statistical analysis. This is carried out after 
information has been aggregated in transition matrices. Changes in 
mobility are assessed using mobility indices.
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This twin-track approach to income mobility is important since 
transition matrices are based on an arbitrary choice of income groups. 
Changing the partition of the sample by increasing the number of 
income groups or the length of the income intervals affects the tran­
sition matrix and consequently the mobility index employed in as­
sessing intra-distributional mobility. By contrast, a stochastic kernel 
density estimate is more general since it does not impose any arbi­
trary grouping of information. Turning this argument around, these 
estimates should be used to give an indication of the extent to which 
the quantification of mobility based on transition matrices is robust 
to choices of income groups.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. For a description of the data 
we refer back to chapter 5. The movements of the cross-sections -the 
shape dynamics of the income distribution- are examined in section 
7.2. The income distributions are estimated directly using (univari­
ate) kernel density methods and inequality indices are computed in 
order to assess their welfare properties. In section 7.3 the twin-track 
approach to mobility is pursued. Section 4 concludes.
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7.2 Cross sectional dynamics: a chang­
ing profile of inequality in the 90s?
^Has the shape of the net income distribution changed ? Figure 
7.1^ depicts the kernel density estimates of this distribution, which 
are superimposed on each other and thus permit a straightforward 
assessment of the shape dynamics of the income distribution. The 
shape of the distribution is surprisingly stable in the period 1990 to 
1991, but changes slightly in 1992. Although the location of the (sin­
gle) mode remains unchanged, more probability mass can be found 
to its left in the last year. The popular spectre of income polari­
sation - as expressed in catch words such as a 1/3 - 2/3-society - 
cannot be detected up to 1991 since the estimated distributions are 
unimodal but a second mode in the lower income group emerges 
in 1992. However, these changes in the shape of the distribution 
are minor when compared to the vast changes experienced in the 
UK (Cowell, Jenkins, and Litchfield (1996)) or the US (Burkhauser, 
Crews, Daly, and Jenkins (1995)) in the 1980s. In both cases, a
^Chapter 8 contains some evidence for the period 1983 to 1989 for a slightly
different income variable.
^The slight difference in the density estimates of the 1991 net income distri­
bution in Figures 7.1 and 6.2 is due to the choice of different bandwidths. The
latter density appears to be slightly under-smoothed.
^Chapter 6 confirms this unimodahty for 1991 by applying Silverman (1981)’s
bootstrap test for multi-modahty. The second mode in 1992 is statistically
significant.
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dramatic polarisation has taken place; nearly unimodal shapes have 
turned into twin-peaks as the middle class occupies a sinking valley 
between them. As Jenkins (1995) observes: ’’The shift away from 
the middle class in both directions is strong evidence that the ‘mid­
dle class‘ was shrunk, however one defines the middle.” Fears of a 
shrinking German middle class are currently unfounded.
Table reports the key statistics  ^for the cross-sections in the 
years 1990 to 1992. GEa refers to the generalised entropy index with 
sensitivity parameter a. There has been income growth -both mean 
and median income have risen- but what happened to income in­
equality ? Inequality appears to have unambiguously increased from 
1991 to 1992, but the ranking of 1990 and 1991 seems to be ambigu­
ous. Closer inspection of the values suggests that this ambiguity 
may just be caused by rounding errors and examining the respective 
Lorenz curves, reported in Table 7.2, supports this suspicion: the 
Lorenz curves do not intersect and shift out, but the ordinates for 
successive years are very close together.
At first glance it appears that the growth in income has been
Frick and others (1995) produce some G inis for this period (0.267, 0.263,
0.264) using a different income concept and equivalence scales based on the
German social assistance programme. The story, however, is similar.
^The formulae for these measures are: Gini —(1/ (2n^/i)) ^ ^  |z/i — Vj\
and GEa  =  [1/ — a)) [{ l /n)Y^{yi/ j i)° '  — 1]. If a  =  0 then GEq —
(—1/n) ^  In (yi/fi) as can be seen by using the transformation exp{ln(yi//i)“ } =
exp{aln(?/i//i)} and de I’Hospital’s rule. Similar reasoning for a = l  yields
GEi =  ( -1 /n )  iVi/P') ki iVi/P) ■
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Shape dynamics of the net income distribution
Figure 7.1: Notes: net income is normalised at the contemporaneous 
mean. The kernel density estimator uses the Epanechnikov kernel 
and the bandwidth is chosen using cross-validation methods.
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year 1990 1991 1992 difference-of-means test
statistic |590,9i | 1590,92! 1591,9 2!
Gini .287 .286 .296 2.72* 2.2* .48
.282 .287 .317 .68 1.65 .99
GEo .164 .168 .174 .26 1.13 1.39
GEi .148 .146 .157 .275 2.16* 2.42*
standard deviation 18,865 19,007 22,002
mean 30,947 31,950 33,953
median 28,125 29,042 30,650
Note: * denotes significant at 5% level
Table 7.1: Summary statistics and the pair-wise difference-of-means 
test
accompanied by a growth in inequality, as in many other OECD 
countries (Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1994)), but are these 
changes in the inequality indices statistically significant? Since all 
the standard inequality indices are asymptotically normally distrib­
uted (see chapter 4), a non-parametric difference-of-means test can 
be applied to test this hypothesis. Table 7.1 reports the results of 
the pair-wise tests for the inequality indices. Most values are not 
statistically significant, or do not dramatically exceed the critical 
level of 1.96. Similarly, the (individual and combined) difference-of- 
means tests applied to the Lorenz ordinates reveals that the apparent 
differences are not statistically significant.
In summary, the apparent increase in inequality is not statisti-
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cally significant. Does this lack of action on the surface - seemingly 
supporting the conventional wisdom of German immobility - conceal 
important intra-distributional changes?
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popula
tion
share
year 1990
Lorenz
ordinate
year 1991
Lorenz
ordinate
year 1992
Lorenz
ordinate
differenc
e
*90,91
of means
*90,92
test
*91,92
.1 .031
(.0006)
.029
(.0006)
.024
(.0007)
2.32* 6.73* 5.2*
.2 .085
(.0009)
.082
(.0009)
.076
(.001)
1.64 4.06* 3.74
*
.3 .152
(.0012)
.149
(.0012)
.14
(.0013)
.86 3.53* 3.5*
.4 .229
(.0015)
.225
(.0015)
.216
(.0016)
1.21 2.49* 1.89
.5 .316
(.0017)
.312
(.0018)
.301
(.0019)
-.88 0.72 1.04
.6 .412
(.0019)
.408
(.0020)
.396
(.0021)
.71 0.61 -.84
.7 .522
(.0022)
.517
(.0023)
.506
(.0024)
1.6 0.77 -1.3
.8 .646
(.0024)
.641
(.0025)
.632
(.0027)
-1.02 -2.0* 1.1
.9 .789
(.0026)
.787
(.0027)
.78
(.0029)
-2.24 -4.4* 1.79
c 5.5 20.1 3.2
Table 2: Lorenz curves and a pair-wise difference-of-means test.
Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis. * denotes significantly different from zero on 
basis of a two-tailed test at 5% level. See the chapter 4 for a definition of the test statistics c and 
s.
7.3 Intra-distributional m obility
The second dimension of the distributional dynamics is intra-distributional 
mobility (Quah (1995)). It is also of particular importance for wel­
fare assessments, since it is a measure of the inequality of opportu­
nity and, according to some commentators, fairness. Basing welfare 
assessments solely on a cross-sectional analysis is inadequate since 
this method cannot discriminate between such diametrically opposed 
worlds where income positions are just replicated or, on the other 
hand, permuted.
The purpose of this section is to examine the folklore of German 
income immobility -whether German stasis is pervasive or whether 
inaction on the surface is deceptive. To this end, we first analyse a 
scatter plot depicting a typical example of the raw data. Then, a 
bivariate kernel density estimate depicts the movement of the entire 
distribution. Finally the analysis is supplemented at a higher level of 
aggregation by transition matrices and various mobility indices are 
computed in order to quantify the mobility process.
Transition matrices are a useful complement to kernel density es­
timates. On the one hand, transition matrices are needed for a sta­
tistical analysis of mobility changes and mobility indices are conven­
tional tools for quantifying them. On the other hand, in transition 
matrices people are grouped according to their incomes, and within
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each group they are treated as if they were homogeneous. Both num­
ber and coverage of the income bands are imposed arbitrarily, and 
choosing different income bands results in different transition ma­
trices. By contrast, the stochastic kernel density estimate (for each 
abscissa, there is a proper density which integrates to one) does not 
depend on such arbitrary grouping. A contour plot is depicted be­
low in Figure 7.5 for two consecutive periods. Thus this twin-track 
approach to mobility is important as the strength of one technique 
compensates the weakness of the other.
Figure 7.2 maps the evolution of real equivalised disposable in­
come from 1990 to 1991 as a scatter plot. A first ad hoc quantifi­
cation of income mobility is to count the income transitions which 
exceed a critical level. To facilitate the inspection of the diagram, 
the 45 degree line has been superimposed. The second band repre­
sents a ±15% change in income which captures only 55.4% of the 
sample. A 1 0 % and a 5% band capture only 42.8% and 25% re­
spectively. An absolute band of ±5,000 DM (about 1 / 6  of median 
income) about the 45 degree captures 60% of the sample since a lot 
of income changes happen at the lower part of the joint distribution. 
Two results emerge:
First, the majority of incomes are persistent, falling into the 
ranges of the superimposed band but 75% of the population experi­
ence income changes in excess of 5%. This impression is corroborated 
when the bivariate distributions are estimated directly Figure 7.3
®The bivariate kernel density estimate was implemented following Silverman
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superimposes the estimates for the years 1990-1991 and 1991-1992, 
whilst the lower panel of that figure furnishes a contour plot of the 
former. The contours appear to be symmetric relative to the 45 
degree line, and the greatest concentration is found about median 
income in both periods. The distribution is unimodal and seems to 
have changed only slightly.
The plots of the kernel density estimates are supplemented by 
conventional transition matrices  ^ reported in Table 7.3. Income has 
been grouped into four classes, the boundaries of which are defined 
in relative terms as 0.5, 1, 1.5 times the contemporaneous median 
income. This partition is useful since the poverty line is often defined 
in the applied literature in relative terms as 0.5 of median income. 
Moreover, the median is robust against outliers in the data.
(1986, p. 89) using the kernel
f 37t“ (^1 — i f  x^x < 1
K{x)  = {
I 0 otherwise
Incomes are normalised at the contemporaneous median. The grid is 25x25 and
the bandwidth is 0.7.
^These transition matrices are implemented using frequency counts. If the
stochastic process is a non-stationary (first order) Markov process, the frequency 
count is also the maximum likehhood estimator (MLE) of the transition proba­
bilities. Let \pik{t)] denote the transition probability within an M x M  transition 
matrix, and riik{t) the number of persons moving from state i to state k at time 
t. The kernel of the likehhood function is L — Ylk  ^ which is to
be maximised subject to the constraint of \pik{t)] being a stochastic matrix. This 
step yields the MLE pik{t) — Uikit)/  Yhk'^ik{i)- Anderson and Goodman(1957) 
derive its asymptotic properties.
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s c a t te r  diagram, oands: +- 15%
1 5 0 0 0 0  -
1 0 0 0 0 0  -
5 0 0 0 0  -
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 00
h y p re n
s c a t t e r  d iag ram , dands: + - 500 0
150000  -
1000 0 0  -
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0 5 0 0 0 0 100000 150000
h y p ren
Figure 7.2: Scatter diagram for income transitions for year 1990 
and 1992; Panel A: a band of relative deviations(d: 15%); Panel B: 
absolute deviations (± DM 5,000)
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Figure 7.3: Upper panel: density estimates for 1990-1991 and 1991- 
1992. Lower panel: contour plot of the 1990-1991 density. Income is 
normalised at the contemporaneous median.
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joint net income distribution 1990 and 1991
year 1991
Marginals
Low
Income
Modest
Income
Middle
Income
High
Incomeyear 1990
Low Income .548 .329 .099 .023 .1
Modest Income .107 .724 .154 .014 .39
Middle Income .042 .246 .606 .0 1 1 .32
High Income .0 2 1 .035 .217 .728 .18
joint net income distribution 1991 and 1992
year 1992
Marginals
Low
Income
Modest
Income
Middle
Income
High
Incomeyear 1991
Low Income .549 .31 .1 1 .03 .1 2
Modes Income .103 .79 .163 .016 .38
Middle Income .044 .168 .667 .1 2 1 .31
High Income .031 .04 .174 .754 .19
Notes: The four income groups are defined with respect to the 
contemporaneous median as follows:
low income (equivalised income below 0.5 times median income) 
modest income (equivalised income between 0.5 and 1 times median income) 
middle income (equivalised income between 1 and 1.5 times median income) 
high income (equivalised income above 1.5 times median income) 
weighted data
Table 7.3: Tr^ggition matrices
The diagonal elements of the transition matrices affirm the results 
of the contour plot: the underlying stochastic process shows both the 
strong broad persistence but also the significant risk of a change in 
one’s income position. Persons in the lowest income group have a 
greater chance of escaping poverty, with a conditional probability 
of about (l-pii)=0.45. The other elements on the main diagonal 
exhibit strong persistence with a conditional probability of remaining 
in one’s income group of about 0.7. The contour plot brings out more 
clearly the extent to which upward mobility is greater than downward 
mobility for the two poorest income groups but this is reversed for 
the two richest groups. These observations can be formalised by 
means of a mobility index. However, as with inequality indices, no 
single index is likely to be considered as completely satisfactory *. 
Let P = \pij] denote the nxn  transition matrix, \ j  its j ’s ordered 
eigenvalue, and tr(P ) the trace of P. Shorrocks’ index is defined as
®As Shorrocks(1978) observes:” (..) we may finally have to admit that no 
single mobility statistic has the minimum requirements regarded as essen­
tial” (p. 1023). He shows that there is an inherent inconsistency between the 
notions of monotonicity [ if pij >  for all i ^  j  and with strict inequahty 
for some, then the index should preserve this ranking] and perfect mobility [ 
the index should have the maximum value for matrices with identical rows] as 
can be seen immediately by considering the 2x2 matrices pij=0.5  ,all i^j and 
Pij=0 ,i = j. In order to obtain a complete ordering he proposes to restrict the 
domain of admissable matrices to those possessing a ” quasi-maximal diagonal”. 
Moreover, as with inequahty indices, ah mobility measures incorporate value 
judgements. See Quah(1995) for a recent discussion of some mobihty indices 
and some apphcations.
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n — 1 n — 1
being the inverse of the harmonic mean of the expected durations of 
remaining in a given income group. An alternative index is given by
(7.2)
which equals ji\ if P ’s eigenvalues are all real and non-negative. This 
index captures the speed of convergence of the underlying Markov 
process since all eigenvalues of P  being a stochastic matrix, are 
bounded by one. This approach can be simplified by concentrating 
on the dominant convergence term, viz. the second largest eigenvalue 
^ 2
=  1 -  |A2 |. (7.3)
This index would be attractive if the economy followed a (first order) 
Markov process. However, as it is demonstrated below, the transi­
tion probabilities are time-varying. Evaluating these indices yields 
A^i(f90,9i )=  0.43 and /ii(P 9i,92)=  0.41, so mobility is deemed to have 
slightly fallen. This conclusion is inevitable since all staying proba­
bilities Pa have increased. The eigenvalues are respectively A9o,9i= (l;  
0.75; 0.53; 0.42) and A9 i^ 92= (l; 0.76; 0.54; 0.48). Since all elements 
are real and non-negative and 112 are identical. The use of 
results in the same ranking of the transition matrices.
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In order to assess the statistical significance of the changes con­
fidence intervals are estimated by bootstrapping and the extent of 
their overlapping is examined. Using 1000 bootstrap replications 
Efron’s (1987) bias-corrected-and-accelerated BCa method ® is ap-
®See Efron(1987) and Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for a description of this 
method. The confidence interval derived by this method has two principal char­
acteristics: it is invariant to transformations, and its error decays at rate 1/n.
The following paragraph gives an outline of this method. 1000 bootstrap 
rephcations -a random draw with replacement- are drawn from the original in­
come pairs, and the transition matrix and /ii is computed for each draw. Let ft* 
denote the bootstrap sample estimator of the mobility index for the population 
parameter fi, and fi the value of the estimator using the original data. Then the 
BCa  method provides a (1 — 2a) confidence interval where
denotes the ath-percentile of the bootstrap sample, a i and « 2  are determined 
as follows. Let $  denote the cumulative normal distribution, its inverse, 
and z (a) its 100 ath percentile point. Then
1 — Û [z -t- z(“)] y y 1 — â [z -h z(“)] J
How are z and ô determined ? z is given by z =  $" ^ ((# ( A* < A)/-^))- ® , 
however, is given in terms of the jacknife values -resampling without replacement- 
of the statistic. Let denote the sample derived from the original sample but 
having the i-th value removed, let be calculated using , and average 
A(.) =  (1/^) A(i) • Then â is given by
E I L i  (A(.) -  A ( o ) ^a =
6
, 3/2
E?=1 ik-) -  ki))
z is a measure of the median bias of fi*, and à deals with the rate of change of 
jl with respect to the population parameter ji.
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plied to the Shorrocks’ index (but could equally well be applied 
to ^ 2)- The resulting 90% confidence intervals are [0.41; 0.45] for 
A^i(f90,9i) and [0.3856;0.4228] for /ii(P 9i,92), which overlap. Nev­
ertheless, the difference of means test, described in the appendix, 
suggests that the estimates of the index are statistically significantly 
different.
Another way of assessing the changes in the mobility structure is 
to superimpose the stochastic kernel density estimates. Figure 7.5 
depicts the contour plots for 1990-1991 and 1991-1992. There are 
large changes in the probability of staying in poverty which tend 
to increase. There is also a remarkable stability for income groups 
II and III. Inference for changes above 2 can be drawn because of 
the small numbers of observations. In general, different groups are 
affected differently, since there is no imiversal trend (which under­
scores the need to work with general tools such as stochastic kernels 
instead of relying solely on transition matrices subject to arbitrary 
grouping).
This brief discussion leads naturally to the next issues about the 
structure of the transition matrices: the two transition matrices ap­
pear to be roughly similar. A multinomial test could be applied in 
order to render precise the extent to which these transition matrices
^®See, for instance, Mood et al. (1974, p.449). It is desired to test the null hy­
pothesis pij  — p2j  =  Pj for two populations i =  1,2, with associated probabilities 
Pij, j  =  1,.., A:-|-1. Sample i has size rii and Nij denotes the number of outcomes 
in group j .  pj  needs to be estimated; its maximum likelihood estimator is (N ij-f 
^ 2j ) / {n i  -h ri2 ). The test statistics can then be arrived at as
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contour plot of stochastic kernel density estimate
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Figure 7.4: The contourplot of a stocliastic kernel density estimate 
for 1990-1991 ; the superimposed grid represents the income groups 
of the transition matrices.
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contour plot of stochastic kernel density estimates
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Figure 7.5: Contour plot of the stochastic kernel density estimates 
for income transitions 1990-91 and 1991-92.
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are identical. The values of the test statistics for the separate tests 
are 4.01, 17.56*, 19.51*, 6.75, and for the combined test 47.82*. The 
three starred items are significantly different from zero, leading to 
the conclusion that the two matrices are not identical.
Are the transition matrices symmetric, i.e. pij = pji ? Inspection 
suggests otherwise, since there is evidence of a dominant upward 
mobility for the first two income groups: The values of the likelihood 
ratio test statistics are 62.65* and 31.9* respectively, exceeding the 
critical value of 16.8 at the 1 % level.
These tests suggest that the transition matrices are not symmet­
ric and that the transition probabilities are time-varying. These sta-
[Njj — Tii{Nij + N2j)/{rii + ri2)X 
ni iNi j  +  N2j) / {ni  +  ri2)
which has a chi-square hmiting distribution with k degrees of freedom. The test
can be combined into one (see, for instance, Amemiya (1985, p.417)). The null
hypothesis is that both matrices are identical. The test statistics is Si for an
M x M  transition matrix, the summation ranging over the number of rows, which
is distributed as chi-squared with M (M  — 1) degrees of freedom. An alternative
test is a likelihood-ratio test, see Anderson and Goodman (1957).
^^See, for instance. Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1988). The test is of the
form
i^ij  ~  ^j i )
where Xij represents an observation on a multinomial variate. The test statistic 
is distributed as chi-squared with M (M  — l ) /2  degrees of freedom, M  being the 
size of the transition matrix.
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tistical results are important and suggest that the process governing 
income dynamics is rich and complicated.
German stability? A  reassessm ent
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is much mobility be­
neath the seemingly stable surface of the German income distribu­
tion. This is good news for a (dynamic) welfare assessment of the 
income distribution.
But the bad news is the distributional dynamics in the 1990s. 
Income inequality rises whilst mobility falls. This seems to be a gen­
eral trend amongst the OECD countries (Atkinson, Rainwater, and 
Smeeding (1994)). For instance, ’’income mobility decreased sub­
stantially” (Veiun (1992)) in the US. The driving force behind the 
income changes appears to be changes in earnings and Buchinsky 
and Hunt (1995) uncover ”a sharp decrease in mobility over time, 
across all skill groups” (regardless of educational attainment and ex­
perience). A similar conclusion is reached by Gosling, Machin, and 
Meghir (1996) for the case of the UK who conclude that the increased 
wage inequality -risen ”at an unprecedented scale”- can only be ex­
plained by an increase in the relative importance of the unobservable 
component determining wages. As in the US, changing returns to 
education or skill cannot explain the extent of the observed disper­
sion. These detrimental effects have been amplified by a reduction 
in the generosity of welfare benefits -the second principal component 
of income- and the onset of the economic downturns (1991 in the
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German case) Other important features are summarised in Atkin­
son, Bourguignon, and Morrisson (1992). These distributional trends 
should be of concern to policy makers.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the two dimensions of income dynamics by 
distinguishing between the shape dynamics and intra-distributional 
mobility. The analysis of the moving cross-section reveals that in­
come inequality has not significantly changed although the point 
estimates appeared to suggest an unambiguous increase in inequal­
ity as the Lorenz curves shifted out. The density estimates for 1990 
and 1991 are unimodal, but in 1992 a second mode emerges in the 
low income group.
Pursuing a twin-track approach to mobility - stochastic kernel 
density estimates and transition matrices - we showed that Ger­
many is more mobile than conventional wisdom suggests. This is 
good news, but the bad news is that mobility is falling. The bi­
variate density estimates are unimodal. A person’s income position 
is persistent because both contour plots of bivariate kernel density 
estimates and transition matrices concentrate most mass along the 
main diagonal. On the other hand 75% of the population experienced 
income changes in excess of 5% - a fact which is in stark contrast 
to the popular prejudice of German income immobility. As regards 
the structure of the transition matrices, they are neither symmetric
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nor identical as transition probabilities vary with time. This non- 
stationarity is confirmed by standard mobility indices, which suggest 
that mobility has unambiguously fallen. The useful complementarity 
between transition matrices and stochastic kernel density estimates 
were explored, since the latter do not impose arbitrary groupings of 
information. The contour plots of the latter showed the complexity 
of the income process as different income groups are affected differ­
ently; at this level aggregation, there is no universal trend such as a 
greater concentration about the 45 degree line.
Recalling Friedman’s criterion for welfare assessments quoted in 
the introduction, we must conclude that Germany has become a 
’’more unequal society” .
Against this background, chapter 8  examines in detail the issue 
of non-stationarity in income transitions, and analyses to what ex­
tent popular stochastic models - such as higher Markovian or mover- 
stayer models - can account for this. In an attem pt to explain the 
observed mobility patterns, various duration models are examined.
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Chapter 8
On the N on-Stationarity of 
German Income M obility  
(and some observations on 
poverty dynamics)
A bstract: The intra-distributional mobility of German income dy­
namics is analysed using GSOEP. Transition probabilities are found 
to be time-varying. The tested models comprise various mixed Markov 
chains in discrete time and a non-stationary mover-stayer model is 
proposed. In order to explain the observed mobility profiles, we con­
centrate on one important income class -the poor- instead of the 
entire transition matrix. Various poverty duration models are exam­
ined.
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8.1 Introduction
As argued in the last previous chapter, the study of income dynamics 
can be divided into the distinct tasks of examining the shape dynam­
ics of the income distribution, and investigating intra-distributional 
mobility. Whilst the former enjoys much popularity because cross- 
sectional data is often readily accessible, the latter task is more elu­
sive, and a common prejudice is that (at least in Germany) mobility 
is low. The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is used in this 
chapter to examine income mobility for the German case. This char­
acterisation is made in two stages. The first stage is descriptive and 
follows an established literature which represents social processes by 
Markov models  ^ (and a new mover-stayer model is proposed). The 
second stage goes beyond mere description and attem pts to explain 
the observed mobility.
Some stylised facts about German income dynamics in the period 
1983 to 1989 can be established by examining Figures 8.1 to 8.3. The 
shape of the net income distribution has hardly changed in this pe-
^See, for instance, Champernowne (1973), McCall (1971), the references in 
the eponymous paper by Singer and Spilerman (1974), Geweke, Marshall, and 
Zarkin (1986). Quah has applied the above taxonomy in a series of papers in 
the context of the debate about the (non)convergence amongst countries. See, 
for instance, Quah (1996).
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riod But in contrast to this seeming ’stability’, the time series of 
summary statistics of the transition matrices, such as the Shorrocks 
(1978) mobility index depicted in Figure 8.2, reveal that mobility dy­
namics behave differently. The lack of action at the surface conceals 
substantial movements beneath it. Several features emerge. The 
statistic is not a constant, suggesting that the underlying transition 
probabilities are time-varying. In fact, there is a downwards trend 
which implies a consistent fall of income mobility over the years ex­
cept for the last year. Since the Shorrocks mobility index is the 
inverse of the harmonic mean of expected durations of remaining in 
a given part of the cross-section distribution, the lower panel of the 
figure depicts the time series of the staying probabilities. For the 
three richest income groups, these have a tendency to rise, but not 
monotonically and some movements are in opposite directions. By 
contrast, the lowest income group - the poor - experience a dramatic 
increase in immobility, but there is also a sharp fall in the last year.
Another way of assessing income mobility is to examine the con-
^The changes in the shape of the distribution are minor when compared to 
the vast changes experienced in the UK (Cowell, Jenkins, and Litchfield (1996)) 
or the US (Burkhauser, Crews, Daly, and Jenkins (1995)) in the 1980s. In both 
cases, a dramatic polarisation has taken place; nearly unimodal shapes have 
turned into twin-peaks as the middle class occupies a sinking valley between 
them. As Jenkins (1995) observes: ’’The shift away from the middle class in 
both directions is strong evidence that the ‘middle class' was shrunk, however 
one defines the middle.” Fears of a shrinking German middle class are currently 
unfounded.
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tour plots of the stochastic kernel density estimates, depicted in Fig­
ure 8.3. They are more general than transition matrices as they do 
not impose an arbitrary grouping of information. There is a remark­
able stability in the middle income group but important changes 
happen in the lower and upper income groups. All this evidence 
suggests that the mobility process is very complicated.
Such changes in the mobility dynamics are clearly important 
when welfare assessments of income distributions are not static, but 
attem pt to capture income histories. Changing income mobility indi­
cates changing opportunities, and according to some commentators 
changing fairness^. Concentrating exclusively on the shape dynam­
ics of the income distribution - seemingly unchanged in the German 
case - would ignore one important dimension of welfare.
Several models are tested which might explain these stylised facts. 
Section 8.3 and 8.4 pursue a statistical approach and examine whether 
piure and mixed Markovian models in discrete time give an adequate 
representation of the mobility process. In order to account for pop­
ulation heterogeneity, a (new) non-stationary mover-stayer model. 
We pursue the twin-track approach to mobility which exploits the 
important complementarity between stochastic kernel density esti-
^Friedman (1962), for instance, considers ’’two societies that have the same 
distribution of annual income. In one there is great mobihty and change so that 
the position of particular families in the income hierarchy varies widely from 
year to year. In the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in 
the same position year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second 
would be the more unequal society” (p. 171).
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Figure 8.1: Shape dynamics of the net income distribution. Net 
income is normalised at the coliîimporaneous mean. The kernel 
density estimator uses the Epanechnikov kernel and the bandwidth 
is chosen using cross-validation methods.
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Figure 8 .2 ; Upper Panel: Time series of the Shorrocks mobility in­
dex, bracketed by estimated 10% confidence, intervals. Lower Panel: 
Time series of staying probabilities.
Notes: If P  =  denotes the nxn transition matrix, the Shorrocks 
index proposed in (Shorrocks 17^) is defined as / / ( P )  =  {n — 
tr{P))/(n  — 1 ). It is the inverse of the harmonic mean of expected du­
rations of remaining in a given part of the cross section distribution. 
The higher the index, the lower is the persistence or the greater is 
the mobility. The transition probabilities are estimated using their 
maximum likelihood estimator (cf. section 3). The confidence in­
tervals were computed using bootstrapping and (Efron 1987)’s BCa
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Figure 8.3: contour plots of the stochastic kernel density estimates 
1984-1985 to 1988-1989. Income is normalised at the contemporane­
ous median.
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mates and transition matrices as the strength of one tool compen­
sates the weakness of the other. Although the mobility analysis is 
based on transition matrices, the income partition is not only chosen 
in an economically meaningful way, but also happens to coincide with 
the natural partition suggested by Figure 8.3. On the other hand, 
transition matrices are a powerful tool for making rigorous statisti­
cal inferences. The next section attem pts to explain the observed 
mobility. The method pursued here is to concentrate on one impor­
tan t income state instead of the entire transition matrix, and the 
chosen income state is poverty -the income state about which most 
policy makers are concerned and for whose alleviation considerable 
resources are deployed. Persistent social exclusion is recognised as a 
grave problem facing any society. Moreover, this group has experi­
enced the most dramatic changes in mobility. Section 8.5.1 explains 
the chances of escaping or descending into poverty by means of a 
Markov model which accounts both for the non-stationarity of the 
data and the heterogeneity of the population. A second class of mod­
els, analysed in section 8.5.2, comprises duration models. Section 8 . 6  
concludes.
8.2 The data
In this chapter the German panel dataset GSOEP is used in its in­
carnation as the ’’Equivalent Datafile” . Comprising the years 1984 
to 1990, the latter is a subset of the former and not only contains
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its principal income variable but also includes some derived vari­
ables, the most important being post-tax post-benefit income. Since 
GSOEP proper was described in detail in chapter 5, a brief outline 
should suffice. Two income concepts are used. The elements of an­
nual gross (pre-tax pre-benefit) income are raw data but need to be 
aggregated. However, the Equivalent Datafile conveniently supplies 
an estimate of annual household post-tax post-benefit income, which 
is derived from the gross income data by means of a tax-beneht sim­
ulation. This income variable is computed as the sum of total family 
income from earnings, asset flows, private and public transfers, the 
imputed rental value of owner occupied housing, and a tax simulation 
is applied.
In order to take account of scale economies within the household, 
income was equivalised using the OECD equivalent scales. Dispos­
able income was divided by household size raised to the power 0.5. 
This choice of equivalence scales had been made for two reasons. 
First, Burkhauser, Merz, and Smeeding (1994) show that the Ger­
man Social Assistance scale implies scale economies which are too 
low. Second, the use of the OECD scale, being the standard scale 
for datasets included in the LIS project, facilitates first ad hoc inter­
national comparisons.
Finally, incomes were standardised at 1991 prices. The data re­
mained unweighted for the subsequent estimation procedures. The
^The income variable differs from slightly the one used in chapter 6 and 
chapter 7 in that the former includes income from asset flows.
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sample examined in this chapter was selected by keeping only per­
sons with a complete income record for the years 1984 to 1990. This 
selection procedure resulted in 9022 observations. Subsequently, the 
income data is analysed by means of transition matrices. Four in­
come groups were defined with respect to the contemporaneous me­
dian (a statistic which is robust against outliers). The poverty line 
is set (arbitrarily) at 0.5 times median income. Modest incomes are 
equivalised incomes between 0.5 and 1 times the median. Middle in­
comes are between 1 and 1.5 times the median. Finally, high incomes 
are those above 1.5 times the median. The choice of these income 
groups is inherently arbitrary, but the relative definition of poverty 
applied in this chapter has become standard practise for European 
countries. In fact, this partition is also suggested by Figure 8.3.
8.3 Pure Markov models in discrete tim e
This section explores the extent to which standard Markovian models 
can explain the observed income transitions. Competing models are 
juxtaposed, and the following sequence of tests is conducted: non- 
stationary and stationary Markov chains of the same order are tested 
against each other. Then, a non-stationary first order chain is tested 
against a non-stationary second order chain. These tests were first 
developed by Anderson and Goodman (1957).
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8 .3 .1  F irst order M arkov chains
Let P (t) = [pij (Z)] be an mxm  transition matrix where pij (t) de­
notes the conditional probability of moving to state j  in the current 
period, given that state i was occupied in the preceding period. The 
chain is observed up to time T at time points t =  1,2, ..,T. If the 
chain is stationary Pij {ti) = Pij {t2) = Pij, Let N  [t) =
[riij (t)] denote the associated matrix of actual transition counts. 
The transition probabilities pij (t) need to be estimated. Since these 
are multinomially distributed, their maximum likelihood estimator 
Pij (t) can be derived by maximising the likelihood function, condi­
tional on the initial distribution
logL =  {t) ■ logPij (t)
t i j
subject to P{t) being a stochastic matrix. The Lagrangian for this 
programme is
t i j t i \  j J
The first order condition implies riij {t) = Xu • pij (t) . Summing 
out j  yields Xu = riij, which upon substitution gives the estimator
riij [t)
Pij {t) =
' i^j ( )^
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being a simple frequency count. For the stationary model, a similar 
calculation gives the maximum likelihood estimator ^
( 0  _  ' i^j (^ )Pij = ELi Ej ^ i j (4 ECl ^ 2+ (<)
where ^2j ' i^j ( 0  — {t) for notational convenience.
Given these functions, tests for non-stationarity can be easily im­
plemented. Let the null hypothesis be that the transition probabili­
ties are stationary, i.e. Ho'- Pij {t) = Pij Vt, 2, j. Using the respective 
likelihood functions, the likelihood ratio is
log A =  ^  ^  ^  riij (t) • {logpÿ -  log Pij (t)} 
t i j
and —2 log A is asymptotically distributed as with (T —l)m (m  — 1) 
degrees of freedom®. If the null hypothesis is true, an asymptotically 
equivalent test is based on the similarity between transition matrices 
and contingency tables. The well-known %^-test then gives the test 
statistic
\Pij -  Pij (f)]^
Pij
which is asymptotically distributed as with m(m — 1 )(T — 1 ) 
degrees of freedom. However, Anderson and Goodman (1957) show
^Anderson and Goodman (1957) show its asymptotic sampling distribution 
to be normal.
®See Rao (1973). The number of degrees of freedom of the asymptotic 
distribution equals the number of linearly independent restrictions. Note that P 
is a stochastic matrix.
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that if the null hypothesis is not true, the power of the -test can 
be different from the power of the likelihood test. Thus both tests 
should be performed.
Since a direct inspection of the transition matrices or the time 
series of the mobility index suggests non-stationarity, it is not surpris­
ing that both tests confirm the greater explanatory power of the non- 
stationary model. The test statistics evaluate to —2 log A =  336.3 
and =  341.4.
8 .3 .2  S econ d  order M arkov chains
The methods of the preceding paragraphs extend in a very natural 
manner to second order Markov chains. P [t) = (t)] denotes the
conditional probability of being in state k at time t, given states i and 
j  at times t — 2 and t — 1 respectively. Again, the transition proba­
bilities are estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function, and 
similar likelihood ratio and tests apply.
The tests suggest once again that the non-stationary (second 
order) model has a greater explanatory power than the station­
ary model. The test statistics evaluate to —2 log A =  561.4 and
=  545.7.
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8 .3 .3  F irst order aga in st secon d  order M arkov  
chains
The theoretical results of the two preceding sections can be combined 
in order to test which order of the non-stationary model has the 
greater explanatory power. If the null hypothesis is that a first order 
non-stationary model is applicable, pijk = P2jk = .. .  = Pmjk = 
Pjk, Vj, A:, the likelihood ratio becomes
log A =  ^  ^  ^  ^  ( )^ ' {logPjt -  log Ajt}
t i j k
—2 log A being asymptotically distributed as with degrees of 
freedom.
Performing this test, the statistic evaluates to —2 log A =  2,955.8, 
being very significant evidence against the null hypothesis. In con­
sequence, the memory of the process governing income transitions 
extends over more than one period.
8.4 M ixed Markovian models in discrete 
tim e
Pure Markovian models are popular both in the theoretical as well as 
in the empirical literature because of their mathematical structure. 
Yet, as the previous section demonstrated, they do not fit the data
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too well. One principal assumption underlying their estimation is the 
‘homogeneity of persons‘: individuals are the same except for their 
income. This assumption is likely to be flawed. Indeed, results de­
rived in chapter 6  suggest that the population is very heterogeneous. 
In contrast to this observable heterogeneity, some latent variable 
may be important. A particular type of unobservable heterogeneity 
is treated next.
The next level of complexity is achieved by mixing indepen­
dent Markovian models, the easiest of which is the following mover- 
stayer model. An unobservable fraction of the population stays with 
certainty in its income group for all periods, whilst the evolution 
of incomes of everyone else, the movers, is determined by a non­
degenerate first order Markov chain. The pure Markovian model is 
nested within this richer structure, since stayers may not be present. 
This nesting gives rise to a natural test, a likelihood ratio test, by 
means of which to discriminate between these two models.
8 .4 .1  A  m over-stayer m od el : th e  sta tio n a ry  case
Although Goodman (1961) presents an extensive mathematical treat­
ment of this model, his estimators, proposed without derivation, are 
not maximum likelihood estimators. These estimators are supplied in 
Frydman (1984) where transitions are stationary.^ A non-stationary
^McCall (1971) applies the mover-stayer model to the issue of earnings mobil­
ity. He simplifies the estimator proposed in Goodman (1961) by letting T —^ oo 
despite the fact that his empirical time series is very short.
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model is proposed below.
Let the unobserved fraction of the population who are stayers in 
income group i be denoted by s*. The income of movers (1 — s )^ 
evolves according to the stationary first order Markov chain with 
m xm  transition matrix M  = The composite process thus
evolves according to P{t) = S I  + {I — S)M* where S' is a diagonal 
matrix with entries Let rii {t) denote the number of persons in 
state i at time t, rii the number of persons staying in state i during 
the entire period of observation, riik = {t) the total number
of transitions from state i to state k, n* =  — 1 ), and n the
total number of persons. The log-likelihood function conditional on 
the initial distribution can be factorised thus
log L(s, M) = log [si +  (1 -  (8.1)
i
+  Y Z  ~  +  Wii -  ^ogma
i
+ ^  ^  log mik
i k^i
The last summation pertains only to transition between unequal 
states, and thus concerns only movers. As regards the first sum, 
a person may remain in income class i for two reasons: either he is a 
stayer with probability Si, or with probability (1  — s )^ he is a mover 
but remains in that state for T  consecutive periods with probabil­
ity m l.  The second term captures movers returning to their initial 
state, who have at least once left it.
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The maximisation strategy is to resubstitute solutions from the first 
order conditions into the objective function®. Eventually the size of 
the equations system is reduced to the number of income classes, and 
the equations for mu can be solved numerically. The estimators of 
the off-diagonal elements ihij are then computed recursively
j - i
f H - l j  —  n ^ j { \  7 ^ 1 1  ^   ^'^ik)/  ^  ^
k=l k=j
The estimates for the stayers are^
Uj - rii (0) ml _  Uj (0 ) -  Uj 
• (0) (1 -  m  (0) (1 -  m D  ’
the last term being the ratio of the observed to the expected number
of persons who make a least one transition from state i during T
periods.
Since the pure Markovian model is nested within the mover-stayer 
model, their relative performance can be assessed using a likelihood 
ratio test. Let the null hypothesis be that the pure model is appro­
priate [si = 0,Vi). The maximised likelihood of the pure model is
®Amemiya (1985) proposes an alternative method of estimation. Two equa­
tion systems are established by considering transitions within two periods, viz. 
P  =  S I  +  { I -  S ) M  and ^  s i  +  {I -  S ) M ‘^ . P  and P(^) can be consis­
tently estimated by the maximum likelihood estimators presented in the preced­
ing sections. Resubstituting these yields 2m{m — 1) equations in m? unknowns.
However, Prydman’s estimation strategy is more parsimonious.
®This estimator may become useless if the observation period T  is small, since
Sf may become negative as Frydman failed to impose a non-negativity constraint.
This problem decays with m l  as T  increases.
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log(Ls^o) =  (0) log {rii (0) -  n) +  riik log {riik/n*). Denote
the ratio of the likelihoods by A, —2 log A is distributed as with 
m  degrees of freedom. Can the statistical significance of an indi­
vidual Si be tested ? If T  and rhu are such that mJi is negligible, 
the estimator for Si simplifies to Si=ni/rii (0 ), being the fraction of 
persons initially in state i who remain there for all consecutive peri­
ods. In this case Goodman (1961)’s argument applies. Let pij denote 
the estimator of the stationary first order Markov chain derived in 
the previous section. The test is based on a comparison between 
s and its expected value p j. (s — pu)  is normally distributed with 
mean zero and a variance which can be consistently estimated by 
0 -^  =  pfiil -pD/rin { 0 ) -n P i^~ \ l  -p ï^ l f i i  , where fii =  Y.t ( )^ 7^- 
Under the null hypothesis Si = 0, and X I  =■ ( s— is distributed 
as with one degree of freedom.
The estimated transitions matrix is not reported here for the sake 
of brevity. Compared to the pure model, probability mass has been 
redistributed away from the main diagonal. The movers are thus 
more mobile than the pure model suggests. The stayers fractions are 
estimated to be s =  (0.1; 0.224; 0.04; 0.14). Testing the competing 
models, the likelihood ratio test confirms the greater explanatory 
power of the mover-stayer model (—2 log A =23,147.8). These esti­
mate have a profound implication, since the first income group is
^^See Rao (1973). The number of degrees of freedom of the asymptotic 
distribution equals the number of linearly independent restrictions. There are 
m  restrictions imposed, viz. {«i =  0 }^ j.
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occupied by the poor (whose income falls short of the contempo­
raneous poverty line). Income mobility is sufficiently high so that 
most persons are able to escape poverty at least temporarily. Yet, a 
statistically significant 1 0 %^  ^ of those deemed in poverty at the be­
ginning of the observation period constitute a hard-core of poverty^ -^ 
remaining poor with certainty.
These results, of course, have to be taken with a pinch of salt, 
as the previous section suggested that income transitions are non- 
stationary. The problem caused by time-varying transition probabil­
ities is addressed in the next section.
8 .4 .2  A  m over-stayer m odel: th e  n o n -sta tio n a ry  
case
The previous model can be generalised so that non-stationarity in 
income transitions can be introduced. Let movers transit accord­
ing to the non-stationary first order Markov chain M{t). In conse­
quence, the composite process evolves according to P{t) =  S I  + (I — 
S) Analogous to equation (8.1), the likelihood function
can be written as
logL (5 ,M (l), ...,M (T)) =  ^ n ^ l o g  -h (1 -  Si) J J m ii( r )^
Applying the above test to the estimate of s i, the estimate of the hard-core 
of poverty, yields a statistically significant result {xi  — 3,766.8).
Labelled by McCall (1971) the ’’back-wash hypothesis”.
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+  (’T'î(O) — rii) log  (1 — Si)
i
+ logmii(r)
i  T
+  ^  ^  ^  {t ) log rriik (r) (8.3)
i  T  k ^ i
Observe tha t the stationary case of equation (8.1) is nested within 
equation (8.3). Maximising this with respect to s* yields the estima­
tor
n i -n i{ 0 ) ] \^ m u {T )  ,
’ n, (0 ) (1  -  n .   ^ ^
(compare to (8.2).) Resubstituting this into equation (8.3) yields
lo g L (s,M (l), ...,M (T’)) =  c -  y ^ (n j( 0 ) -  rii) log | 1 -  f f  m«(T)
i \  T /
+  {riii {r) -  rii) log mu{T)
i T
4- ^  ^  ^  ( t)  log rriik (r)
i T k^i
where c denotes a constant. The Lagrangian of this problem is
£ =  log L{s, M ( l ) , M ( T ) )  -  Ç  (^E -  1 j
Maximising this with respect to m u { t )  and rriik{t), summing these 
and solving out the Lagrange multipliers { t )  yields a non-linear 
equations system for m u { t )
Hrr i i i  { t )  - r i i  =  { r i i +  { t )  -  r i i )  m u { t )  +
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rii{0) -  rii m u { t )
This is a non-linear system comprising T  equations in T  unknowns 
with solution mu = ( m ü ( l ) , mii(T)) G [0,1]^. It is solved nu­
merically using the multidimensional Newton’s method (see Press, 
Teukolsky, Vetterling, and Flannery (1992)). The solutions to mik{t) 
and Si are then computed recursively.
Tests of hypotheses can be implemented following the methods 
outlined in the previous sections.
This estimation procedure resulted in the following estimates for 
the stayers s = (0.11; 0.33; 0.13; 0.31). Compared to the stationary 
model, the estimates of the fraction of the poor has not changed, 
whilst the other estimates all have increased. As regards the mover 
probabilities, the entries of M{t) follow the changes suggested by the 
movement of the Shorrock mobility index. Probability mass is moved 
onto the main diagonal as time passes, suggesting that incomes have 
become more immobile.
8.5 Poverty re-examined
The aim of this section is to go beyond the descriptive Markov models 
of the preceding sections and to attem pt to explain the observed 
mobility profiles. Instead of analysing the entire transition matrix, 
we concentrate on one important income state - poverty - and analyse 
the processes governing the movements into and out of poverty. Two 
types of models are examined.
191
8.5 .1  A  M arkov m od el w ith  ob served  h etero g en e­
ity
This section examines a two state Markov model with exogenous 
variables as proposed in Boskin and Nold (1975) and further dis­
cussed in Amemiya (1985). Person i may be in either of two states: 
either he is in poverty at time t, yi (t) = 1 , or he is not yi (t) = 0 . 
The probability of being in poverty conditional on the preceding 
state is Pi{yi (t) = l\yi {t -  1 )) =  F{P'xi (t) -f 7 'xi (t) yi {t -  1 )) 
where F{.) is a distribution function with corresponding density / .  
Thus, the model is a generalised first order Markov model, in which 
the exogenous variables Xi {t) exhibit non-stationarity and hetero­
geneity amongst persons. This formulation nests within it a va­
riety of observationally equivalent models, depending on the para- 
metrisation of 7 . For instance, setting 7  =  — (a -f- /?) and if /  is 
symmetric, the model has the following interpretation. The (con­
ditional) probability of person i entering poverty is determined as 
Poi( 0  — F{P'xi (t)), whereas the (conditional) probability of escap­
ing poverty is Pio(0 =  F{a'xi (t)). Thus the profile of a representa­
tive person entering poverty is stipulated to be different from that 
of a representative person escaping poverty.
The log-likelihood function can be written as
log L(a, p) = ^  2/i (t) log F{p'xi (t) + ^Xi (t) y i { t - l ) )
i t
+ ( 1  -  yi {t)) log [1 -  F{P'xi (t) -f i x i  (t) yi {t -  1 ))] 
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The distribution function is chosen to be logistic F{x) = e^ /(l +  
e^), so that the objective function is globally concave and the es­
timation step reduces to estimating a standard logit model. The 
maximisation strategy is to employ the iterative method of scoring 
separately for each parameter. The MLE is consistent and asymp­
totically normal (see Amemiya (1985)). Note also that the indices 
(2; t) can be treated as a single index. Thus, although the time series 
is relatively short but the cross section is large, the sample can be 
considered to be large.
The sample was chosen to contain only persons above the age of 
2 0  in order to focus on the causes of poverty, a step which reduces 
the size of the sample to 6266 observations. The regressors comprise: 
indicators for employment status, disability, and household size in a 
given year nationality, the age, and education level (measured 
in years) of the person in the year 1984. The importance of these 
variables is not surprising given the results of a static analysis in 
Schluter (1996a) who estimates the income distributions for various 
partitions of the sample using kernel density estimators.
^^Bane and EUwood (1985), for instance, emphasise the importance of the 
household formation process as a determinant of poverty in the case of the US.
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Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates for poverty model
unweight 
ed model
variables 
(standard errors)
chi-
squared
log-
likelihood
N
parameter nationality age84 hhsize education84 disability unemployment constant
P . 8 8 6 -.027 -.304 -.131 .437 1.53 -1.24 716.48 -4,174.4 35,574
(.076) (.0 0 2 ) (.02) (.02) (.08) (.077) (.29)
Y .268 .006 -.137 -.085 .203 .64 .57 114.3 -1,337.9 2,022
(.1 1 ) (.003) (.036) (.027) (.1 1 ) (.1 1 ) (.38)
a=-(P+Y) -1.154 -.033 .441 .216 -.64 -2.17 .67
weighted
model
(robust standard errors)
p .859 -.038 -.55 -.14 .363 1.75 -.034 -4,340.1 35,574
(.1) (.003) (.05) (.027) (.11) (.124) (.418)
Y .43 .008 -.15 -.103 .08 .727 .75 -1,302.5 2 , 0 2 2
(.156) (.004) (.053) (.033) (.15) (.169) (.45)
a -.1.289 .03 .697 .24 -.443 -2.47 -.72
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: nationality is an indicator set equal to one for foreigners; age84 is the age of a person in year 1984 on 
the survey date; the education level is measured by years of education up to year 1984; hhsize refers to the size of the household at time t disability 
at time t is an indicator equal to one for disabled persons; unemployment at time t equals one when unemployed.
Chi-squared refers to the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis being that only the constant term has explanatory power.
Robust standard errors were computed following the methods proposed in (Huber 1967).
Both weighted and unweighted data are used and Table 8.1 col­
lects the estimation results. The results contain some surprises. As 
regards the unweighted data, the probability of escaping poverty is 
higher when a person is a German, is well educated, healthy and 
ends unemployment spells quickly. This last ability is the most de­
cisive and the relative size of the parameter estimate is perhaps 
astonishing. More formally, the relative importance of the vari­
ables can be assessed by computing an elasticity such as :=
(^Poi W ) / ( 4  W /Poi W) =  - P o i W ) 4 ( )^ w ^ch ap­
proximates the effect of a change in a discrete variable Xj for person 
i. The effect of becoming unemployed is dramatic; r]i.unempioyed = 
1.53(1 — Poi(^)) ( but this effect diminishes as (3'x‘^{t) increases). Un­
employment and nationality are of even greater importance for those 
escaping poverty.
The coefficient for nationality is large but this may be due to over- 
sampling foreigners. When the data is weighted, the coefficient on 
nationality is expected to fall because foreigners were oversampled. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient is only slightly lower, but the employ­
ment status coefficient is markedly higher. This implies a different 
profile for persons slipping into poverty. For Germans, the princi­
pal reason appears to be unemployment, whilst it seems to be low 
earnings for foreigners.
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8 .5 .2  Sem i-M arkov processes: n o n -sta tio n a ry  du­
ration  m o d els
The discrete time models of the preceding sections have to confronted 
the time aggregation problem, highlighted in Singer and Spilerman 
(1976), caused by the absence of a natural time unit: income tran­
sitions do not happen at the end of regularly spaced intervals which 
coincide with those of the panel survey. As a consequence, para­
meter estimates cannot be interpreted as structural information. In 
this case it is more appropriate to fit a continuous time model. But 
this strategy gives rise to two problems. First, the model needs to 
be formulated in such a way that the actual discrete time observa­
tion is embeddable within the continuous time model. A nice set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions has yet not been found.
The second problem is caused by the particular data under scrutiny, 
viz. their non-stationarity. Whilst it is impracticable to estimate a 
general continuous time Markov chain, researchers have pursued two 
avenues. Singer and Spilerman (1976) discuss (but do not estimate) 
a mixture model in which transitions follow a stationary Markov 
chain but waiting times between transitions may vary with time. A 
second possibility and the strategy pursued below is to focus on one 
economically meaningful state, such as poverty, and to estimate a
^^Geweke, Marshall, and Zarkin (1986), for instance, present a calculation to 
test the embeddability of a discrete first order stationary Markov chain within a 
stationary continuous time model. See also their references for the embeddability 
problem.
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parametrised duration model.
This section presents a standard duration model as outlined in 
Cox and Oakes (1984) and follows suggestions of Amemiya (1985). 
Person i may be in either of two states: either he is poor or he is 
not. The time in poverty T, i.e. the length of the poverty spell, 
is a random variable with distribution F  and associated density / .  
If the population is heterogeneous, these may differ across persons, 
written as F .^ It is convenient to work with the hazard rate A* (t) := 
f i { t ) / [ l  — Fi{t)] where Xi (t) A t has a probabilistic interpretation: 
it is the probability that, given the person has not left poverty in the 
time interval(0, ^), he will do so the next moment, i.e. in ( t,t  +  At). 
A basic assumption of the continuous time model is reminiscent of 
Poisson processes, since the probability that a person changes her 
income state more than once in a small time interval {t^t At) is 
negligible. A* {t) may vary with time. The duration function F  can 
then be written as
Fi {t) = 1 — exp{— f  Xi {z) dz} (8.5)
Jo
If person i completes J  poverty spells of individual length t ij  the 
contribution to the likelihood function is 0 ^ = 1  fi i^i,j)- However, the 
estimation problem is complicated by the fact that person i may have 
censored spells. A spell at the end of the panel t* is right-censored 
and thus incomplete if the person cannot be observed to leave that 
state, leading to the contribution 1 —F^  (t*) to the likelihood function. 
A spell is left-censored if person i is in poverty at the beginning of
197
the panel, and may have been in this state for a long time. Amemiya 
(1985) shows that the contribution to the likelihood function then 
is [1 — Fi (t)] /  f  sfi{s)ds}^ For the sample under scrutiny Table 8.2 
collects information on the incidence and duration of poverty spells, 
and the extent of censoring.
The problem, of course, is how to parametrise the hazard rate 
Xi (t). A parametrisation, popular in the econometrics of labour 
turnover, is a Cox proportional hazard rate A, (t) = h {t) exp {/3'xi (t)), 
where Xi {t) is a vector of time-varying exogenous variables. Follow­
ing the previous Markov model, Xi {t) includes two different processes: 
an unemployment process and a household formation process which 
traces the evolution of the size of the household. Note that the para­
meter (3 does not vary with the number of spells. The baseline hazard 
rate h{t) captures duration dependence of the poverty process.
some applications, such as duration models of criminal recedivism or 
fertility, the probabihty of eventual ’’failure” is less than one; some censored 
observations will never ’’fail”. If the survival function is thus defective for some 
persons, Schmidt and Witte (1989) propose to use a split population model, 
which parametrises Pr{never fa il}= l — G{a'zi) =  1 — 1/(1 +  exp(a'zi)), where 
Zî is a vector of explanatory variables. The likelihood function then needs to be 
adjusted accordingly.
In the current model, the problem is minor, since this criticism could at most 
be applied to the old, hving on social benefits. However, the density estimates 
reported in chapter 6 show that poverty is not a predominant old age phenom­
enon. Moreover, a poor old pensioner could alter her income state by entering 
the household of her children. The problem, however, is not completely absent 
given the previous results of the mover-stayer model.
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length [years] numbers of spells left censored right censored
1 893 194 145
2 246 62 63
3 113 19 53
4 64 16 27
5 33 6 23
6 30 1 0 2 0
7 51 51 51
Table 8.2: Poverty spells: incidence, duration, and censoring
The parameters are estimated by maximising the (partial) like­
lihood function^®, but in order to simplify the estimation problem 
left censored spells were deleted. In order to evaluate the integral 
in (8.5) with discrete data, the exogenous variables were assumed to 
remain constant during the interval between observations.
The estimation results on the unweighted data are reported in 
Table 8.3.
Both the nationality and the age variable are not significant. An 
increased household size increases the poverty hazard. But most 
important, confirming the evidence of the preceding section, is the 
employment process. Being unemployed reduces the hazard of leav­
ing poverty.
Furthermore, the plot of the baseline hazard rate h (t) is derived
^®See Cox (1975) or Lancaster (1990) chapter 9 for a discussion of the partial 
likelihood function.
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variables ML estimates standard errors
unemployment status -.236 .0858
household size .065 .029
nationality -.1556 .091
age in 1984 -.0009 .0027
Table 8.3: The continuous-time Cox poverty hazard model
by setting the parameter values (3 to zero. Inspecting the (not pro­
vided) plot of the non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard 
rate, it increases at first, but then falls monotonically. Thus medium 
and long term poverty profiles differ with the latter exhibiting neg­
ative duration dependence (see also the non-parametric estimates of 
the discrete duration model) Thus, the longer the poverty spell, 
the less likely is the person to escape from it. However, these findings 
must be considered tentative in the light of a result due to Heckman 
and Singer (1984). They have demonstrated that variable selection 
is a grave problem since ’’uncontrolled unobservables bias estimated 
hazard rates towards negative duration dependence” . This follows 
since more mobile persons leave the less mobile persons behind, cre­
ating the appearance of stronger negative duration dependence than
^^/i(t) is often assumed to be Weibull, h{t) = since a Weibull specifi­
cation leads to a non-constant hazard rate (but nests within it the exponential 
distribution which exhibits a lack of memory). Duration dependence is negative 
(positive) if a  <  1 (a  >  1). Fitting a Weibull distribution leads to an estimate 
of â  =  0.833 <  1, confirming the conjectured negative duration dependence.
200
actually exists.
Unobservable heterogeneity can be modelled by introducing a 
mixing distribution, so that the hazard rate is perturbed by an un­
observable random variable V. Following Lancaster (1979), let v be 
iid from a G am m a(l,?;) distribution with variance rj~ ,^ assumed to 
mimic the unobservables. Thus, the hazard rate for person i becomes
Xi (t) = Vifii{t) where fii{t) = exp (/3'xi (t)) (8 .6 )
This specification leads to conditional distributions Fi (i|v) and the 
unobservable v needs to be integrated out. This yields the uncon­
ditional distribution F*{t) = Ey[Fi (^|f)) =  1 — [1 +  and
density f*[t) = fi{t)[l 4- where z{t) = fj,{s)ds. The
maximum likelihood estimation of the parameter vector (/?, 77) is car­
ried out using the —algorithm (see the appendix for a descrip­
tion). However, the resulting estimate of the variance of the mixing 
Gamma distribution, is already very high on only the uncen­
sored data, 77"^ =  14. This implies that a Gamma mixing model, 
popular in the literature, is inappropriate in the present context.
It may be argued that the continuous time model is misspecified 
in that discrete-time data have inappropriately been treated as if 
they were continuous. Does a discrete-time model have different 
implications ?
The theory outlined above extends in a natural maimer to the 
discrete-time case. For instance, the hazard rate now has the inter­
pretation Ai {t) = Pr{Ti =  t\Ti > t; Xi (t)}. As pointed out by Allison
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(1982) and reiterated by Jenkins (1996), estimation of this model is 
straightforward. Making the unit of analysis the spell month and 
thus reorganising the data, the likelihood function for the discrete­
time duration model can be rewritten in a form which is standard 
in the analysis of a binary variable. Two parametrisations of the 
hazard rate are examined. First, the complementary log-log haz­
ard rate (t) = 1 — exp{— exp{/i(t) -f P'xi (()}} is chosen, since it 
is the counterpart of the underlying continuous time proportional 
hazard model examined above. But since there is no reason why 
hazard rates should be proportional, the second parametrisation is 
the logistic hazard rate A, {t) =  1 / ( 1  +  exp{—h{t) — /3'xi (Z)}).
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 8.4. The se­
lected variables are the same as in the previous models. Duration 
dependence is captured by the baseline hazard h(t), which is esti­
mated non-parametrically by a sequence of dummies. The results of 
the two parametrisations are very similar. This should not be too 
surprising, since it is well known that the logistic model converges 
to the proportional hazard model as the hazard rate converges to 
zero. Once again, poverty spells of the long-term poor exhibit neg­
ative duration dependence. The hazard of leaving poverty is lower 
for foreign nationals, and the household formation process is neither 
important nor very significant. Finding employment is the principal 
way of escaping from poverty.
W hat are the determinants of re-entering poverty ? Applying a 
duration model to this issue is problematic, since sample sizes are
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model c. log-log logistic
ML estimates SE ML estimates robust SE
duration= 2  years .138 .1 0 2 .169 .124
duration=3 years -.163 .159 -.181 .185
duration=4 years -.549 .232 -.64 .263
duration >5 years -.639 .504 -.73 .553
employment status .407 .0818 .495 .099
household size .0656 .0283 .0828 .034
nationality -.161 .089 - . 2 0 2 .105
disabled -.044 .092 -.048 .108
education in 1984 .03 .0 2 1 .0377 .0268
age in 1984 .0014 .0027 .0018 .0032
Table 8.4: The discrete-time duration models of the hazard of leaving 
poverty
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small: there are 1050 single spells out of poverty which followed a 
poverty spell of which 70% are right censored. So the subsequent 
statistical analysis has to be regarded as tentative. However, this 
data structure suggests that for economically mobile persons (the 
movers in section 4) poverty is a predominantly transitory and rare 
event, which once overcome is unlikely to be experienced again.
The hazard rate Xi (t) now captures the probability of person i 
re-entering poverty at time t. The results of estimating the model 
with the two hazard parametrisations are reported in Table 8.5. The 
selected variables are those of the previous models. The estimates 
show the expected strong negative duration dependence: the longer 
the spell out of poverty, the less likely is the person to experience 
poverty again. The surprise, however, is that although the coeffi­
cients on all other explanatory variables have signs consistent with 
the previous results, they are not statistically significant. Moreover, 
the size of the employment coefficient is very small. This duration 
model is thus inadequate for analysing the probabilities of re-entering 
poverty.
8 .5 .3  G erm an  p o v erty  d ynam ics in  co n tex t
How do these findings relate to results found by other researchers 
for other countries such as the US ? The results are, in many ways, 
similar to those of Bane and Ellwood (1985). Using the PSID for the 
years 1970 to 1982, they find that most of those who become poor will
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model c. log-log logistic
ML estimates SE ML estimates robust SE
duration= 2  years -.522 .139 -.676 .176
duration=3 years .223 -1 .1 .263
duration=4 years -1 .1 1 .279 -1.364 .317
duration >5 years -5.12 .326 -5.47 .33
employment status -.039 .129 -.064 .166
household size -.043 .045 -.059 .058
nationality .07 .14 .0999 .185
disabled .144 .135 T 8 8 .177
education in 1984 -.005 .04 -.0076 .053
age in 1984 -.005 .04 -.004 .005
Table 8.5: The discrete-time duration models of the hazard of re­
entering poverty
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have only a short stay in poverty, whilst the stock of the poor is pre­
dominantly composed of the long-term poor. The hazard of leaving 
poverty also exhibits negative duration dependence (although these 
are computed ignoring observable and unobservable population het­
erogeneity). Using cross-tabulation techniques, they find that earn­
ings changes explain 75% of all poverty spell endings, but this figure 
is dramatically lower for beginning spells. This result is mirrored in 
the German case by the importance of the (un)employment process.
The household formation process is found to be of lesser impor­
tance than in the US. However, this process is modelled only crudely 
here as a change in the size of the household, whereas Bane and Ell­
wood examine separately the various possibilities such as the birth 
of a child, the wife becoming household head or escaping poverty 
through marriage or the departure of children from the household. 
Thus, changes in the size of the household subsume possible events 
with opposite effects on the poverty status which might explain the 
small estimated coefficient. Since the current study analyses annual 
income data, the caveat of Ruggles and Williams (1989) applies, 
who, using monthly data, find that the typical poverty spell is much 
shorter than would be anticipated using annual data as 2/3 succeed 
in escaping poverty before 12 months.^® In this case, annual data
^®See also Blank (1989) for a similar econometric approach in the context of 
single AFDC spells (amongst female household heads) in the US using monthly 
data. The principal focus of her analysis is duration dependence whose various 
parametrisations she compares with a non-parametric step-wise specification. In
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combines multiple short spells into one long spell, giving the impres­
sion of longer duration dependence.
8.6 Conclusion
Intra-distributional mobility is a very important dimension of income 
dynamics and examining merely the shape dynamics of the income 
distribution is likely to result in misleading welfare judgments. In the 
German case, the lack of action at the surface conceals substantial 
movements beneath it. Indeed according to Friedman’s criterion 
Germany has become a more unequal society because overall mobility 
has fallen.
Several statistical models based on transition matrices were es­
timated in order to provide a concise description of the mobility 
process. The transition probabilities vary with time and the process 
exhibits a memory which extends beyond one period. The mover- 
stayer models also suggest the importance of population heterogene­
ity.
In order to examine the economic determinants of the income 
process further and to go beyond the descriptive analysis, we have 
concentrated on one very important income state -poverty- instead 
of the entire transition matrix. Although different models were esti­
mated - a Markov model with exogenous variables and several dura-
contrast to annual data which might combine multiple short spells, she finds evi­
dence of only weak duration dependence but two distinct groups of beneficiaries.
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tion models- the principal findings are similar: unemployment is the 
principal determinant of poverty; in contrast to the US, the house­
hold formation process is only of minor importance, as are age and 
educational background. Poverty spells of the long-term poor exhibit 
negative duration dependence: the longer the poverty spell, the less 
likely is the person to escape poverty.
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8.7 Appendix: The EM -Algorithm
This section describes the EM-algorithm used for maximum like­
lihood estimation in the poverty hazard model with unobservable 
heterogeneity. For a more detailed description see Cox and Oakes 
(1984) or Lancaster (1990), upon which the following discussion is 
based.
The EM-algorithm consists of two principal steps, viz. taking an 
Expectation, and Maximising the objective function thereafter.
Let the random variable V  with realisation v be iid with dis­
tribution function G{.;r]) and associated density known up
to a parameter vector 77. This process generates the unobservable 
heterogeneity. Let T  with realisation t denote the random vari­
able waiting time, parametrised such that its conditional density is 
f{t\v\l3,r]) = ?;/i(t;/?)exp(-7;2:(t;/3)) where z(t;/)) =  fi{s)ds. The 
log-likelihood of the joint distribution of V  and T  is
N
\ogL{(3\7]\t]v) = Y^[\og f{U \v i;P ) lo g  h{vi\r])
N
=  Y^[\og V i -h l o g -  V i z { U ; P )  + logg{vi;rj) 
i = l
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1 . From an initial guess {Pn, ^n) calculate the log-likelihood func­
tion of the joint distribution of V and T.
2. Calculate its expected value using the initial guess
0 ( ( A  v) ( A ;  'nn)) =  E{log L{P; 77); V\t, ( / ? » ;  rjn))
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In the context of the present model, the following calculations are 
typical. Since g{v) and f{t\v) are known, f{v\t) can be calculated. 
The terms such as E{V\t) and E{\ogV\t) are then readily derived.
3. Maximise this with respect to (/?; rj). The solutions to the first 
order conditions define the new iteration values {Pn+i] Vn+i) •
4. Continue to iterate until the value of the unconditional log- 
likelihood converges.
210
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